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ABSTRACT 
Subnational foreign activities are a new and relatively unexplored aspect of 
the international system. The absence of clear and universal rules creates an 
ambiguous political playground that can be misused by both states and their 
subnational governmental units for reaching their foreign policy and foreign trade 
goals. 
Worldwide, different patterns for subnational foreign activities in federal 
states have emerged. For example, in the United States, member states of the 
federation are fighting over foreign investments mainly. In Germany, on the other 
hand, members of the federation have delegated their rights in terms of foreign 
activities to the federal government. In general, federations with long democratic 
traditions have managed to introduce the formulas for containing subnational foreign 
activities.  
In Russia, in contrast, the breakdown of the Soviet Union confronted both the 
federal centre and members of federation with a fundamentally new situation. In 
Soviet times, the territorial units of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR), were of administrative nature only, i.e. they lacked the political dimension.   
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Some of the Russian regions were using their newly-gained freedom for the 
purpose of challenging the federal centre. Pskov region of Russia has been one of the 
most active subnational actors.  
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Preface 
 
Today, the Baltic area may also be a ￿zone of change￿ for Russian foreign policy, a place where Russia 
might get rid of her Cold-war fears and post-imperial complexes and aim at creating a liberal model of 
foreign policy based on geographical proximity, economic interests and regional networks (￿regional 
political economy￿). 
 
In Medvedev, Sergei. ￿Geopolitics and Beyond: The New Russian Policy Towards the Baltic States￿, in: 
Jopp, Mathias and Sven Arnswald, The European Union and the Baltic States:  Visions, Interests and 
Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region. Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti - The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs and Institut f￿r Europ￿ische Politik, 1998. 
 
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) broke up in 1991 
and Russia became an independent state, some observers predicted that, soon, 
Russia would follow the path of the Soviet Union. Gloomy scenarios describing 
the disintegration of the Russian Federation as inevitable, and even as a good 
thing to happen, began to appear even in academic publications.  
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At that time, several Russian autonomous republics had declared 
themselves ￿sovereign￿. Some authors call this period a ￿parade of 
sovereignties￿.
1  
In Tatarstan, radical nationalists even called for independence from 
Russia. In Chechnya, a secessionist movement succeeded in disarming and 
expelling Russian troops sent to quell the revolt. Following these events, Russian 
krais and oblasts showed an apparently uncontrollable urge to improve their 
status in the federation, compared to national republics, too. First the Vologda and 
Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) oblasts and then several other Russian regions 
announced their intention to proclaim themselves republics. History seemed to 
repeat itself when, similar to what had happened in Russia after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, new regional associations were formed, like the ￿Greater Urals￿, the 
￿Greater Volga￿ and the ￿Siberian Agreement￿, contributing to the erosion of the 
already seriously weakened connections with federal centre. Some republics were 
granted full control over their natural resources.
2 
In the 1990s, western regions of Russia seemed likely to align themselves 
with neighbouring systems, such as the Nordic countries or the Baltic Sea area, 
while their far-eastern counterparts were attracted in the same way by China, 
Japan, the Pacific Rim, Asia, or even the United States. Karelia, Pskov, St 
Petersburg and Leningrad oblast were developing subnational foreign contacts 
with their Baltic and Nordic neighbours. 
                                                 
1 Oldberg/Hedenskog (2000): Oldberg, Ingmar and Jakob Hedenskog. In Dire Straits: Russia￿s 
Western Regions between Moscow and the West. Defence Research Establishment: Stockholm, 2000. 
2 For more on how regions were forcing Yeltsin to cede more and more power to them see Melvin 
(1995):Melvin, Neil. Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Post￿Soviet Business Forum), 1995.  
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In this context, the visit of Kaliningrad governor Leonid Gorbenko on 
October 26 and 27 1998 to Vilnius where he met not only with the leaders of the 
Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists but also with Economics Minister 
Vincas Babilius, Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas and even with President 
Valdas Adamkus, must be seen as the peak of a long-standing trend which started 
in 1992, when more than 150 Russian administrative units (oblasts, administrative 
regions and even individual cities) applied to the federal authorities with requests 
to set up so-called  free economic zones in their territory in order to stimulate the 
influx of foreign investments. 
The Yeltsin period was a boon to regions and municipalities in Russia, in 
terms of increasing their freedoms. Establishing regional ￿foreign ministries￿, in  
the Republic of Karelia, for example, and establishing representations abroad by 
Russian regions, was in fashion. Thousands of cooperation agreements were 
signed with foreign partners, without any interference from the federal ministries 
etc. Some regional leaders were in fact acting as heads of semi-independent states. 
The arrival of Vladimir Putin as the President of the Russian Federation in 
the Kremlin is gradually reversing this trend, however. Step by step, regions are 
being taken under stricter federal control. This means not only the reduction of 
their freedom domestically, but tighter control of their dealings with foreign 
partners, too. As one of the first measures in the campaign of re-centralisation, 
governors were expelled from the Federation Council, which meant the loss of 
their impunity status. Subnational foreign activities were directly subordinated to 
federal ministries. Those steps did alter fundamentally the nature of subnational 
foreign activities in Russia, but did not terminate them. 
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Subnational Foreign Activities and the International System 
For various reasons that are discussed below, the worldwide experience in 
the field subnational activities has not been researched sufficiently. Important 
questions are still waiting for an answer. In the contemporary academic literature 
of international relations the focus is still on national states. To some extent, more 
recent theories include the notion of new actors from private sector, such as 
international non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations. 
Lower levels of government in federal states, such as regional or local, are being 
ignored by the researchers to a great extent, however. 
Subnational foreign activities are an aspect of federalism, regionalism, 
centre-periphery relations, cross-border cooperation, trans-border cooperation etc. 
The scope of the rights to engage in foreign activities of a subnational unit in a 
particular federal system is an important indicator for the relative autonomy of its 
members from the federal centre. Further research on subnational foreign 
activities should be undertaken not only for academic purposes. In fact, academic 
studies could contribute towards finding the optimal role for subnational foreign 
activities in the international system. 
From the viewpoint of the international law, it is the task of a federal 
system to define the rules for subnational foreign activities of its members using 
the Constitution. Lax federal regulation and absence of control of subnational 
foreign activities can lead to absurd developments. As we can observe in the case 
of Russia, regions began to set up their own foreign ministries, for example in 
Karelia, in the 1990s. Furthermore, regional administrations, especially in oil-rich  
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parts of Russia, began to claim the rights over the use of natural resources in their 
territory.  
For the sake of territorial integrity, a federal centre must control 
subnational foreign activities. It is not to say that subnational foreign activities 
should be banned, however. 
The multitude of voices claiming to represent a federation abroad is 
another potentially dangerous companion of subnational foreign activities. This 
multitude can be manipulated by foreign actors in their own interests. For 
example, a foreign actor can encourage a subnational unit in another state to 
oppose the official foreign policy of the central government and thereby weaken 
the negotiating position of the opponent, i.e. the federal centre of another state. 
In our inter-linked world subnational foreign activities can pose a threat to 
a federation. At the same time, giving the subnational units the right to engage in 
foreign activities can enhance the capabilities of a federation to act in the 
international scene. Finding the right formula for those activities is, therefore, in 
the interests of all participants, i.e. the federation and its members. Moreover, 
subnational foreign activities can contribute to the stability of the international 
system by offering new negotiating channels, cooperation networks and platforms 
for the exchange of ideas. 
 
 
Subnational Foreign Activities in Russia 
Among other factors, future of Russia depends on the socio-economic 
development of its 88 regions.
3 Russia￿s regions will have better chances to 
                                                 
3 Following a referendum on 7 December 2003 the Perm oblast￿ and Komi-Permyak autonomous okrug 
were merged as a new entity, Perm krai,  starting from 1 December 2005. Further mergers of Russian  
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succeed economically when direct exchange of ideas with foreign partners is 
allowed for by the federal centre. Attracting investments from foreign countries is 
an important aim of subnational foreign activities.  
The majority of regions in the Russian Federation are still lacking a clear 
profile for the outside world. In order to attract foreign investment, regional 
administrations need to promote their exclusive features of their respective 
regions abroad. Often, foreigners, speaking of Russia, only have Moscow or St 
Petersburg in mind. Everybody knows the German Bundesland Bavaria, but who 
has heard of Pskov before? When one hears Bavaria, one thinks of Oktoberfest, 
Alps and BMW. Not too many, however, could name anything in connection with 
Pskov, for example. 
Currently, all of Russian regions are subsidised from the central budget.
4 
This fact puts them in a weak position in their dealings with Moscow. As a result 
of the policy of distributing subsidies, virtually all of Russian regions are heavily 
dependent on the central government. Under these circumstances, Moscow, which 
is interested in keeping its ￿vassals￿, i.e. governors in the regions, under control; 
increases the control over contacts of regions with foreign partners, which can 
help to strengthen  regions both economically and politically. This could pose a 
threat to Moscow￿s dominant position.  
The success of regions in the field of foreign activities can increase their 
leverage vis-￿-vis Moscow. Therefore, the central government has grown keener 
to keep the foreign contacts of regions under closer supervision. Federal 
                                                                                                                                           
regions will take place: this will reduce the number of members of the federation to 83 by 1 March 
2008. 
4 For more on the financial situation of Russian regions after federal tax reforms see Orttung (2004): 
Orttung, Peter W. ￿Key Issues in the Evolution of the Federal Okrugs and Center-Region Relations 
under Putin￿, in Robert W. Orttung and Peter Reddaway (eds.), The Dynamics of Russian Politics. 
Putin￿s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p. 30.   
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government can use a variety several instruments to control subnational foreign 
activities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is probably the most efficient one. As 
far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned, the Russian Federation is a 
unique state: there are more than twenty domestic representations of the ministry. 
One of the main tasks of these regional representations is to coordinate foreign 
contacts of federal subjects. Stated differently, those representations can be used 
by the central government to keep the foreign relations of the regions under close 
surveillance.  
The study of subnational foreign activities offers clues on the future of 
Russia in general. The ability and willingness of central government to facilitate 
the foreign policy and foreign economic interests of regions is a test for the 
strength of the federal structure of Russia. By simply forbidding subnational 
foreign activities the federal centre risks increasing tensions inside the federation, 
which could lead to the emergence of secessionist tendencies.  
 
 
Subnational Foreign Activities in Pskov 
This thesis examines the external behaviour of one of the 88 Russian 
regions. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russian regions 
have re-entered the lists of research topics of political and social scientists. As the 
number of Russian regions is remarkably high and their diversity overwhelming, 
it is understandable that not all of the regions have been scrutinised with the same 
commitment by academics as of now. 
Russian regions need foreign investments for economic recovery. To 
attract foreign investments, regions need intensive foreign contacts. The region  
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this thesis is dealing with ￿ Pskov - has external borders with three foreign 
countries, all of them former Soviet republics. Pskov has the potential of 
developing intense foreign contacts, not only with its direct neighbours. In fact, it 
could even become a model in this respect for other Russian regions.  
Pskov oblast￿ was chosen for various reasons. Most importantly, despite 
its geographic closeness to the European neighbours of Russia, Pskov has 
received notably little attention from researchers of Russian regions. There are 
some publications on the impacts of the EU and NATO enlargement on Russia in 
general and its regions, which focus on Kaliningrad region mainly, however. 
Oldberg, in one of these publications on Kaliningrad, claims the military 
importance of the Kaliningrad region attracted the attention in the early 1990s. A 
gradual decline of the military potential of the armed forces in Kaliningrad took 
place in the course of the 1990s, however. Another crucial issue linked to 
Kaliningrad exclave is the perception of possible German territorial claims. More 
recently, however, the socio-economic crises unwinding in the Kaliningrad 
oblast￿ has dominated the agenda in the dialogue between Moscow and Russia on 
the future of the region.
5 
Kaliningrad￿s situation has been, as a Russian exclave bordering EU 
members Lithuania and Poland, one of the reoccurring issues in the EU-Russia 
official dialogue. A group of authors sees Kaliningrad in the spotlight of the EU 
eastern enlargement, given the fact that there are two Russias, the motherland and 
Kaliningrad. The so-called ￿little Russia￿, Kaliningrad region, is increasingly 
inside the EU and as such exposed to EU policies much more than any other 
                                                 
5 Oldberg (2001): Oldberg, Ingmar. Kaliningrad between Brussels and Moscow. The Russian Study 
Group Working Papers Series No 17, Eidgen￿ssische Technische Hochschule Z￿rich: Centre for 
Security Studies and Conflict Research, 2001, pp. 13, 19, 29.   
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Russian region. Since Kaliningrad and ￿big￿ Russia are intertwined, the EU 
cannot implement its policies in Kaliningrad separately from Russia itself. The 
authors claim.
6 
The case of Pskov is interesting since this oblast￿ was governed by Mr 
Zhirinovsky￿s ally Mr Mikhailov for nearly a decade. Mr Zhirinovsky and his 
party LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) were famous for their anti-
western rhetoric. Was this rhetoric reflected by the pattern of subnational foreign 
activities of the regional administration? 
There are a small number of publications on Pskov oblast￿￿s fate after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, most prominent of which is the article by Mikhail A. 
Alexseev and Vladimir Vagin in Europe Asia Studies. In this article, authors 
describe the case of Pskov as ￿especially instructive￿ because of the geographical 
location of the oblast￿.
7 
The authors of the above-mentioned publication indicate several aspects 
which make the case of Pskov oblast￿ interesting. Firstly, the regional elite of 
Pskov were confronted with foreign policy and foreign trade issues suddenly, 
after the republics of Estonia, Latvia and Belarus became independent from the 
Soviet Union. Secondly, a transformation of the foreign activities of Pskov 
regional administration can be observed during the 1990s. A strong sympathy for 
Belarus as the main foreign partner has been replaced by a Baltic orientation for 
economic reasons. Thirdly, Pskov region is confronted with inter-regional 
competition with Leningrad oblast￿, which has been chosen by the federal centre 
                                                 
6 Joenniemi/ Dewar/ Fairlie (2000): Joenniemi, Pertti,  Dewar, Stephen, and Lyndelle D. Fairlie.  The 
Kaliningrad Puzzle ￿ A Russian Region within the European Union. Karlskrona: The Baltic Institute, 
2000, p. 3. 
7 Alexseev/Vagin (1999):Alexseev, Mikhail A. and Vladimir Vagin. ￿Russian Regions in Expanding 
Europe: The Pskov Connection,￿ Europe-Asia Studies 1999, 51 (1), pp. 43-64.   
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for an ambitious port project. The new ports in Ust-Luga village in the northern 
part of Leningrad oblast￿ would divert from Pskov oblast￿ a large share of Russian 
transit goods to the West. 
Another publication on Pskov by a Russian academic Andrey Makarychev 
lists the possible foreign orientations of the regional elite. The regional elite seem 
to be torn between neighbours ￿ Belarus on the one hand and Latvia and Estonia 
on the other. Moreover, Makarychev explores the roles played by two initiatives 
of the European Union, the ￿northern dimension￿ and the ￿eastern dimension￿.
8 
The impact of these two EU initiatives will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
Some Russian authors believe that Pskov oblast￿ is a ￿classic example￿ for 
the failures of subnational foreign activities. It is weakly developed socio-
economically and, therefore, unable to establish sustainable contacts with foreign 
partners. As Mezhevitch and Litovka underline, it is not Pskov￿ fault: the Soviet 
heritage of weakly developed border areas of the Russian SFSR is to blame. The 
self-isolation policy of the Soviet Union caused grave disparities in the regional 
economies of the RSFSR ￿ relevant industrial potential was concentrated in the 
central regions of Russia.
9 As far as Pskov region is concerned, it is, indeed, 
weakly developed; process of the regional economic demise compared to some 
other Russian regions began in the 1970s already.
10 
                                                 
8 Makarychev (2005): Makarychev, Andrey. ￿Pskov at the Crossroads of Russia￿s Trans-border 
Relations with Estonia and Latvia: Between Provinciality and Marginality,￿ Europe-Asia Studies 2005, 
57 (3), pp. 481-500. Makarychev (2005). 
9 See Mezhevitch/Litovka (2002): Litovka, O. P. and N. P.Mezhevitch. Globalizatsiya i Regionalizm ￿ 
Tendentsii Mirovovo Razvitiya i Faktor Socialno-ekonomicheskovo Razvitiya Rossii. Kult-Inform-
Press, St. Petersburg, 2002, p. 69.   
10 Read more on socio-economic indicators of Pskov regional economy in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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This thesis focuses on subnational foreign activities in Pskov region. 
There are three types of subnational actors engaged in foreign activities ￿ 
regional, local municipal and local rural actors. This thesis examines all these 
types of actors in Pskov region, which makes it the first of its kind in this field. 
Usually, the relevant literature focuses on regional actors only. By taking a closer 
look at the subnational foreign activities in the Pskov oblast￿ on all subnational 
levels, i.e. on the regional and local municipal/rural levels of government one can 
try and predict the behaviour of both Russian regions and Russia as a federal state 
in the field of subnational foreign activities. Examining the recent changes in the 
structure of the Pskov regional administration can offer us clues on how Russian 
subnational regional units will reorganise their foreign activities in order to 
comply with new standards introduced by the Putin administration in Moscow. 
 
 
Methods 
The existing framework of theories and concepts for explaining 
subnational foreign activities will be discussed in the Chapter 1 of this thesis. In 
general, there are several weaknesses related to existing theories. The main flaw 
of the existing theories on subnational foreign activities is the lack of 
measurement tools. Currently, comparison seems to be the only tool for 
evaluating the extent of international involvement of a particular subnational unit.  
The method of comparison displays its deficiencies when applied in the 
case of subnational foreign activities in Russia, however. Relevant inputs on 
subnational foreign activities have not been collected in most cases. Moreover, 
the data compiled using the method of comparison is not usable as long as the  
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criteria by which this information will be assessed has not been universally 
defined and accepted by researchers. 
I will use both qualitative and quantitative methods in this thesis. Since 
official information on subnational foreign activities is scarce in Pskov, 
interviews with relevant actors from federal, regional, municipal and district 
authorities and NGO-s were crucial sources of information. Numerous 
interviews were conducted by the author, in Pskov and Estonia. Local and 
national ￿ both Estonian and Russian ￿ newspapers, magazines were other 
source of interviews. 
Quantitative data on subnational activities in Pskov originates from 
official documents of regional/local administrations mainly, especially 
publications of the Statistics Committee.  Furthermore, statistical data was 
available in newspaper articles and magazines. 
The use of qualitative data on subnational foreign activities of Pskov was, 
to a certain degree, hindered by the reluctance of relevant officials of to be 
quoted, however. Especially, officials from federal authorities preferred to remain 
anonymous.  
As far as quantitative data is concerned, given the circumstance that a 
model for evaluating this type of data in the case of subnational foreign activities 
has not been proposed and universally accepted by academics, the extent of its 
usability remains limited. 
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Period 
This thesis examines the foreign activities on the subnational level in the 
Pskov region in the years 1991-2000 mainly - the Yeltsin period - from the last 
days of the Soviet Union to the recent political changes in the federal centre, 
which have brought about a gradual reduction of rights of the members of 
federation. 
Why was this period chosen? Since the regions of an independent Russia 
did not have the same status in the Soviet Union, the year 1991, the last year of 
the break-up of the union, would be the correct start for the examination of 
subnational foreign activities. In the year 1999, the first Russian president Boris 
Yeltsin resigned from his post. The then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a former 
head of the internal security service (FSB), became the acting president. The 
elections in March 2000 were more or less just a formality, a ￿coronation￿ of the 
new ￿tsar￿, hand-picked by the previous one. 
With President Putin, a new period in the history of Russia started. 
Whereas Yeltsin had often relied on the then-powerful regional leaders for 
political backup, Putin had other backers. His previous positions as head of the 
internal security service (FSB) or the secretary of Security Council enabled him to 
build up a close relationship with the vast and powerful intelligence community in 
Russia. In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin did not necessarily need the support of the 
regional governors; many of them had become warlords or semi-dukes. Putin 
decided to reduce the freedoms of regional bosses, whose actions were partly 
perceived in Moscow as dangerous to the territorial integrity and the strong state. 
As Peter Reddaway points out in his recent book The Dynamics of Russian 
Politics, in Russian history, there are repetitive cycles of authoritarianism  
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combined with the weakening of the central state. The periods of relative 
weakness of the federal centre and the emergence of regions as more powerful 
actors are followed by the rapid strengthening of the centre.
11 A similar pattern 
can be identified during the 1990s and early 21
st century when a period of gradual 
weakening of the federal centre in the Yeltsin era was followed by a period of re-
centralisation under Putin. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to single out the various steps of the 
above-mentioned cycle in Pskov region. Seeking more autonomy in dealings with 
the outside world was one of the accompanying effects of this process of 
decentralisation. The thesis has been completed in the hope of giving not only 
clearer indications for the future path of one of the North-western regions, but 
also of the future of centre-periphery relations in Russia in general.  
The thesis is dealing with two levels of government in Pskov oblast￿ 
below the national level: regional and municipal. The municipal level, for its part, 
has been divided into municipal and rural units.  
In the broader context of Russian-European relations, it is worth 
examining, why Pskov has been a pioneer or even an ￿oracle￿ of the developments 
in these relations. Pskov regional administration did not whole-heartedly attempt 
to establish a good-neighbourly relationship with its pro-Western Baltic 
neighbours of Estonia and Latvia in the 1990s, despite potential economic 
advantages..   
What happened in Pskov in the course of the 90s, happened in the 
Russian-European, or even Russian-Western relations in general after the 
                                                 
11 This intriguing hypothesis can be found in Reddaway (2004): Reddaway, Peter. ￿Historical and 
Political Context￿, in Robert W. Orttung and Peter Reddaway (eds.), The Dynamics of Russian Politics. 
Putin￿s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p. 3.   
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replacement of Yeltsin by Putin in the late 90-s. National interests and security 
concerns returned to the political agenda in Moscow, pushing economic 
considerations aside. In Pskov oblast￿, frequently, politics have prevailed over 
economic reasoning during the last fifteen years. 
 
 
 
 
Structure 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters, which are followed by a 
conclusion. First three chapters are of introductory nature. Chapter 4 examines the 
topic of Pskov subnational foreign activities in detail. Chapter 5 will go to the 
￿grass-root￿ level of subnational activities. For this purpose, two case studies have 
been chosen. The last Chapter tests the validity of the existing theories on 
subnational foreign activities in the case of Pskov regional, local municipal and 
local rural administrations. 
In the first chapter, Regions as foreign policy actors, an overview will be 
given of the worldwide experience in the field of subnational foreign activities. 
Moreover, an extensive overview will be given of the terms and definitions 
applied by the researchers. The last sections of Chapter 1 will give examples of 
subnational foreign activities in several federations, such as the United States of 
America or Germany, for example. Moreover, the impact of a supranational 
organisation, the European Union, on subnational foreign activities will be 
examined.  
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As far as terms and definitions are concerned, there is some confusion in 
the relevant literature. There is no universally accepted terminology for 
subnational foreign activities or subnational actors. The first chapter takes a close 
look at the terminology used by authors in this field. A new terminology, which 
will partly overlap with existing terminologies, will be offered in the hope of 
contributing to greater clarity.  
Russian regions and municipalities are relatively new players in the 
international arena. Subnational units in some other federations such as the United 
States, Canada or Germany have begun to discover the world of subnational 
foreign activities in the 1950s already. The Canadian province Quebec is a 
prominent example of far-reaching subnational foreign activities, which have 
been a cause for numerous conflicts with federal centre.  
In the section of examples, the experience in the field of subnational 
foreign activities in several federations with democratic traditions will be 
examined. A special emphasis will be put on procedures that have been 
developed by federations for facilitating the foreign interests of their members. 
What could Russia learn from the experience of other federations in that respect? 
Following the introductory chapter on worldwide experience in 
subnational foreign activities, comes Chapter 2, which will explain the political 
and legal environment, in which Russian regions operate in terms of foreign 
activities. Relevant federal laws will be analysed. Here, special emphasis will be 
put on constitutional limitations to subnational foreign activities. 
A constitution establishes the general division of power in a state. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 2, in most cases, Constitution does not prevent members 
of the federation from acting in the international arena by default. However, it  
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establishes the prerogatives of the federal government in terms of foreign affairs. 
The general view among experts in International Law is that it is up to the federal 
constitution to define the rights of subnational units in terms of foreign activities. 
Therefore, the study of the Russian constitution is relevant for the purpose of this 
thesis. Beside the Constitution, federal laws define the rights and obligations of 
the federation and its members in terms of foreign affairs.  These laws will be 
analysed here in order to give an overview of the rights and obligations of Russian 
subnational units when engaging in foreign activities. 
Furthermore, Russian centre-periphery relations will be discussed in this 
chapter. Subnational foreign activities are an aspect of centre-periphery relations, 
and, therefore, one of the battlefields where regions try to increase their room for 
manoeuvres. The federal centre, on the other hand, must try and contain 
subnational foreign activities. Forbidding these activities is not an option in a 
democratic society; the methods and instruments of the federal centre for 
controlling them will be scrutinised in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 3 begins with an overview of the historic origins of the Pskov 
region as we know it today. The history of subnational foreign activities goes 
back to the 16
th century, when Pskov had its own foreign ministry. The history of 
Pskov region is rich in contacts with foreign partners, and, in many cases, foreign 
enemies. The Hanseatic League is the prime example of the benefits that direct 
interaction with the outside world has brought to Pskov. The forced accession of 
Pskov to the centralist Russian state brought about a decline of foreign activities, 
however. 
The ability and willingness of a particular subnational unit to engage in 
foreign activities depends on its socio-economic situation and the availability of  
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natural resources. As scholars such as Neil Melvin have pointed out, the urge to 
gain control over the export of natural resources is one of the main drivers behind 
subnational foreign activities. Therefore, an overview of the development of the 
regional economy in the 1990s will be given. 
The nature of subnational foreign activities on the regional level of 
government will be examined along with local municipal/ rural levels in the 
fourth chapter. A closer look will be taken at the actors and their motivations that 
lie behind those activities. These two levels of subnational government will be 
compared in terms of foreign activities as far as the existing theories allow for it, 
in Chapter 6. 
In order to give examples and in-depth analysis of the practical side of 
subnational foreign activities of some particular subnational units, two case 
studies have been added to the thesis in the form of Chapter 5. The first case study 
will examine the attempts by subnational units to establish two euroregions on the 
Russian-Estonian and Russian-Latvian borders. Here, the regional administration 
has demonstrated a strong interest in a trilateral undertaking with subnational 
partners from Estonia and Latvia. This case study will look for answers to several 
questions. Why has the regional administration of Pskov met resistance from 
foreign and domestic partners when trying to increase its exposure to foreign 
affairs? Who were the main actors trying to ￿twist its arms￿? Is the concept of 
euroregion suitable for the Russian-Estonian-Latvian triangle of border areas? 
In the second case study a closer look will be taken at the implications of 
post-imperial relationship between a former Soviet republic of Estonia and the 
successor state of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, on the economic level 
in the field of subnational foreign activities. The re-establishing of the ship link  
 
 
 
 
 
31
between Tartu (Estonia) and Pskov has become a modern saga without an end in 
sight. This case study will try and examine the political factors that have 
contributed to the failure of this cooperation project. 
Further in this case study, possible motivations of the Pskov regional 
administration behind its drive to boost foreign activities will be examined. For 
the sake of illustration, the dimension of subnational private actors, i.e. private 
companies, has been included. Generally in the thesis, subnational foreign 
activities of private units are not covered for reasons, which will be discussed 
further on. In this particular case study, however, subnational private units play 
central role and will, therefore, be included. 
Taking Brian Hocking￿s concept of international actorness as a point of 
departure, findings of this thesis in the case of Russia in general and in Pskov 
oblast￿ in particular will be reflected in Chapter 6. Using the inputs proposed by 
Hocking, the international actorness of subnational units in Pskov region will be 
examined. How should inputs obtained by using Hocking￿s theory be evaluated? 
Are the inputs collected using Hocking￿s theory comparable in the case of Pskov 
regional administration, City of Pskov administration and administrations of 
border-located rayons? Can it be measured using Hocking￿s theory, which of the 
subnational units in Pskov region is the most active or successful in terms of 
foreign activities? 
Directions, goals, structures and resources of the regional administration, 
the City of Pskov and some of the border-located rayons of the Pskov region in 
terms of foreign activities will be singled out in this chapter. By comparing the 
regional unit and local municipal/rural units, similarities and differences in their 
foreign activities can be singled out. Here, the theory of international actorness  
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proposed by Brian Hocking will be applied for collecting information for relevant 
inputs in his theory. 
In the concluding part of the thesis, some suggestions will be made on 
how to improve the instruments for measuring the phenomenon of subnational 
foreign activities. Are the theories and concepts developed by Western authors 
suitable for the understanding of the complex nature of subnational foreign 
activities in Russia? What is the state of knowledge on Russian subnational 
foreign activities?  
In this part, proposals will be made on how the existing theoretical 
framework could be developed in order to make them usable for the analysis of 
subnational foreign activities in the case of Russia. Russia is an asymmetric 
federation
12, i.e. its members have different status; this further complicates the 
analysis of Russian subnational foreign activities; a fact that needs to be taken 
into account when applying existing theories 
Further in the conclusion, possible future scenarios for subnational foreign 
activities both in the global and Russian contexts will be discussed. How do 
federal reforms affect centre-periphery relations? Will the unrelenting drive of 
central government under Putin to increase the level of centralisation in Russia 
end the era of subnational foreign activities? More specifically, how did the 
election of the new governor in Pskov change the relationship with foreign 
partners? Does the relationship of Pskov with its Western partners offer clues on 
how Russian-Western relations will develop? 
                                                 
12 The asymmetric nature of the Russian Federation, especially in financial terms,   has been analysed 
by Treisman in Treisman (1998): Treisman, Daniel. ￿Deciphering Russia￿s Federal Finance: Fiscal 
Appeasement in 1995 and 1996￿, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, Nr. 5, 1998, pp. 893-906 and in 
Treisman (1999): Treisman, Daniel. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in 
Russia. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Regions as Foreign Policy Actors 
In international relations the last decades of the 20
th century were a period 
of rapid change and re-orientation. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union radically changed the international environment. The factors that 
encouraged the emergence of subnational foreign activities existed long before 
those events, however. 
This chapter will offer an overview of the worldwide experience in the 
field of subnational foreign activities. Moreover, terms and definitions applied by 
the researchers in this field will be discussed. The last articles of this chapter  give 
examples of subnational foreign activities in several federations, such as the 
United States of America or the Kingdom of Belgium.  
Globalisation is a term that is often used to explain the recent rapid global 
changes. These changes are of a different nature: geopolitical, geoeconomic, 
geosocial, geocultural and geoenvironmental, but they all take place on a global 
scale. Some authors argue that one of the main features of globalisation is the fact  
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that the nature of human activities has changed from state-centred to global.
13 
When globalisation is defined as a process where world￿s economies, societies 
and cultures are becoming ever more closely intertwined
14, then several questions 
occur in the context of the subnational foreign activities. Are these activities 
simply a response to the process of globalisation? How do these activities change 
the international system? Are they undermining the monopoly of the state as actor 
in the international system?  
In different parts of the world, subnational units of government have 
launched, continued, or, in some cases, intensified, their efforts to enter the 
international arena. The legal framework of those activities remains to be clearly 
defined, however. What is the status of subnational units of government from the 
viewpoint of international law? 
The ability of central governments to control subnational units of 
government in general, and their foreign activities in particular, is subject to the 
process of globalisation. Central governments still have the unquestionable 
prerogative over main foreign policy issues, such as peace and war. But, for 
various reasons, which are discussed below, subnational units of government have 
intensified their attempts to enter the international system, in some cases 
circumventing foreign-policy authorities of central governments. What 
instruments are available to central governments to control and co-ordinate 
subnational foreign activities? How do these activities affect centre-periphery 
relations? 
                                                 
13 For a definition of globalisation see Johnston/ Taylor/ Watts (1995): Johnston, Ronald J., Peter J. 
Taylor and Michael Watts (eds.). Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late 
Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, p. 6. 
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Several authors have contributed to the study of the nature of foreign 
activities of subnational units. Scholars from different continents have examined 
the nature, and impact, of the changes in the centre-periphery relations in terms of 
subnational foreign activities. The number of publications on this subject is not 
particularly high, however. Some authors believe that the reason for the 
￿academy￿s bored disinterest￿ in subnational foreign activities lies in the 
underestimating of these activities by national governments, on the one hand, and 
the overestimating of their own importance by subnational governments, on the 
other.
15  
Jain Purnendra, who has studied extensively the foreign activities of 
Japanese subnational governments, gives three reasons for the low interests of 
theorists in the phenomenon of subnational foreign activities. First, the fast 
growth of the number of new actors in the international arena has over-stretched 
the theorists￿ attention. Second, the media ignores subnational foreign activities to 
a large extent, since they lack the clout of the foreign activities of national 
governments, The third reason is the fact that the inheritance of the Cold War 
period, which makes the majority of international relations￿ theorists believe that 
national government is still the ￿unitary and predominant player￿. 
16  
Clearly, more academic work needs to be done in describing and analysing 
subnational foreign activities. The list of major authors, who have contributed to 
knowledge in this field so far, includes Ivo D. Duchacek
17, Elliot J. Feldman and 
                                                 
15 Darel (2005): Paul, Darel E.  Rescaling International Political Economy: Subnational States and the 
Regulation of Global Political Economy. New York: Routledge, 2005, p. vii.  
16 Purnendra (2005): Purnendra, Jain. Japan￿s Subnational Governments in International Affairs. New 
York, Routledge, 2005, p. 14. Purnendra (2005) 
17 Duchacek￿s main contributions include Duchacek/ Latouche/ Stevenson (1988): Duchacek, Ivo D., 
Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds.), Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: 
Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988 and  
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Lily Gardner Feldman, and Brian Hocking. These authors have contributed 
towards general concepts for explaining subnational foreign activities. This thesis 
uses the inputs from the above-mentioned authors. 
On various aspects of subnational foreign activities have contributed 
Francisco Aldecoa, Jean Beaufays, Luc Bernier
18, Earl H. Fry
19, Michael Keating, 
John Kincaid, John M. Kline
20, Daniel Latouche, Yves Lejeune
21, John Loughlin, 
Hans J. Michelmann, Paul Painchaud
22, Jain Purnendra (Japanese subnational 
activities) and Panayotis Soldatos.  
More specifically on Russian subnational foreign activities have 
contributed Oleg B. Alexandrov
23, Andrei S. Makarychev, Neil Melvin, and 
Jeronim Perovic, 
The research results of most of the above-mentioned authors are discussed 
below. It should be underlined that these authors not only apply a variety of 
                                                                                                                                           
Duchacek (1990): Duchacek, Ivo D., ￿Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in 
International Relations,￿ in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), Federalism And 
International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 1-
33. 
18 An expert in subnational foreign economic activities: Bernier (1988): Bernier, Luc. ￿The Foreign 
Economic Policy of a Subnational State: The Case of Quebec￿, Ivo D Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and 
Garth Stevenson (eds.), Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign 
Contacts of Subnational Governments. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 125-140. 
19 Fry has specialised in foreign activities of US states. See for example, Fry (1993): Fry, Earl H. ￿The 
US States and Foreign Economic Policy: Federalism in the ￿New World Order￿ ￿, in Brian Hocking 
(ed.), Foreign Relations and Federal States. London: Leicester University Press, 1993, pp.122-139. 
20 Kline is an expert in the role of subnational governmental units in co-shaping the US foreign policy: 
Kline (1993): Kline, John M. ￿Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State and Local Role 
in US Foreign Relations,￿ in Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Relations and Federal States. London: 
Leicester University Press, 1993, pp. 105-121. 
21 Lejeune has his research focus on Belgian subnational foreign activities: Lejeune (1990): Lejeune, 
Yves. ￿Belgium,￿ in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), Federalism And International 
Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 142-175 
22 Painchaud has examined the nature of the Canadian province of Quebec foreign activities: Painchaud 
(1988): Painchaud, Paul. ￿The Epicenter of Quebec￿s International Relations,￿ in  ,￿ in Ivo D 
Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds.), Perforated Sovereignties and International 
Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, 
pp.  91-98. 
23 A case study on Karelia:  Alexandrov (2001): Alexandrov, Oleg B. The role of the Republic of 
Karelia in Russia￿s foreign and security policy. The Russian Study Group Working Paper Series No. 5. 
Eidgen￿ssische Technische Hochschule Z￿rich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 
2001. Alexandrov (2001).  
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concepts, but also use different terminology to describe the same concept.   
Therefore, a rather comprehensive overview of terminology applied by them is 
necessary in this thesis.  
Additionally, it should be mentioned that there is a substantial amount of 
criticism among authors concerning other authors￿ research.  Especially, some of 
them seem to feel that the specialised literature is mainly focussing on negative, 
i.e. disintegrating and fragmenting, aspects of foreign activities of subnational 
units.
24  
The main subject of this thesis is the subnational foreign activities of all 
levels of government in the Pskov region, one of the members of the Russian 
federation. Therefore, an overview will be given on what authors have written on 
the subject of foreign activities of subnational units of government in federations 
during the last decades of the 20
th century. In order to illustrate the different 
experiences that have been made by states or international organisations when 
handling subnational foreign activities, several cases are examined in the section 
￿Examples￿ of this chapter.   The European Union, Kingdom of Belgium, Federal 
Republic of Germany, the United States of America, and the Quebec of the 
Canadian Confederation were chosen as the examples for subnational foreign 
activities for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For a critical review of contemporary academic research on subnational foreign activities see 
Soldatos (1990): Soldatos, Panayotis, ￿An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as 
Foreign Policy Actors,￿ in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.). Federalism And 
International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 40.  
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1.1. Terms and Definitions 
There is a disturbing confusion of definitions that have been used by 
authors to describe the subject of foreign activities of subnational units. Indeed, 
Aguirre is correct to regret the use of ￿buzz-words￿, often with no clear definition, 
in this context.
25 The terminology applied by contemporary authors will be 
discussed below.  
As far as the actors are concerned, the terms vary widely. Duchacek, one 
of the first researchers in this field, used the general term ￿subnational unit￿, with 
two subdivisions ￿subnational groups/subnational private groups￿ and 
￿subnational territorial communities/authorities￿ or ￿subnational units of 
government￿ or ￿noncentral governments￿.
26 Hocking, for his part, speaks of ￿non-
central government￿
27, and, in his more recent publications, additionally, of 
￿substate region￿ and ￿substate territorial actor￿.
28 Aguirre, the critic of the use of 
￿buzz-words￿ mentioned above, adopts ￿non-central government￿.
29 
                                                 
25 A list of bizarre terminology including ·mytho-diplomacy￿, ￿anti-diplomacy￿, techno-diplomacy￿, 
￿crypto-diplomacy￿, and ￿macho-diplomacy￿ can be found in Aguirre (1999): Aguirre, Inaki. ￿Making 
Sense of Paradiplomacy? An Intertextual Enquiry about a Concept in Search of a Definition,￿ in 
Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.). Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of 
Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, p. 185, 194-195.  
26   For example, in Duchacek, Ivo D, Daniel Latouche, and Garth Stevenson (1988). 
27  In Hocking (1993): Hocking, Brian (ed.). Foreign Relations and Federal States. London: Leicester 
University Press, 1993.  
28 Hocking (1999): Hocking, Brian. ￿Patrolling the ￿Frontier￿: Globalization, Localization and the 
￿Actorness￿ of Non-Central Governments,￿ in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.). 
Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999, pp. 17-39. 
29 In Aguirre (1999), p. 185.  
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It is relatively common for one author to use different terms when 
referring to actors. For example, Latouche uses three different terms: ￿intra-state 
actor￿, ￿subnational state actor￿ and ￿state-connected actor￿ when referring to 
subnational units of government.
30 Melvin, however, refrains from the use of 
different terms. But he uses terminology not to be found elsewhere. He refers to 
actors as ￿sub-state organizations￿, using this term in general for all - 
governmental and private - kinds of subnational units.
31 Kincaid, for his part, has 
shifted from ￿constituent government￿
32 to the more precise ￿state and local 
governments￿.
33  Another author, Michelmann, favours ￿component units￿.
34 
Keating, again, uses 3 terms: ￿regions￿, ￿regional governments￿ and ￿sub-state 
governments￿.
35  
Soldatos is more precise, using the term ￿federated units￿ when referring to 
subnational federated units. For subnational units in general, he uses the term 
￿subnational actors￿, which includes regions, municipal communities and cities. 
He distinguishes between subnational and transnational actors. ￿Transnational 
                                                 
30 For example in Latouche (1988): Latouche, Daniel. ￿State Building and Foreign Policy at the 
Subnational Level,￿ in Ivo D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds.), Perforated 
Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 29-42.  
31 In Melvin (1995):Melvin, Neil. Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (Post￿Soviet Business Forum), 1995.  
32 In  Kincaid (1990): Kincaid, John. ￿Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-State: 
Conflict and Cooperation,￿ in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), Federalism and 
International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 54-
76. 
33 See, for example, Kincaid (1999): Kincaid, John. ￿The International Competence of US States and 
their Local Governments,￿ in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action: 
The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, pp. 111-
133.  
34 The use of ￿component units￿ is unique by Michelmann: Michelmann/Soldatos (1990): Michelmann, 
Hans J. and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.). Federalism And International Relations: The Role of 
Subnational Units. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
35  Keating (1999): Keating, Michael, ￿Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and 
Strategies,￿ in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign 
Relations of Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, pp. 1-16.  
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actors￿ are in this context the multinational corporations engaged in ￿external 
activities￿.
36 
The above-mentioned terms, except for those referring to subnational 
private units (private companies, pressure groups, NGOs, etc.) or transnational 
actors (multinational companies, international NGOs, etc.), refer to subnational 
units of government. To be more precise, they refer to the subnational federated 
state/regional/provincial level (federated units￿ level) and, in some cases, to the 
municipal or local level. However, occasionally it remains unclear whether other 
than federated units￿ level, i.e. municipal and local, is included as well, because 
no clear definition is provided. Some authors, like Latouche, define ￿state-
connected actors￿ more precisely: central, provincial, regional and local.
 37 
The terminology to describe the foreign activities of subnational units of 
government is occasionally confusing, too. Again, authors use different terms to 
refer to the same concept.  Some authors provide explanations of why they prefer 
certain terms, but not all of them do so. 
Duchacek uses the general term ￿trans-sovereign activities￿, with several 
subtypes:  ￿paradiplomacy￿, ￿macrodiplomacy￿, ￿protodiplomacy￿.
38 At least one 
of his terms, ￿paradiplomacy￿, is still being used widely.
39  Nevertheless, some 
authors use a very different terminology. Foreign actions taken by subnational 
units have been referred to as ￿constituent diplomacy￿.
40 Melvin uses both 
￿foreign policy￿ and ￿external policy￿.
41 Latouche, however, adds an adjective, 
                                                 
36 In Soldatos (1990). 
37 Latouche (1988), p. 34. 
38 In Duchacek/Latouche/Stevenson (1988), and in Duchacek (1990), pp. 1-33.  
39 In Keating (1999). 
40 In Kincaid (1990). 
41 In Melvin (1995).  
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obviously for clarity￿s sake. He prefers the term ￿subnational foreign policy￿.
42 
Other authors prefer the more neutral ￿international involvement￿.
43 Some authors 
stick to one term: Feldman and Feldman prefer ￿territorial 
transgovernmentalism￿.
44 
Soldatos uses three different terms: ￿external activities￿, ￿foreign policy￿, 
and ￿paradiplomacy￿. He argues that the use of the term ￿foreign policy￿ is 
appropriate in the context of foreign activities of federated units, as there are 
￿objectives, strategies, tactics, institutions, a decision-making process, 
instruments, and a ￿foreign-policy output￿. Moreover, the manifestations of 
foreign activities of federated units, such as visits abroad, agreements with foreign 
partners, representations in foreign countries, are similar to the ones of foreign-
policy activities of states.
45 
But not every author is satisfied with the terms ￿paradiplomacy￿ and 
￿foreign-policy￿. Hocking favours the terms ￿multi-layered diplomacy￿
46 and 
￿extranational involvement￿ or ￿international involvement￿
47, claiming that the 
term ￿paradiplomacy￿ would be as inappropriate as the use of the foreign-policy 
paradigm for explaining the foreign activities of subnational units.
48  Moreover, 
he dismisses the use of the term ￿foreign policy￿ in this context as ￿unhelpful and 
                                                 
42 In Latouche (1988). 
43 In Aguirre (1999). 
44 Feldman/ Feldman (1988): Feldman, Elliot J. and Lily Gardner Feldman. ￿Quebec￿s 
Internationalization of North American Federalism￿, in Ivo D Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth 
Stevenson (eds.), Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of 
Subnational Governments. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 69-80.  
45 In Soldatos (1990), pp. 34-35. 
46 In Hocking  (1993). 
47 In ibid. 
48 He makes his argument against the term paradiplomacy proposed by Duchacek in Hocking (1999), p. 
33.  
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misguided￿ as it fails to reflect the complex net of interlinked motivations that 
drive the foreign activities of subnational units.
49 
The inability of authors to agree on a single terminology is an indication 
that the opinions between authors in the field of subnational foreign activities 
differ to a great extent. For readers, this circumstance may be both confusing and 
annoying. Therefore, one of the aims of further research of foreign activities of 
subnational units should be the search for a universally accepted terminology. 
 
 
Terms Explained 
There are two groups of subnational units engaged in subnational foreign 
activities, governmental actors and private actors. In this thesis I will use the term 
subnational unit when generally speaking of an actor that is a subnational 
(federated, provincial/regional or local) unit of government or a private unit. 
When referring to non-private subnational units only, I use the term subnational 
governmental unit, whereas when I explicitly refer to an actor that represents the 
subnational federated, regional, provincial or local unit of government, I use the 
term federated unit, regional unit, provincial unit or local unit respectively. In the 
case of local units, I will make a distinction between two subgroups: municipal 
units (cities and towns) and rural units (districts/rayons). 
The second group of actors engaged in subnational foreign activities 
includes non-governmental, i.e. private actors.  I refer to these as subnational 
private units. This group includes private companies, NGO-s, pressure groups etc, 
i.e. all private organisations engaged in foreign activities.  
                                                 
49 Further to dismissing the term paradiplomacy Hocking rejects the use of ￿foreign policy￿ in the case 
of subnational units as inappropriate in Hocking (1999), p. 34.  
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I share the view of Soldatos that multinational companies are not of 
subnational  nature.
50 They should be included in the separate group of 
transnational units. I would additionally include in the group of transnational 
units international non-governmental organisations, such as Amnesty 
International, Greenpeace, etc. As the foreign activities of transnational units are 
not of subnational nature, in this thesis they are only dealt with when transnational 
foreign activities affect subnational units. (For example, if a multinational 
company or an international non-governmental organisation targets a subnational 
unit of government.)  
When referring to foreign actions taken by subnational units I will use the 
general term subnational foreign activities. Foreign activities of subnational units 
may occur both inside the federal state and in foreign states. Inside the federal 
state, subnational units can influence the foreign policy of central government by 
lobbying, for example. In foreign states, subnational units can engage in 
autonomous or non-autonomous (from the federal government) types of foreign 
activities. Subnational units may become targets of foreign actors. The reactions 
to the actions taken by foreign actors towards subnational units are covered by the 
term subnational foreign activities, too.  
The main type of subnational foreign activities will in this thesis be 
referred to as paradiplomacy, a term proposed by Duchacek in the 1980s.  I agree 
with Hocking that in the context of subnational foreign activities the term 
￿foreign-policy￿ could be misleading.
51 This term should only be used in the case 
of the international activities of central governments. 
                                                 
50 See Soldatos (1990), p. 35. 
51 See Hocking (1999), p. 33.  
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1.2. Subnational Actors in the International System 
The list of subnational units that have recently entered the international 
system is relatively long. Authors include various actors in this list. However, as 
far as the main subcategories of subnational units engaged in foreign activities are 
concerned there is a broad consensus among authors, with some modifications.  
Again, many authors have followed Duchacek￿s lead. He proposes the 
following scheme: there are two subgroups of subnational units engaged in 
foreign activities: (1) subnational private groups (pressure groups, private 
companies, etc.) and (2) subnational territorial authorities (federated states, 
provinces, regions, etc.).
52   
Soldatos shares Duchacek￿s view in general, but argues that the 
governments of federated units are of different nature, and, therefore, should not 
be included in the subgroup of subnational territorial authorities. As the reason for 
this separation he quotes the fact that the foreign activities of federated units have 
the constitutive elements of foreign policy, such as objectives, strategies, tactics, 
institutions, a decision-making process, instruments and a ￿foreign-policy￿ output. 
Moreover, the foreign activities of federated units are in their manifestations - for 
example, visits and missions abroad, concluding agreements with foreign partners 
- similar to the foreign activities of the state. Consequently, he classifies federated 
units as ￿non-sovereign state actors￿, whereas he labels non-federated regional 
governments, municipal communities, municipalities, etc. as ￿infra-state actors￿.
 53 
                                                 
52 A typology of subnational actors can be found in Duchacek (1988), p. 4.  
53 Soldatos (1990), pp. 35, 39.  
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Mainly the specialised literature focuses on foreign activities of 
subnational governmental units. Especially, researchers have been interested in 
foreign activities of subnational units of federal systems, i.e. federated units. 
Lower and non-federated subnational levels of government, such as regional, 
provincial, municipal and local and private actors have attracted less attention 
from researchers. Subnational private groups are usually dealt with in the context 
of economic paradiplomacy or foreign policy localization (Hocking).  
In Hocking￿s view, traditional literature of foreign policy is state-centred 
and ￿describes a world which no longer exists.￿ Authors that include the 
subnational dimension, on the other hand, describe ￿a world which has not yet 
arrived￿. 
54  
There is a major weakness to be pointed at in the specialised literature. 
Authors often omit, or only mention briefly, the legal aspects of subnational 
foreign activities. It is an important topic, however. The central question is, and 
the legal dispute continues here, whether subnational units can be subjects of the 
International Law. I will come back to this issue later in this Chapter when I 
discuss the instruments available to subnational units when engaging in 
subnational foreign activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 In Hocking (1997): Hocking, Brian. ￿Regionalism: An International Relations Perspective,￿ in 
Michael Keating and John Loughlin (eds.), The Political Economy of Regionalism. London: Frank 
Cass, 1997, pp. 90-111. In Hocking￿s definition, foreign policy localization is a form of social activism 
by subnational actors, both state and private, which is directed towards affecting both domestic affairs 
and foreign policy.  
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1.3. Reasons for Subnational Foreign Activities   
Generally, most of the authors agree that the major factors accompanying 
foreign activities of subnational units include crisis of the state, globalisation, 
glocalisation (combination of globalisation and localisation), the end of the Cold 
War, and introduction of new technologies, especially communications 
technologies. Some authors, on the other hand, insist that one single event might 
have been the deciding catalyst for subnational foreign activities.   
It should be noted here, however, that some authors have chosen a 
different approach than trying to find factors explaining subnational foreign 
activities. For example, Latouche suggests we should give up the habit of 
repeating that  ￿the international arena is not what it used to be,￿ trying to explain 
the emergence of subnational actors in the international system. Instead, we 
should accept these new actors as what they are, ￿less a result than an illustration 
of a new interdependent international context￿.
55  
The opinions do not differ widely on the factors accompanying 
subnational foreign activities. However, the discussion over the specific reasons 
for these activities is much livelier. The authors divide the reasons usually in two 
groups: domestic and external.  
However, in recent publications, the necessity of searching for domestic 
and external reasons has been critically questioned. Hocking argues that it is the 
interaction between globalisation and localization we should look at when trying 
                                                 
55 See Latouche (1988), pp. 30-33.  
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to find reasons for subnational foreign activities. Moreover, it is important to 
remember that the local would not be the antithesis of the global in this context, 
but just another dimension of the processes of globalisation.  Subnational foreign 
activities would be driven by the need of individuals and groups to use the 
￿linkages between policy arenas￿. Regions or localities are simply a ￿route to 
influence￿ for these groups and individuals.
56  
The variety of viewpoints on reasons why subnational units have entered 
the international system is presented below. In general, authors divide the reasons 
into two groups: domestic and external reasons. Domestic reasons for subnational 
foreign activities are often processes that emerge over a period of time. External 
reasons, for their part, seem to represent single events, such as oil-shock (OPEC 
oil embargo on industrialised states). 
 
 
Domestic Reasons 
Domestic reasons for foreign activities of subnational units indicated by 
authors are more numerous than the external ones. This fact does not imply, 
however, that domestic reasons are considered to be more important.  
Probably the most comprehensive overview of domestic reasons has been 
provided by Soldatos. He indicates twelve such reasons for the emergence of 
￿paradiplomatic activities￿. Those reasons are divided into two types: federal-level 
causes and federated-units-level causes.  
On the federal level, Soldatos identifies the following five reasons for 
subnational foreign activities. Firstly, federal errors and/or inefficiency in the 
                                                 
56 In Hocking (1999), pp. 18-19.  
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conduct of foreign policy. In this case, federated units may attempt to offer 
alternatives to the official foreign policy, either by supportive or substitutive 
paradiplomacy. Secondly, problems with the ￿nation-building process￿: federated 
units may have conflicting interests with the federal centre in the issues of foreign 
policy and may demand subnational control over the conduct of foreign policy.  
Thirdly, an institutional gap. Here, the absence of a federal institution to represent 
federated units or being able to make an impact on foreign policy decisions 
triggers paradiplomacy. Fourthly, constitutional uncertainties: federated units 
take as much responsibilities as possible, foreign policy included, in order to 
enforce a subsequent de jure recognition of these roles. And, fifth, foreign-policy 
domestication, which refers to a trend that emphasis in foreign policy is being put 
on ￿low-politics￿ issues, such as economic growth, environmental protection, 
social justice, etc. Therefore, subnational governmental units that are responsible 
for the success in these issues in their constituencies are interested in engaging in 
subnational foreign activities.
57 
Soldatos￿ list of federated-units-level causes has seven entries. First, 
objective segmentation, which refers to geographic, cultural, linguistic, religious, 
political, and other features that make a federated unit different from other unit(s). 
Second, perceptual segmentation (electoralism) is the segmentation of attitudes, 
perceptions, loyalties, conceptions of interest, etc. of elites and populations 
leading to ￿many voices￿ in foreign policy. Perceptual segmentation is the 
consequence of objective segmentation or of subjective perception of objective 
segmentation. Third, regionalism/nationalism (￿we-feeling￿) can be caused by the 
first two entries. The perception of being underrepresented in international affairs 
                                                 
57 For a more detailed list see Soldatos (1990), pp. 44-48.  
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encourages federated units to consider paradiplomacy.  Fourth, asymmetry of 
federated units: differences in the demographic, economic or administrative 
weight of federated units can cause resentment towards some foreign policy or 
external economic policy initiatives that seem to benefit only certain members of 
the federation. Fifth, growth of federated units: growing institutions, budgets and 
functions of federated units encourage subnational elites to seek new fields of 
activity, including foreign policy, which leads to ￿externalization￿ of these units. 
Sixth, the so-called ￿me-tooism￿ or imitation: certain federated units imitate other 
federated units in their foreign activities.   
Duchacek adds to the list of domestic reasons the introduction of a 
￿tutelary concept of welfare government￿ on all levels of government. In his 
opinion, governments are being held responsible for the overall socio-economic 
situation in the units governed by them.  In order to maintain and increase the 
living standards of their subordinates, subnational governments are required to 
deal with external issues. Foreign trade, investments and tourism are factors that 
can help to boost revenues, create new jobs, enable transfer of know-how etc.  
According to Duchacek, the subnational unit￿s welfare, and consequently the 
political survival of its leaders, increasingly depends on the elite￿s ability to 
handle external issues. Especially, the regional leaders￿ success in combining the 
intra-federal resources (such as links to the central government and its funding 
agencies) with external sources (such as economic, financial and industrial power 
centres) has become an important criterion for voters.
58 
                                                 
58 See Duchacek (1990), p. 6, 8.   
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Kincaid argues that the democratisation of foreign-policy-making has 
encouraged the federated units to participate in this process.
59 As the foreign 
policy issues are discussed more openly in the society, subnational units feel 
entitled to articulate their interests, too. 
 
 
External Reasons 
External reasons for subnational foreign activities have been examined in 
depth by Soldatos, who has provided the most comprehensive overview of 
domestic reasons, too. In addition to the above-mentioned seven domestic 
reasons, he indicates four external reasons for paradiplomatic activities. 
The external reasons for subnational foreign activities include, according 
to Soldatos: (1) global interdependence (in two ways: first, as national boundaries 
cannot protect federated units from external influences, such as structural 
unemployment, they search for contacts with foreign actors in order to improve 
the situation, and, second, global interdependence can encourage federal 
government to retake control over foreign policy in order to increase the 
efficiency of its conduct, thereby subordinating the interests of subnational units), 
(2)  involvement of external actors (Soldatos uses the example of the French 
President Charles de Gaulle￿s role in developing the international profile of 
Quebec), (3) macro-regional interdependence (between non-neighbours; such as 
Quebec and France), and, (4) micro-regional interdependence (between 
                                                 
59 He makes this remark in Kincaid (1990), p. 66.   
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neighbouring communities, such as the ￿regional continentalism￿ between Canada 
and the US).
60 
Duchacek indicates that an important external reason is the shift in foreign 
policies during the second half of the 20
th century from defence and status matters 
to economic, social, cultural and environmental issues. External interests of 
subnational governments used to be entirely subordinated to ￿national security￿ 
issues. But, increasingly, non-military issues such as trade, investment, energy 
transfers, environment, cultural exchange, migration, commuting workers, drug 
traffic, epidemics and social issues would find their place on the foreign relations￿ 
agenda. Usually, these issues are still considered less important than national 
security, military balance or diplomatic status (￿hard security￿). However, in some 
cases, they are considered equally important now.
61 
It is noteworthy that some authors see one single event with its 
consequences as the trigger for subnational foreign activities. Several authors 
consider one of the major reasons for subnational units to enter the international 
system the oil embargo imposed by OPEC in 1973 and the energy crisis that 
followed.
62 The ￿oil shock￿ and its global consequences increased the awareness 
of subnational elites of vulnerability to distant events.
63 
In more recent publications, authors have included in the list of external 
reasons the emergence of transnational regimes for military purposes (NATO), for 
trade (NAFTA), for political integration - formulating and implementing common 
policies, such as common security and foreign policy or common monetary policy 
                                                 
60 For the full list of external reasons for subnational foreign activities see Soldatos (1990), p. 48. 
61 For more on the evolving understanding of security issues read Duchacek (1990), p. 2. 
62 At least two authors point the so-called oil-shock out as a catalyst for the beginning of subnational 
foreign activities: Duchacek (1990), p. 6, and Hocking (1997), pp. 94-95. 
63 In Duchacek￿s view the perception of subnational actors that they are affected by events in distant 
countries leads to subnational foreign activities, see Duchacek (1988), p. 7.  
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- (EU) and for the protection of human rights (European Convention on Human 
Rights). As these regimes deal with issues partly under subnational jurisdiction or 
on their territory, they are bound to ￿draw regions into the international arena￿.
64  
Hocking believes that the ￿hybrid actorness￿ of subnational governmental 
units, i.e. the ability to operate simultaneously or sequentially in various networks 
(subnational, governmental, intergovernmental, transgovernmental), encourages 
them to engage in subnational foreign activities, as it may be advantageous. Still, 
from these networks, the governmental and intergovernmental channels would 
offer the shortest way to achieve their goals in terms of subnational foreign 
activities.
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Keating (1999), p. 1. As we shall see later in this thesis, the EU and NATO enlargements have been 
powerful factors behind subnational regional foreign activities in Pskov, too. 
65 Hocking believes that participation in networks including the national government are the most 
efficient way for subnational units to pursue their international goals, in Hocking-(1999), pp. 29-30.   
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1.4. Conceptual Framework: Types of Subnational Foreign 
Activities 
A number of concepts have been proposed to explain the subject of this 
study, foreign activities of subnational governmental units. Most authors have 
accepted the concept of paradiplomacy developed by Duchacek. Other authors, 
however, argue that we need more sophisticated concepts to analyse these 
activities. The following concepts have been proposed: paradiplomacy (formerly 
microdiplomacy), protodiplomacy, paradiplomatic action, segmentation (formerly 
fragmentation), transnational relations, comparison with similar entities, 
international actorness and plurinational diplomacy.  
Duchacek is a pioneer of the research of subnational foreign activities. He 
developed the concepts of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in the 1980s. He 
defines paradiplomacy as a parallel, subsidiary or accessory form of diplomacy. 
He sees no major differences between the traditional, central-state diplomacy and 
paradiplomacy in terms of its aims, which is ￿negotiating and implementing an 
agreement based on conditional mutuality￿, i.e. both sides solemnly promise to 
behave in a certain way in the future, provided the other party will honour the 
agreement as well. Both on para- and macrodiplomatic level, there is no common 
superior authority to be called in if the agreement is not honoured.  Despite the 
absence of institutions able to enforce such diplomatic agreements, the  
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circumstance that both sides normally remain interested in the advantages of the 
respective agreement guarantees the mutual adherence to it.
66  
According to Duchacek there are three categories of paradiplomacy, which 
are based on the criteria of geography and territory.
67 The first category is called 
transborder regional paradiplomacy. This category includes transborder contacts 
between adjacent regions - institutional, formal and informal - which are 
predominantly conditioned by geographic proximity and the resulting similarity in 
the nature of common problems and their possible solutions, such as border 
crossings by migrants and immigrants, movement of goods, fight against 
smuggling, drug traffic or excess purchases on the other side of the border (for 
example, the shopping sprees of US American citizens in Mexico in the wake of 
numerous devaluations of the Mexican peso), joint management of water 
resources, energy transfer (transfer of hydroelectric power between Quebec, New 
York State, and New England states, for example), etc.  
The second category, transregional  or macroregional paradiplomacy 
refers to relations and negotiations between ￿subnational governments￿ that are 
not neighbours geographically, but whose national governments are. 
Transregional paradiplomacy is more formal in its nature than transborder 
paradiplomacy. This can cause conflicts with diplomatic protocol.  
The third category by Duchacek is global paradiplomacy: political-
functional contacts with distant nations that bring ￿non-central governments￿ into 
contact not only with trade, industrial, or cultural centres on other continents but 
also with various branches or agencies of foreign national governments. 
                                                 
66 Duchacek (1990), pp. 16, 25. 
67 More on these three categories of subnational foreign activities can be found in Duchacek (1990), 
pp.15-27.  
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Duchacek illustrates this category by the example of the Canadian province of 
Quebec, which has permanent missions in Paris, Brussels and Tokyo.  Global 
paradiplomatic initiatives are part of the ￿transborder regional contacts￿ in Europe, 
too. For example, German L￿nder, French regions and Belgian communities are 
engaged in global paradiplomacy with various partners worldwide.
68 
The second concept from Duchacek is called protodiplomacy. 
Protodiplomacy is fundamentally different from paradiplomacy as far as its 
objectives are concerned. In Duchacek￿s definition, protodiplomacy refers to 
subnational foreign initiatives and activities of federated units, which are likely to 
have a separatist final objective. Protodiplomatic activities in the fields of external 
economic relations and social or cultural links with foreign nations are of 
preparatory nature. More precisely, in the case of protodiplomacy, federated units 
use foreign activities in their preparations for future secession; it would pave the 
way for a future recognition of a new sovereign unit in the international system. 
In order to explain protodiplomacy Duchacek uses the political criterion, i. e. the 
political will of federated units to secede, expressed by protodiplomacy. He uses 
for illustration the example of the Canadian province of Quebec, which has 
undertaken various protodiplomatic activities since 1960s.
69 
In 1990, Feldman & Feldman proposed the use of comparison when 
evaluating subnational foreign activities.  In their view, six dimensions should be 
taken into account: motivations, bureaucratic organization, budgets, external 
presence, geographic emphasis, and the nature of activity.
70 This is a rather 
                                                 
68 See Duchacek (1990), pp. 13, 26-27.  
69 Ibid, p. 27. 
70 The proposal to use comparison as a method for analysing subnational foreign activities was made in 
Feldman/Feldman (1988), pp.  69-80.  
 
 
 
 
 
56
descriptive approach, however, because no in-depth analysis follows the 
description. 
In the early 1990s, Soldatos proposed an adapted version of the concept of 
segmentation.
71 In his view, there are two types of segmentation: (1) territorial or 
vertical segmentation and (2) functional or horizontal segmentation. Territorial 
segmentation would occur on different levels ￿ federal, federated, municipal ￿ of 
government. When it comes to the relationship between the federal level and the 
federated level, there is not always a clear subordination between them in terms of 
power and importance in this context, he argues. Functional segmentation, on the 
other hand, refers to a situation, where different departments and agencies of the 
same governmental level are engaged in foreign activities. He believes functional 
segmentation is caused by the ￿domestication￿ of foreign policy.  
Territorial segmentation has four sub-levels. The concept of segmentation 
explains how the first level, objective or situational segmentation in a territorial 
unit, which is caused by objective factors such as peculiar features of the unit: 
economic structures, geographic situation, and political, linguistic, cultural, and 
religious background, leads to perceptual  or  image  segmentation. Perceptual 
segmentation is the segmentation of perceptions, loyalties, conceptions of 
interests of the elites and populations in the unit, ￿based on the reality of objective 
segmentation or on a perception of such segmentation￿. Consequently, he believes 
that perceptual segmentation can be based on false perceptions of the local elites 
and populations. Perceptual segmentation is the reason for the phenomenon of 
￿many voices￿ in foreign policy. 
                                                 
71 This concept was originally proposed by Ivo D Duchacek in Duchacek (1984): ￿The International 
Dimension of Subnational Self-Government￿, Publius, 14/4 (1984), pp. 5-31.  
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The previous two levels of segmentation would lead to the third sub-level 
of segmentation, policy segmentation. Policy segmentation means that in a 
federated system numerous positions on foreign issues coexist. Policy 
segmentation can cause actor segmentation, which is the fourth sub-level of 
segmentation:  the occurrence of the previous levels can encourage federated units 
to use their institutions for developing ￿foreign-policy activities￿. However, if a 
federated unit is relatively well-positioned in the federation it will ￿ despite the 
policy segmentation ￿ accommodate itself with the federal foreign policy 
apparatus and use it for its own advantage, i.e. actor segmentation would not 
occur.
72 
Soldatos claims that actor and policy segmentation are the two essential 
elements of federated units￿ paradiplomacy and defines it as ￿direct and, in 
various instances, autonomous involvement of federated units in external-
relations-activities￿. The concept of paradiplomacy Soldatos uses is different from 
Duchacek￿s in one aspect. He uses the term global when classifying categories of 
paradiplomacy in a functional rather than geographic meaning, i.e. global 
paradiplomacy deals with issues of global concern, such as peace and war or trade 
liberalisation.
73 
The second concept from Soldatos, the concept of paradiplomatic actions, 
uses the degree of cooperation between central government and federated units in 
the field of foreign activities as the criterion. Consequently, the paradiplomatic 
actions are categorised as cooperative/supportive or parallel/substitutive.  
Cooperative action can be taken by federated units either in a coordinated way 
                                                 
72 Soldatos (1990), pp. 36-37. 
73 In the case of global paradiplomacy subnational units deal with issues affecting the international 
system as a whole, see Soldatos (1990), p. 37  
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(coordinated by the federal government) or as a joint action of the federal 
government and federated unit(s). Parallel action, on the other hand, can be taken 
by federated units in harmony or in disharmony with the federal government. 
Federal institutions do not always monitor the paradiplomatic actions taken in 
harmony with the federal government. The actions taken in disharmony with the 
federal government are a potential source of conflict with the centre.
74 
In recent publications, other concepts have been proposed. Hocking, for 
example, argued in 1999 that both concepts, paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, 
would indicate that these activities are merely imitations of diplomacy on 
subnational level. He disagrees on this and, in his concept, called the concept of 
international actorness, new criteria are used to evaluate foreign activities of 
subnational units. No longer the traditional criteria ￿ sovereignty, territory, 
population, recognition, foreign policy capacity ￿ but alternative criteria ￿ aims 
and motivations, extent and direction of involvement, structures and resources, 
levels of participation, strategies ￿ should be applied.  
This approach would help to clarify the confusion caused by the fact that 
some of the traditional criteria, such as territory, population and sovereignty, are 
shared by federations and federated units. Additionally, it would end the debate as 
to who are important actors in world politics. In 1988 Feldman & Feldman made 
a similar attempt, although not in a similarly sophisticated way (see above). 
Hocking￿s concept is aimed at measuring international actorness. He 
underlines that several important aspects need to be kept in mind when measuring 
                                                 
74 Soldatos (1990), p. 38.  
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the extent of engagement of subnational governmental units in the field of foreign 
activities:
 75 
As far as the ￿aims and motivations￿ are concerned, he warns us not to 
confuse subnational foreign activities with foreign policy. We should not forget 
that, for example, the representations of subnational governmental units abroad 
have usually very limited scope and resources. In fact, they often consist of a 
single part-time consultant. He believes the main focus of subnational foreign 
activities is on trade issues, especially on non-tariff barriers and regulation. The 
increasingly complex and fluid nature of the policy-making processes forces 
actors to seeks new ways to intervene; subnational foreign activities is an 
important tool in this respect as it enables subnational governmental units to build 
alliances with similar actors in other states or participate in international forums to 
make their voices heard. 
The ￿extent and direction of involvement￿ is affected by several factors: 
bureaucratic resources, geographic location, location in policy environments (EU, 
NAFTA, etc.), asymmetry within the given federal system and powers assigned to 
subnational governmental units. Subnational foreign activities are characterised 
by continuity and their focus on specific issues (￿low policy￿, i.e. non-military 
agenda). Subnational governmental units become increasingly interested in non-
military security issues, such as drug trafficking, climate change or BSE (￿mad 
cow disease￿). 
The ￿structures and resources￿ of subnational governmental units depend 
mainly on the diversity and wealth of a particular unit. Hocking reminds us not to 
measure the international actorness in terms of financial resources available only. 
                                                 
75 Hocking (1999), p. 21-35.  
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Often, bureaucratic resources are of paramount importance. For example, in some 
policy issues such as fishery the central government alone may be deficient, 
whereas subnational governmental units can offer high-quality expertise. When 
compared to subnational private actors, subnational governmental units enjoy 
crucial privileges as they can access national diplomatic networks and 
international negotiations. 
Hocking writes that the ￿levels of participation￿ is the most important 
input in the concept of international actorness. The variety of networks in which 
subnational governmental units can operate includes subnational, governmental, 
intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational organisations. These 
networks are now less clearly defined and the interaction and interdependence 
between them is more evident. Moreover, they are no longer dominated by states, 
as a growing number of new actors have entered the networks. In fact, the success 
of central government in achieving its foreign-policy goals in these networks is 
increasingly determined by its ability to boost relations with other types of actors, 
such as subnational governmental units, and even adopting their behaviour in 
some cases. 
The above-mentioned inputs are necessary for measuring the ￿international 
actorness￿ of subnational units. The evaluation of subnational foreign activities, 
based on the findings from this input cannot be accurate if we do not abandon the 
state-centred foreign policy paradigm, Hocking argues. Instead, we should 
examine the ￿international actorness￿ in the context of ￿multilayered policy 
environments￿ that constitute world politics. These environments are 
characterized by the interdependence of actors and the potential of ￿linked 
strategies￿ for various networks. This new approach would enable us to more  
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accurately explore the diversity of subnational foreign activities. However, no 
￿coherence in the patterns underpinning regional internationalization￿ would exist. 
Moreover, in terms of foreign activities, subnational governmental units are as 
little unitary actors as are the states. 
Hocking distinguishes between two categories of strategies of subnational 
governmental units for foreign activities: mediating and primary strategies. In the 
case of mediating strategies, subnational governmental units use their access to 
the national policy-makers, including intergovernmental networks that deal with 
issues under (partial) subnational jurisdiction. Primary strategies, on the other 
hand, presume ￿direct international action￿. Those subnational governmental units 
would consider primary strategies that think their foreign interests are not 
sufficiently represented by central government. Not every subnational 
governmental unit is free to choose between these strategies, however. Hocking 
believes that peripheral subnational governmental units are more likely to choose 
primary strategies, although they often lack the resources to be directly present 
abroad.  
Hocking effectively disputes the validity of all previous concepts for 
explaining subnational foreign activities. They are preoccupied, in his opinion, 
with the out-of-date state-centred foreign-policy paradigm. He comes to the 
conclusion that subnational governmental units are ￿hybrid actors￿ in the 
international system. Their ability to operate simultaneously and sequentially in 
different networks makes it impossible to explain subnational foreign activities 
using the state-centred foreign-policy paradigm with its emphasis on the role of 
governmental and intergovernmental networks.   
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The concept of transnational relations deals with subnational foreign 
activities in a specific case. Risse-Kappen, who in the 1990s reactivated the 
discourse on transnational relations, believes that there is a direct correlation 
between transnational foreign activities and subnational governmental units.   
When we analyse the interactions between transnational units such as 
multinational companies and international non-governmental organisations on the 
one side and domestic/international structures of governance on the other side, 
then we discover that the success of transnational foreign activities directly 
depends on the response from state structures￿ both national and subnational - 
Risse-Kappen argues.
76 
The last concept on our list is the concept of plurinational diplomacy. This 
concept has been developed in order to explain subnational foreign activities in 
the context of a supranational organisation, the European Union. Aldecoa, the 
author of this concept, regrets that both concepts ￿ paradiplomacy and 
protodiplomacy ￿ are too old-fashioned to explain the ￿transformed diplomacy￿ in 
the contemporary world.  
Aldecoa argues that the EU is affecting both national and subnational 
foreign activities of member states substantially. Therefore, a new concept to 
explain these activities in the EU is thought to be necessary. He has introduced 
the concept of plurinational diplomacy for the study of the EU￿s subnational 
foreign activities. Plurinational diplomacy is, in Aldecoa￿s definition, ￿definition, 
decision and execution of matters of foreign relations which in a plurinational 
                                                 
76 For more on transnational foreign activities and on their interaction with subnational foreign 
activities see Risse-Kappen (1995): Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.). Bringing Transnational Relations 
Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.   
 
 
 
 
 
63
state are the object of formalised political negotiation, whether it is executed at 
the level of central administration or autonomous substate administration￿. In 
other words central administration needs to consider the interests of subnational 
units in its foreign-policy decisions. Subnational units, for their part need a ￿state 
dimension￿ in their foreign activities. In order to meet the challenges of shared 
sovereignty, it is necessary to redefine the making of foreign-policy, Aldecoa 
argues.
77 
The member states should take into account both the European dimension 
and the ￿sub-state￿ dimension in the contemporary EU. Aldecoa makes some 
rather provocative proposals, arguing that ￿substatal￿ units should be asked to 
participate in the negotiations of treaties on shared, i.e. state and subnational, 
competences, their treaty-making capacity should be recognised, a multicultural 
and plurinational citizenship should be introduced and a ￿double loyalty￿ of 
￿substatal￿ units in foreign-policy issues units is to be permitted.
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Aldecoa (1999): (Aldecoa , Francisco. ￿Towards Plurinational Democracy in the Deeper and Wider 
European Union (1985-2005),￿ in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in 
Action: TheForeign Relations of Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, pp. 
84, 90. 
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1.5. Instruments   
As far as the instruments available to subnational units for foreign 
activities are concerned, there is no standard, internationally accepted, set of rules. 
Legal and political discussions continue, what kind of instruments are subnational 
units entitled to use when dealing with foreign issues. 
As was mentioned in the section 1.2. Subnational actors in the 
international system some authors in the field of subnational foreign activities 
often omit the issue of the legal basis for these activities. I believe, however, that 
it is important to examine what the international law, constitutions and federal 
laws say about the right of federated units to use different instruments in their 
foreign activities. 
From the viewpoint of international law, the relevant question is, whether 
subnational federated units of federation possess international personality. 
International law does not establish clearly the right of federated units to engage 
in the international system independently from federal government, i.e. possess 
international personality. Despite this, some experts believe they are not banned 
from doing so either. Shaw, for example, argues that federated units, which have 
been ￿provided with certain restricted international competence￿ by the 
constitution of their respective federation, may be considered, from the  
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perspective of the international law, as having a ￿degree of international 
personality￿.
79 This rather vague definition leads us to the next question. If 
federated units have a ￿degree of international personality￿, are they entitled to 
enter legally binding international documents with foreign counterparts? 
Article 5 (2) of the International Law Commission￿s Draft Articles on the 
Law of Treaties was an attempt to establish the right of federated units to 
conclude internationally binding documents with foreign counterparts. In the 
1950s the opinions differed on whether federated units can conclude ￿treaties in 
the meaning of international law￿ (Lauterpacht) or are they only entitled to act as 
agents on behalf of the federation, which is a subject of international law and is, 
therefore, the entity bound by the treaty and responsible for its implementation 
(Fitzmaurice). An amendment was proposed to the Vienna Conference on the 
Law of Treaties, which would have entitled ￿member states of a federal union￿ to 
￿possess a capacity to conclude foreign treaties if such capacity is admitted by the 
federal constitution and within the limits there laid down￿, i. e. to possess 
international personality. In 1969, the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties 
rejected this draft proposal, which would have granted federated units the right to 
conclude treaties, for two reasons. Firstly, this amendment would have enabled 
third states to intervene in the internal affairs of federal states by ￿seeking to 
interpret the constitutions of the latter￿. Secondly, this change would have 
￿unduly￿ enhanced the powers of domestic law in issues of international 
personality at the cost of international law.
80  
                                                 
79 For more on the legal aspects of subnational foreign activities see Shaw (1991): Shaw, Malcolm N. 
International Law. Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991, p. 152.  
80 Ibid, pp. 152-153.  
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In recent publications, the right of subnational units to conclude treaties 
has been defined more clearly. O￿Brien claims that, from standpoint of the 
international law, subnational units of a state may, if it is allowed by the 
constitution, conclude treaties with foreign counterparts in ￿matters of local 
interest￿, such as maintenance of joint facilities and infrastructure.
81 
The Council of Europe has approved the Convention on Transfrontier 
Cooperation
82 in 1980, and the additional Protocol in 1995. Especially the 
additional Protocol brought some clarity to the issue of rights of subnational units 
to conclude agreements with their counterparts on the other side of the border. 
The Protocol establishes the right of regional units to conclude agreements on 
cooperation under their administrative jurisdiction.
83 
The federation must decide whether to allow its federated units to possess 
a degree of international personality or capability. Federal states have found 
several ways to deal with subnational foreign activities. The right of federated 
units to use the instrument of treaty-making is established by the federal 
constitution.  
Federal constitutions vary widely in terms of rights of federated units￿ 
foreign activities. Some constitutions grant federated units the right to enter 
international agreements ￿exceptionally￿ (Switzerland), others establish central 
government as the sole international actor (India, Pakistan, Mexico, etc.), whereas 
in certain federations the constitutions allow federated units to enter international 
                                                 
81 O￿Brien (2001): O￿Brien, John. International Law. London: Lavendish Publishing, 2001, pp. 145-
146.  
82 For the text of the convention and the additional protocol see the homepage of the Council of Europe 
at www.coe.int. 
83 Sodupe (1999): Sodupe, Kepa. ￿The European Union and Inter-regional Co-operation￿, in Francisco 
Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational 
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agreements in ￿more or less strictly confined circumstances￿  (the United Arab 
Emirates, Argentina, etc.). In some federations, the constitution, without granting 
international capacity to federated units, seeks to protect them from their opinion 
being ignored in external relations on issues under their jurisdiction by the central 
government. Generally, experts believe that there is a contradiction between 
effective national foreign policy and advanced protection by the constitution of 
the right of subnational units￿ foreign activities: when the positions of central 
government on foreign policy issues differ from those of the federated units, and 
such a situation is perceived abroad, the federation￿s international bargaining 
position weakens. Despite these aspects, for two reasons, the debate on the issues 
of subnational foreign activities of federated units is bound to continue. Firstly, 
federated units are still capable of entering into agreements with foreign states, 
unless it is established as the exclusive right of the federal government by the 
constitution. Secondly, the central government is capable of ￿invading￿ issues 
under subnational jurisdiction by entering and effectuating international 
agreements on these issues.
84 
Besides signing legally binding documents with foreign partners, there are 
several other instruments that subnational units can use for foreign activities. 
Generally, Duchacek argues, subnational units have two options to choose from: 
they can try to persuade the central government to pursue their interests on their 
behalf or they can go it alone. When they choose the first option, the subnational 
units use lobbying efforts toward central government branches. When they decide 
                                                 
84 For more on the constitutional aspects of subnational foreign activities see Craven (1993): Craven, 
Greg. ￿Federal Constitutions and External Relations,￿ in Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Relations and 
Federal States. London: Leicester University Press, 1993, pp. 9-26.   
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to act independently, the subnational units develop trans-sovereign contacts; a 
practice that can cause conflict with the official foreign policy.
85 
Duchacek indicates seven main formulas for subnational foreign activities. 
The first formula is the establishment of permanent offices in foreign capitals, 
which both encourage the inflow of foreign investments, and help  officials of the 
administration of a subnational unit to communicate with foreign national 
governments, and gather relevant information for various lobbying activities. 
Second, subnational units organise visits of their top-level officials abroad. These 
visits are usually well-promoted and well-publicized. Third, subnational 
governments send fact-finding missions to gather information on a particular 
subject. Fourth, subnational units send their representatives to trade and 
investment shows, with emphasis on tourism promotion. Fifth, they establish on 
their territories foreign trade zones.. Sixth, they participate in the work of 
international conferences or organisations. Seventh, they appoint own 
representatives to the diplomatic missions of the federal government abroad. This 
practice is called co-location. In Canada, for example, several provinces had 
appointed their ￿foreign service officers￿ to Canadian diplomatic representations 
abroad.
 86 
Soldatos adds to the list of instruments for actors in the field of 
subnational foreign activities full membership or observer status in 
intergovernmental organizations.
87  
To sum up, there is no uniform catalogue of what instruments federated 
units are entitled to use in their foreign activities. It is an issue which is still 
                                                 
85 Duchacek (1988), p 5.  
86 In Duchacek (1990), pp. 14-15, and in Duchacek (1988), p. 13. 
87 In Soldatos (1990), p. 29.  
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subject to continuous interaction between the international community, federal 
centres and federated units. Meanwhile, subnational governmental units 
experiment with different instruments, including entering and effectuating 
treaties, agreements and compacts with foreign states or with their subnational 
governmental units. In some cases, subnational units have set up their own foreign 
ministries, etc. 
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1.6. Consequences of Subnational Foreign Activities 
The benefits of foreign activities to subnational units have been questioned 
in recent publications. As subnational units often lack necessary resources, such 
as competent staff, expertise, and funds, there has been some disillusionment in 
recent years. Some authors indicate that subnational units are now more critically 
evaluating the results of their foreign activities. In some cases, after having added 
up the total costs of these activities, some subnational units find the results of 
doubtful value￿.
88 
Even if subnational foreign activities have not brought the expected 
advantages to subnational governmental units, they have changed centre-
periphery relations. Many federated units struggle for more autonomy, in different 
policy areas, such as foreign economic relations and cross-border or trans-border 
cooperation, where the right to deal directly with foreign partners is certainly an 
important issue. Although the foreign activities of subnational units need not 
necessarily harm federal interests, national centres tend to observe them with a 
degree of suspicion.  
How are subnational foreign activities affecting states federations as a 
whole? Paradiplomacy is normally not ￿state-transforming￿ Keating is convinced, 
i.e. the aim is not to establish and independent state. Except for in states such as 
Canada or Belgium, which are disintegrating for other reasons than subnational 
foreign activities. There, these activities are, indeed, of ￿state-forming￿ nature.
89 
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How does a national centre react to subnational foreign activities? In a 
democratic state the federal centre cannot try and suppress the subnational units￿ 
wish for autonomous foreign activities. Therefore, different mechanisms have 
been developed by federal centres to enable to supervise, coordinate, and control, 
those activities. Kincaid advises federal governments not to try and retake control 
over subnational foreign activities at any price. In fact, it would require a large 
bureaucracy to supervise these activities and review every foreign agreement 
concluded on the subnational level. Therefore, Kincaid advocates the use of ￿soft 
law￿ in this context. ￿Soft law￿ is a concept common in international commerce 
since the 1980s. It refers to voluntary agreements and codes of conduct, usually of 
an informal nature. The Council of American States in Europe, a voluntary body 
of the US American states active in Europe, for example, uses the concept of soft 
law for governing interstate competition.
90 
Hocking thinks better coordination would be mutually advantageous, to 
both central government and subnational units. Subnational units lack the 
international information, communication networks and other resources that the 
diplomatic service offers to central government. And they lack international 
recognition. Central government, for its part, would gain from access to local 
interests. According to Hocking, there are two types of coordination: sectoral 
(focusing on sectoral policy issues) and strategic (aiming at interrelating the 
demands flowing from policy sectors within the overall external policy).  Hocking 
explains that federal states differ in their use of linkages for coordinating 
subnational foreign activities. Whichever mechanisms a federal state decides to 
choose, both the central government and federal public servants may be reluctant 
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to accept subnational units in the fields they regard as ￿their own exclusive 
preserve￿.
91 
The phenomenon of subnational foreign activities has consequences that 
reach beyond national borders. In Duchacek￿s view, one of the consequences of 
transborder paradiplomacy is the emergence of a new subcategory of international 
regimes, which are based on the co-operative frameworks on both sides of 
sovereign borders. There is a similarity in the relations of two contiguous 
sovereign states and the relations of contiguous subnational units: there is no 
authority that would be superordinate to both actors. Therefore, decisions must be 
taken on consensual basis, as they cannot be enforced and must be followed 
voluntarily. The emergence of this new subcategory is encouraged by the 
imperatives of regional interdependence, especially the need to facilitate the trans-
sovereign cross-border movement of persons, goods, energy, etc.
92 
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1.7. Outlook 
In the related literature, some authors have predicted scenarios for the 
future of subnational foreign activities in federal states. Other authors have taken 
a more focused approach and deal with the future of subnational foreign activities 
in a single state only. The fact that authors propose a relatively high number of 
scenarios indicates how difficult it is to foresee the future of subnational foreign 
activities, because it is subjected to many factors such as global political changes, 
changes in inner-federal centre-periphery relations, evolution of International 
Law, etc. 
More than ten years ago, Duchacek outlined four possible global scenarios 
for the future of subnational foreign activities. A further segmentation could not 
be ruled out, he wrote. In his first scenario, secessionist fragmentation, 
subnational units would be engaged in protodiplomacy, and prepare for a possible 
secession in the future. Consequently, subnational foreign activities would be 
directed against the interests of the federal centre, which is normally not 
interested in a secession of its federated units. The second scenario, tight 
centralisation in foreign policy, would be a reaction by the central authorities to 
the concern that there were too many international actors inside the state. This 
concern would result in suppression of subnational foreign activities. The third 
scenario, combinative foreign policy, would mean that the foreign policy would 
be coordinated between federal centre and federated units, except for matters of 
national security, which would be under the sole jurisdiction of the centre. The 
fourth scenario, co-operative/competitive segmentation, is a mixture of 
cooperation between central government authorities and subnational units in some  
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areas of foreign activities, and competition or duplication in the others. This 
scenario would allow the subnational governments to establish separate missions 
abroad, send their officials to foreign states and become either full members or 
observers of intergovernmental organisations. In his personal evaluation, 
Duchacek considered the last scenario the most likely.
93 
Soldatos does not regard paradiplomacy a temporary activity.  But the 
nature of paradiplomacy would change in the course of time, he argues, as it 
would be subject to the rationalization process: the more integrated a federal 
system becomes; the stronger would be the drive to rationalize the foreign policy 
process. The rationalization process prevents actor segmentation from causing 
policy segmentation, as the national elites are able and willing to react to actor 
segmentation by offering conflict management and providing mechanisms for the 
articulation and exertion of subnational foreign interests. If this should be the 
case, subnational foreign activities would help to rationalize the foreign-policy 
process in general.
94  
Kincaid, on the other hand, sees the future of subnational foreign activities 
as one aspect of the general struggle of federated units against federal centre. In 
the end, he argues, subnational foreign activities would force the states to accept 
the fact that the ￿cartelistic international arena is a pluralistic international 
arena.￿
95 
Keating thinks that, ironically, federated units could subsequently become 
￿victims￿ of the globalisation process, which had encouraged them to enter the 
international arena in the first place. Inside subnational federated units, other 
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subnational units, such as private groups, could aspire to act in the international 
system independently. If the leadership of a particular federated unit has failed to 
articulate the interests of these new actors, new coalitions of subnational units 
could emerge to challenge it in the field of foreign activities.
96 
Makarychev focuses his prognosis on the future of subnational foreign 
activities in a single federal state. Instead of proposing abstract global scenarios 
he links the future of subnational foreign activities to ￿geopolitical scenarios￿, 
which would affect all aspects of the federation. He outlines six of such scenarios 
for the Russian Federation and predicts how the occurrence of those scenarios 
would affect subnational foreign activities.   The first scenario, Optimal, brings a 
gradual integration of Russia with the West, accompanied by liberal market 
reforms. The regions would then become ￿juncture points￿ of modernization and 
￿gates to the global world￿. The second scenario, Realpolitik, means a continuing 
division of spheres of influence between Russia and the West. The regions 
bordering CIS states would be encouraged to engage in subnational foreign 
activities whereas other regions would become isolated internationally. The third 
scenario, called ￿Malign￿ by Makarychev, refers to direct confrontation between 
Russia and the West. For the Western regions of Russia this setting gives the role 
of ￿security barriers￿. The Far Eastern regions of Russia, on the other hand, would 
be considered important gateways to China, an important partner. Next comes 
Huntington or Clash of civilisations, which would bring complete chaos to both 
the federation and its members. Ethnic regions would use violence in order to 
secede from the federation. The following scenario, Imperial Russia, means a 
minimization of the autonomy of regions and re-centralisation.  Last comes the 
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perspective of Russia becoming a confederation. In a confederated Russia, 
regrouping and enlargement of regions would take place. Those larger entities 
would seek international roles in a new situation.  
The author believes the first two scenarios, Optimal and Realpolitik, are 
the most likely to occur, i.e. the integration of Russia in the West or the 
continuous struggle for spheres of influence without direct conflict.
97 For a more 
detailed analysis of the scenarios proposed by Makarychev see section 2.3. 
Russian regions in the international system. 
Hocking, instead of outlining any scenarios, predicts that subnational 
foreign activities would continue having an ￿aura of inappropriateness￿. The 
reason for this is the absence of a clearly identified place for these activities in 
world politics.
98 
 
 
 
 
1.8. Examples 
In this section several examples will be discussed of how federal states are 
handling subnational foreign activities. There are relevant differences between 
federations in terms of foreign activities of their subnational units. Similarly, there 
are differences between continents in this respect. In Europe, the European Union 
has crucially influenced the subnational foreign activities. In North America, on 
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the other hand, the integration of states is less advanced and affects 
economic/trade issues mainly. 
The examples of the United States of America, the Canadian province of 
Quebec, the European Union, Federal Republic of Germany and Kingdom of 
Belgium were chosen for the following reasons. The example of the United States 
of America demonstrates that subnational foreign activities are not a new 
phenomenon in world politics after all. The second example, the Canadian 
province of Quebec, is probably the best-publicised case of protodiplomacy. The 
European Union deserves attention because of its unique institutions and policies, 
which directly affect subnational foreign activities in its member states. The 
German example reveals an interesting modus operandi for intra-federal 
articulation and aggregation of foreign interests, from which some other federal 
states could draw useful conclusions. In the Kingdom of Belgium, on the other 
hand, the central government has tried the opposite. Instead of trying to facilitate 
the foreign activities of the members of the federation it has attempted ￿ 
unsuccessfully - to centralise them.  
 
 
 
1.8.1. US States 
The subnational foreign activities of the US states have a long history. 
Despite the long tradition, for various reasons that are discussed below, these 
activities remain a minor business for federated and municipal units of the US.  
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Two centuries ago, the US states were very difficult to control by the 
federal centre. For example, they were ignoring the foreign treaties negotiated by 
the Congress. Although the Congress had the power to regulate the commerce 
with foreign states and the President was in charge of foreign treaties, both 
institutions lacked one important thing to support foreign policy: the military 
force. The member states of the federation, and not the federal centre, were in 
control of the major military force in the country ￿ the militia. It was only in the 
year 1812 that the states lost this crucial leverage of foreign policy.
99 
Nowadays, the US states are, by Constitution, forbidden to enter into 
agreements or compacts with a foreign nation without the consent of Congress.
100 
In real life, however, Congress only reserves the right to abrogate agreements that 
￿contravene US foreign policy or suborn US sovereignty￿.
101 Therefore, states are 
relatively free to act, but must keep in mind the interests of the US as a whole. 
Despite this freedom, the US states have been rather passive in terms of 
subnational foreign activities. In fact, they only spend approximately 0.3 per cent 
of their budget on foreign activities. Kincaid indicates several reasons for this 
inactivity. First, local voters do not seem to think the elected state officials should 
engage in foreign activities, as they do not consider them beneficial to the state. 
Second, the US is an attractive destination for foreign investors; therefore, no 
further engagement is needed. Third, state officials rely to a great extent on 
private business in foreign issues. Fourth, state officials see the domestic 
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competition between states far more significant than global competition.
102 As 
another author, Fry, puts it, the subnational foreign activities of the US states can 
be seen as a ￿civil war for foreign money￿.
103  
In spite of the domination of economic issues, the member states have 
some interest in foreign policy issues, too. In the process of foreign policy 
making, states can make their voices heard using the congressmen and senators in 
Washington. The Congress makes states important players in the US foreign 
policy, because party loyalties are often less important than the geographic 
location of the constituency of a Congressman or Senator.
104  
To sum up, despite the relatively broad rights in terms of foreign activities, 
the federated units of the US are not very active in the international system. 
Nevertheless, the potential political and economic leverage many US states have 
is enormous. As some US states would rank among the richest nations in the 
world if taken separately, they could certainly change the international 
environment by acting more independently from the central government.  
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1.8.2. Quebec 
Quebec is an interesting case of protodiplomacy. The well-published 
activities of this Canadian province are rather instructive, as they indicate that 
central governments may tolerate paradiplomatic activities of federated units, but 
certainly not protodiplomacy, which is aimed at future secession of the 
subnational unit, which endangers the territorial integrity of a federation. 
Both the media and researchers have in detail examined the nature of 
Quebec￿s  para- and protodiplomatic activities. Several authors, for example 
Duchacek, E. J. Feldman, L.G. Feldman, Balthazar, have analysed the foreign 
activities of Quebec. Some authors think that, in fact, Quebec is the most 
advanced case of subnational foreign activities in world.
105  
When Quebec began to act in the international system in the 1960s, 
Canadian foreign policy was still young and fragile. Encouraged by the French 
President Charles de Gaulle, Quebec opened its delegation in Paris in 1961. 
London followed in 1962, and subsequently delegations were opened in all major 
European and American cities. The aim was to become a ￿fully-fledged 
international actor￿.
106 
In 1965, Mr Gerin-Lajoie, the then-Minister of Education of Quebec, 
made the so-called ￿Gerin-Lajoie doctrine￿ public. He declared that Quebec was 
￿/￿/ not sovereign in all matters: it is a member of a federation. But it constitutes, 
in a political sense, a state. It possesses all elements: territory, population, 
autonomous government. It is also the political expression of a people that is 
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distinct in many ways from the English-speaking communities inhabiting North 
America /￿/ Quebec is determined to take its proper place in the contemporary 
world.￿ That document is now considered the foundation of foreign activities of 
Quebec.
107 
The case of Quebec is specific, because a third, external, party ￿ the 
central government of a foreign state ￿ has been actively approaching a 
subnational unit of another state. In 1969, de Gaulle spoke out his famous: ￿Vive 
le Quebec libre￿. The Canadian government became even more suspicious of 
Quebec foreign activities afterwards.
108 
What encouraged the Quebec province to enter the international system? 
Some authors argue that, inside the Canadian confederation, Quebec was 
interested in maintaining its special political and cultural position through 
subnational foreign activities. Because of this, in the 1960s and 1970s, Quebec 
was engaged in politically, culturally and educationally motivated foreign 
activities mainly. In the 1980s, however, its foreign activities became more 
economically motivated.
109 
The Canadian central government did not tolerate all types of foreign 
activities of Quebec. Especially, it was opposed to the possibility of full 
membership of Quebec in international organisations. In one case, the Canadian 
central government even broke diplomatic ties with the African state of Gabon, 
which had invited Quebec to participate ￿alone￿, i. e. Canada was not invited, in 
an educational conference for French-speaking countries in 1969. In a similar case 
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the central government accepted Quebec as a ￿participating government￿ inside 
the Canadian delegation. In Niger, in 1970, where the ACCT (￿Agence de 
cooperation culturelle et technique￿) was established, the representatives of 
Quebec were granted the right by the central government to express the views of 
the Quebec governments in issues under its jurisdiction.
110 
Some scholars believe that the struggle between Quebec and the federal 
centre is bound to continue. Balthazar indicates two reasons, why future co-
operation between Quebec and Ottawa in foreign activities will be complicated, if 
not impossible. First, Canada has adopted a new concept in foreign policy, which 
promotes it as a unitary state. Second, the emerging nationalism in Ottawa has 
provoked even more separatism in Quebec. Balthazar concludes that central 
governments only tolerate subnational foreign activities to a certain extent. 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 In Balthazar (1993), p. 142. 
111In Balthazar (1999), pp. 168-169.   
 
 
 
 
 
83
 
 
1.8.3. Germany 
The end of the Cold War ended the division of Germany, which had lasted 
for 45 years. Germany was reunified in 1990, as the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) incorporated the formerly Communist German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and the former capital Berlin was reunited, too. By this, the number of 
L￿nder (federated units) of the FRG increased from 10 to 16.  It was certainly not 
a ￿merger of equals￿, but rather a ￿takeover￿ of the GDR by the bigger and much 
wealthier Western Germany.  
Despite the economic difficulties and political changes that followed 
reunification, the German federal system managed to remain relatively stable. 
Compared to other federations, where federated units constantly struggle for more 
rights, the German system seems to offer its participants sufficient channels to 
articulate their interests in various policy issues, foreign-policy included. In 
practical life, this does not mean absolute freedom for federated units to engage in 
foreign activities, however. In fact, whatever the federated units do, they must not 
forget about the so-called principle of Bundestreue (￿federal comity￿). 
According to Michelmann, the German L￿nder have engaged in various 
types of subnational foreign activities, such as economic, regional paradiplomacy, 
international cultural and educational exchange and development aid. For this, the 
L￿nder have teamed up with different partners: non-governmental organisations 
(economic paradiplomacy), the federal government (economic paradiplomacy,  
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cultural and educational exchange, development aid) and subnational units of 
foreign states (regional paradiplomacy).
112  
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the constitutional framework for the 
conduct of foreign policy is clearly defined. The Basic Law regulates the rights of 
L￿nder in terms of foreign activities (Article 32). It defines the federation as the 
sole entity entitled to conduct relations with foreign states. However, it requires 
the federal government to consult the respective Land before signing any treaty in 
case the jurisdiction of that Land is affected. Additionally, the article grants the 
L￿nder the right to conclude treaties with foreign states in issues under their 
jurisdiction.
113 
As far as the L￿nder￿s exercise of the above-mentioned rights is 
concerned, there are three main options. Firstly, the L￿nder can directly 
participate in the foreign-policy process via the upper chamber of the parliament, 
the Bundesrat. Secondly, they can act independently by concluding treaties with 
foreign states or subnational units in questions under their jurisdiction (culture, 
education, etc.) or by maintaining representations in foreign states. Third, 
referring to the Lindau Agreement (Lindauer Abkommen), L￿nder may entrust 
federal government to represent their interests abroad by mutual agreement.  
The first option is especially important in EU matters; in other foreign 
questions the Bundesrat plays a rather symbolic role. The German federal system 
is somewhat exceptional, as the federated units￿ governments have been given full 
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and direct control over the upper chamber of the parliament. The L￿nder 
governments appoint their representatives to the Bundesrat independently. The 
quantity of those representatives depends on the size of population in the 
respective Land. The ideological background of the representatives depends on 
the ideology of the ruling coalition in their Land.
114   
In terms of treaty-making, the tasks of the Bundesrat are restricted. There 
are two types of treaties, which need the Bundesrat￿s approval or non-objection. 
First, treaties requiring the full consent of the Bundesrat are those over issues 
concerning amendments of the Basic Law, L￿nder rights over fiscal policy or 
taxation and L￿nder rights and interests in the execution of federal laws. The 
second type of treaties concerns all remaining issues. This type of treaties is only 
subjected to the Bundesrat objection. Should the Bundesrat o b j e c t  t o  s u c h  a  
treaty, the lower chamber of the parliament, Bundestag, can override this decision 
by ratifying the treaty again. In case the Bundesrat has objected to it by a two-
thirds majority, a majority of equal size in the Bundestag is required to override 
the objection.
115 The real power of the Bundesrat in treaty-making is, therefore, 
rather moderate compared to the power of the Bundestag, which is directly 
elected by the people. Michelmann indicates that there has been only one case 
when the Bundesrat objected to a treaty proposed by the central government. It 
was an Ostpolitik
116 treaty of the social-democratic Brandt government. In this 
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case, the parties controlling the Bundesrat were opposed to the central 
government. The opposition wished to make a symbolic gesture of disapproval. 
However, the Bundesrat￿s  objection was overridden subsequently by the 
Bundestag, the lower chamber of the German parliament.
117  
Things are different, however, when the EU is involved. The Basic Law 
grants the federal government the right to transfer sovereign powers to 
international institutions (Article 32, Paragraph 3). The L￿nder argue that the 
exercise of this right by the federal government means, effectively, the transfer of 
L￿nder rights, too. Because of this, the L￿nder are reluctant to delegate to the 
federal government their right to communicate directly with the EU.
118 
The Bundesrat has become the main body to coordinate the triangular 
relationship of the EU, the federal government and the L￿nder. When in 1986 the 
European Single Act (ESA) was ratified, the L￿nder succeeded in adding an 
important clause to the Statute of Ratification of ESA, which required the federal 
government to ￿give sufficient time and opportunity for the Bundesrat to state its 
opinion￿ prior to its decisions in the EU that would affect ￿exclusive legislative 
competence or the essential interests of the L￿nder￿.
119 Michelmann doubts, 
however, if the Bundesrat and its Committee for Questions of the European 
Union are useful tools for the L￿nder in EU issues as the Bundesrat lacks 
legislative leverage over the federal government.
120 
The  L￿nder have in Brussels a common observer appointed by the 
Conference of L￿nder  economics ministers who attends the meetings of the 
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Council of Ministers of the EU as a member of the German delegation. Among 
other duties he reports relevant information about developments in EU institutions 
in general and the Council of Ministers in particular to the L￿nder 
governments.
121 
The second option for German L￿nder to exercise their rights, concluding 
treaties with foreign states or maintaining foreign representations independently 
from the central government, has been used relatively rarely. According to 
Michelmann, the L￿nder mainly conclude agreements, not treaties, and these 
often deal with administrative issues. Michelmann indicates several reasons why 
the L￿nder have not been interested in concluding treaties with foreign states 
circumventing the central government: (1) the Basic Law grants L￿nder very few 
legislative powers; (2) the principle of Bundestreue; (3) non-validity of the 
treaties without federal government￿s approval and (4) the Lindauer 
Agreement.
122  The impact of the Lindauer Agreement concluded between the 
federal government and the L￿nder is discussed below. 
In case the L￿nder are dealing with foreign subnational units, they are not 
restricted by the Basic Law in doing so. As the Federal Constitutional Court ruled 
in one of its first decisions, federal units are free to communicate with foreign 
subnational units.
123 
Additionally to concluding foreign agreements and treaties, in the past the 
L￿nder have maintained own representations abroad. In the times of the Reich, 
the Imperial Constitution of 16 April 1871 established the right of both the 
federation and federated units to engage in foreign relations. Especially the larger 
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federated units such as Bavaria, W￿rttemberg, Saxony and Baden continuously 
maintained their representations abroad that had existed before the Reich was 
established. The Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 was more restrictive in 
terms of subnational foreign activities. The new constitution established the right 
of federated units for treaty-making in issues under their jurisdiction. Those 
treaties were, however, subject to the consent of the Reich, which had become the 
sole player in foreign affairs. In the FRG, too, the offices of the L￿nder abroad 
cannot act as diplomatic missions without violating the Basic Law.
124 Therefore, 
the L￿nder have established foreign representations, called ￿contact offices￿ or 
Aussenstellen, which are not public, but private law organisations. The staff 
members of these representations are usually former EC/EU officials or L￿nder 
civil servants on leave from their official duties.
125  
The third option available to the German federated units is the Lindau 
Agreement of 14 November 1957. This agreement, concluded between the central 
government and the L￿nder, is aimed at regulating questions of treaty-making in 
issues under L￿nder jurisdiction. By the Lindau Agreement the federation became 
the representative of the L￿nder in negotiating or signing treaties with foreign 
states in issues under L￿nder jurisdiction. Consequently, the L￿nder gave up their 
right (Article 32, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law) to conclude treaties with foreign 
states. In return, the central government gave up its right to sign treaties 
concerning issues under L￿nder (co-)jurisdiction without unanimous consent of 
the L￿nder.
126 
                                                 
124 Leonardy (1993), pp. 237, 239. 
125 Michelmann (1990), p. 227. 
126 Leonardy (1993), pp. 238-239.  
 
 
 
 
 
89
The central institution created for implementing the Lindau Agreement is 
the Permanent Treaty Commission (St￿ndige Vertragskommission), which 
consists of the plenipotentiaries of the L￿nder to the federation. As these officials 
are occupied with the whole range of issues concerning federated units, everyday 
work is being done by their deputies in charge of international relations. The main 
task of the Commission is to assist the communication between the federal 
government and the federated states, its members have access to federal and 
L￿nder ministries. The decisions of the Commission require formal ratification of 
all members. Its decisions are of recommendatory nature. Despite the irritation 
caused by occasional insufficient communication from the federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or an irresolute Land government abandoning the common 
platform on a particular issue, the Lindau Agreement is widely considered a 
workable procedure.
127 
Despite the efforts of some L￿nder to promote international and cross-
border cooperation, surveys by Bundesbericht Forschung conducted in 1988 and 
1993, indicate that many of them, especially in Eastern Germany still lack 
necessary policy framework, or give this issue a low priority. However, when 
compared to 1988, in 1993 five Western L￿nder, which had given low priority to 
foreign activities previously, had developed their strategies for subnational 
foreign activities and gave this issue a high priority. The total number of L￿nder 
prioritising subnational foreign activities had grown from 2 to 9.
128  
Some authors argue that the German model is of all-European 
significance. In fact, Germany￿s experience of subordinating powers of federation 
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to federated units could serve as a model for the reform of political institutional 
structures and organisation in member states of the EU. Wagstaff believes that 
Germany and Austria are the only member states of the EU that have succeeded in 
subordinating the power of the state to its federated units.
129 Indeed, when 
compared to other EU states, Germany￿s achievements in terms of facilitating 
subnational foreign interests and developing common a sustainable foreign policy 
are remarkable.  
 
 
1.8.4. Belgium 
The Kingdom of Belgium, relatively small by territory and population, is a 
federal state with a complex structure.  As there are three language communities 
in Belgium, Dutch, French and German, keeping the federation stable and 
operational has not always proved to be an easy task. Against this background, it 
is not surprising that the engagement of subnational units in foreign activities has 
been accompanied by the ￿fear of dismemberment￿ of the Belgian state.
130 
Some scholars compare Belgium to Czechoslovakia, which was an 
artificial creation of the Great Powers, too. The modern history of Belgium, a 
trilingual state sandwiched between the Netherlands in the North, France in the 
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South, and Germany in the East, is best described as an ￿ever-present threat of 
fracture or rift between the various elements that make up Belgium￿.
131 
In the 19
th century, the French-speaking Walloon minority dominated 
political life. The Dutch-speaking majority was largely excluded from political 
life, not to mention the German-speaking minority. Only the French language had 
legal validity. Moreover, the governmental and administrative structure was 
copied from France. In 1970, a constitutional change introduced two new 
concepts, the community and the region to the state structure of the kingdom. The 
Flemish proposed the concept of community. It was an entity based on cultural 
criteria only. The Walloons, for their part, suggested the concept of region, which 
was based on socio-economic criteria. Whereas the jurisdiction of communities ￿ 
cultural and linguistic affairs ￿ was clear, the field of responsibilities of the 
regions remained less clearly defined. The main obstacle to defining the 
responsibilities of the regions was the capital Brussels, which had two 
communities superimposed on it. In 1993, another constitutional revision was 
passed into law. The new Article 1 of the Constitution established that Belgium 
was a ￿federal state￿. The upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate, was 
reformed and reflected from then on the linguistic composition of the population. 
The problem of Brussels remained unresolved, however.
132 
Currently, the Belgian federation consists of three communities and three 
regions. The communities include the French community (French-speaking 
people in Wallonia and Brussels), the Flemish community (Dutch-speaking 
people in Flanders and Brussels) and the relatively small German community. 
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Beside, and sometimes overlapping with the communities, there are three regions: 
the Walloon region, which includes the German-speaking community, the 
Flemish region and the capital of the federation, Brussels. Beaufays argues that 
the complex system of federation with so many different players and occasionally 
overlapping jurisdiction is only manageable with the help of a specific political 
system in Belgium. As on all levels of government the same political forces 
represent the majority; nobody is actually interested in challenging the federal 
system.
133 
As far as the foreign activities of subnational units of the Belgian 
federation are concerned, the central government, represented by the Ministry of 
External Relations, has not always welcomed these initiatives. For example, in 
1983, the Minister of External Relations of Belgium reminded in a note the 
Executives of the subnational units that no Belgian law entitles them to conclude 
treaties with foreign partners. Additionally, the minister recalled the fact that only 
the King may, under the responsibility of his Ministry, sign foreign treaties. The 
Executives replied in a rather sharp manner to this note, however. The Minister 
retreated subsequently and recognised their right to ￿make agreements￿, though 
not binding for Belgium.
134   
The subnational units have, despite the rather critical attitude of the 
Ministry of External Relations, set up their autonomous structures for foreign 
activities. The Walloon and Flemish communities have established 
Commissariats; the Flemish Commissariat is responsible for both the Flemish 
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community and the Flemish region. The Walloon region has a Directorate General 
for External Relations. In the region of Brussels, the Minister of Finance is in 
charge of external relations, whereas in the German community, the director of 
the Executive deals with external issues.
135 
Belgian subnational units have actively used the opportunities to engage in 
activities abroad. They have appointed ￿attaches￿ to the Belgian diplomatic 
missions, opened cultural centres abroad, concluded cultural and ￿person-
related￿
136 agreements with foreign states and subnational units, created joint 
inter-parliamentary cooperation committees, assisted the central government in 
implementing bilateral agreements, participated in interregional associations, 
visited foreign partners and received representatives of foreign states and their 
subnational units. The subnational units are, however, not allowed to become 
members of international organisations.
137 
In order to facilitate and coordinate subnational foreign activities, the 
Ministry of External Relations has offered the communities and regions various 
platforms to discuss the foreign policy decisions of Belgium. In 1984, a special 
division was created in the Ministry of External Relations to supervise relations 
with the Regions and the Communities.
138 Even more important is the agreement 
of the Ministry from the year 1983 to allow Community Executives to participate 
in the implementation of bilateral cultural agreements of Belgium.
139 
The method of integrating the subnational units into the foreign-policy 
process is called ￿concertation￿ (concerted action) in Belgium. The communities 
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and regions are invited to participate in various federal-level ministerial or inter-
ministerial committees and subcommittees to discuss foreign policy issues.
140 
However, despite the efforts of the federal government to integrate the foreign 
interests of subnational units, the drive for more independence has not weakened. 
In recent years, for example, the wealthier Flanders has complained about the 
Belgian state ￿dragging on its comparative advantage￿.
141 
To sum up, Belgian subnational foreign activities remain more ambiguous 
than in many other federations, given the historical background of the kingdom. 
The Ministry of External Relations has been actively seeking new ways of 
integrating subnational foreign interests. The future of subnational foreign 
activities in Belgium depends on the future of the kingdom of Belgium as a 
whole, however. Given the ever-present tensions between the two main language 
communities, secession cannot be ruled out. If this should be the case, 
paradiplomatic activities may turn into protodiplomatic activities, which are 
aimed at future recognition of a subnational unit as sovereign state. 
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1.8.5. The European Union 
In the context of deepening European integration it is interesting to 
examine how this process has affected the lower levels of government. Is there 
not a contradiction between the processes of integration and regionalism in the 
EU? Sodupe argues that on the contrary ￿ regionalism, which encourages 
interregional cooperation, stimulates integration by increasing interdependence. 
Consequently regionalism makes an important contribution to the unification of 
Europe.
142 
The main institution dealing with regions of the EU is the Committee of 
the Regions (CoR). Its existence reflects the fact that deeper European integration 
has eroded the autonomy of member states of the EU and made regional factors 
more important. Article 198a of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) provides for the 
establishment of ￿an advisory committee of representatives of regional and local 
authorities, hence to be called the Committee of the Regions￿.  The CoR was first 
constituted in 1994. At the beginning, there were 189 members, whereas every 
member state could send a certain number of regional units to participate in the 
work of the committee, according to the size of the population. Germany, Italy 
and France had the largest number of members (24), whereas smaller states had 
relatively more members per number of inhabitants (Luxemburg, for example, 
had 6 members). When new members joined the EU in 1995, the number of 
members of the committee rose to 222. The EU member states governments 
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decide who becomes member of the CoR. The CoR is obligatorily consulted by 
the decision-making institutions of the EU, such as Council, Commission or 
Parliament, in issues of education, culture, public health, trans-European networks 
for transportation, telecommunications, energy, economic and social cohesion. 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 added to the list the following items: 
employment, social policy, health, environment, vocational training and transport. 
The above-mentioned institutions are not obliged to take the advice from CoR, 
however.
143 
There are two types of regional associations in the EU, representative and 
functional. Representative associations, such as the Assembly of the Congress and 
the Council of Local Authorities and Regions of Europe, communicate to the 
European institutions the viewpoints of their members concerning the status and 
functions of the regions in the Community and the member states of the EU. The 
other group, functional associations, deal with specific issues such as frontiers, 
industrial decline and peripheral status of the regions. The functional group has 
two subgroups, cross-border (promoting cross-border cooperation) and 
transregional. Functional associations in the EU are the Association of European 
Frontier Regions, the Four Motors of Europe, the Working Communities of the 
Alps, etc.
144 
The EU has financed by several billions of euros its initiatives for regional 
cooperation, INTERREG I (1989-93) and INTERREG II (1994-99). Sodupe asks 
if this money has been well spent in order to promote transregional cooperation. 
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He comes to the conclusion that the EU￿ s emphasis was too much on the cross-
border cooperation, as the main goal of those initiatives was to prepare the 
member states and their subnational units for a ￿Europe without borders￿. Because 
of this, trans-regional cooperation was neglected to a great extent.
145 
Keating argues that various institutions of the EU, such as the Committee 
of the Regions or the Economic and Social Committee, that enable the 
subnational units to make their voice heard, have not proved particularly useful 
for the regions.  They cannot represent themselves individually in those 
institutions, but need first to agree on a unitary position of the regional units. Nor 
have other concepts, such as Europe of the Regions, Third Level, Europe with the 
Regions or Europe of the Cultures proven helpful. Subnational units have 
different interests and cannot, therefore, agree on a concept that would suit all of 
them. Because of this, despite all these efforts, states still dominate the political 
agenda.
146 
There are other obstacles on the way of subnational units articulating their 
interests in the context of the EU. For example, there is still substantial opposition 
by central governments to subnational foreign activities in the EU. For various 
reasons, some member states are reluctant to grant subnational units substantial 
rights in this field. Sodupe even believes the states have deliberately created 
obstacles to prevent inter-regional cooperation, in order to avoid an erosion of 
their traditional role.
147 
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Conclusion 
Although there has been some disappointment on the part of subnational 
units concerning the benefits of foreign activities, they will continue seeking ways 
to interact with the outside world directly. Some of them have probably 
discovered that dealing with foreign issues is not just a privilege promising high 
returns but a rather challenging task. Nevertheless, the factors that have triggered 
subnational foreign activities, such as globalisation, interdependence, and new 
communications technologies, have not disappeared. What is more, the pressure 
on subnational units to deal with foreign issues keeps growing. 
It would not be correct to assume that subnational units engage in foreign 
activities just to annoy central government. In many cases, it is actually the failure 
of the federal centre to facilitate subnational foreign interests that encourages 
subnational units to enter the international system. Often the federal government 
is not able to protect federated units against negative aspects of globalisation and 
interdependence. When subnational units do not help themselves by attracting 
foreign investments, tourists and know-how, then nobody will do it for them. 
Moreover, in a global economy, the competition between subnational units for 
foreign resources is fierce. Therefore, even if a federated unit is not interested in 
challenging the foreign policy of the federal government, it needs to take interest 
in foreign issues. Otherwise it risks falling behind.   
In some cases, like in Germany, subnational units and federal government 
have found a modus operandi, when dealing with foreign issues. The German  
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L￿nder have given up their right to conclude treaties with foreign states granted 
them by Basic Law. The federal government in return consults the L￿nder before 
concluding any treaties concerning their jurisdiction.  
As far as the reasons for subnational units to become active in the 
international system are concerned, the explanations provided are not always 
complete. It could be argued that the reasons vary and should, therefore, be 
examined in every single case taking into account the specific features of the 
particular subnational unit. For example, it could be asked if the end of the Cold 
War affected subnational units in Australia or Africa as much as in Russia, which 
was a major participant in the global confrontation. The next chapters will 
examine how subnational units in Russia have reacted to the pressures of 
globalisation and other factors seen as catalysts for subnational foreign activities 
by many researchers. 
A serious impediment to the subnational foreign activities is their 
ambiguous status from the viewpoint of the International Law, which does not 
consider subnational subjects equal to states by default. The situation is even 
more confusing in states in a legal vacuum. What happens to subnational foreign 
activities if the particular state is being governed using partially contradicting 
laws, like the Russian Federation in the 1990s? The following chapter will offer 
some answers to these questions.    
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Chapter 2 Russian Regions as Foreign Policy Actors 
This chapter will describe the changes that have taken place in the Russian 
foreign policy making after the collapse of the Soviet Union. How were the 
existing foreign policy institutions reformed? Which new institutions emerged, 
and how were the questions of jurisdiction solved? Special focus will be on the 
aspects of these changes that concern subnational foreign activities.  
An overview of literature on subnational foreign activities in Russia will 
be given with the purpose of placing Pskov foreign activities in a more 
comparative perspective. Can Russian subnational units participate in the making 
of the official foreign policy? What are the rights of subnational governmental 
units in terms of independent foreign activities? In which way has the federal 
centre reacted to their attempts to enter the international system, circumventing 
the federal authorities? Has the federal centre succeeded in coordinating and 
facilitating the foreign activities of the members of the federation? 
Not only the output, but also the process of the Russian foreign policy 
making has changed fundamentally in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Global confrontation between the capitalist and socialist bloc has been 
replaced by a variety of new coalitions and new adversaries. Russia is in the  
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process of to defining its role in international affairs. In the process of formulating 
the foreign policy new actors have appeared beside federal institutions. 
In Soviet times the Communist Party effectively controlled the conduct of 
foreign policy for the entire Soviet Union, including the formally autonomous 
Soviet republics. Although there were branches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the USSR in all Soviet republics, except for the Russian SFSR, they were not 
allowed to act in the international system independently. Ironically, Ukraine and 
Byelorussia were even members of the United Nations, as if they were 
independent states.  
The decision-making in foreign policy was under the control of the CPSU 
Politburo. Formally, the decisions were rubberstamped by the Supreme Soviet. 
Another institution dealing with foreign policy issues were the International 
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Peter Shearman, 
for example, thinks that the variety of foreign policy institutions was the basis for 
a ￿particularly exclusive and restricted kind￿ of pluralism in the foreign policy 
making, as there were no free elections, free media, multi-party system, or any 
form of public participation involved in that process.
148 
Other scholars are less convinced of the unquestionable monopoly of the 
Communist Party in Soviet foreign policy making. Malcolm, for example, argues 
that the secretary general of the Communist Party, who was the highest party 
official, had to manoeuvre between powerful actors and seek coalitions, especially 
with the military. Various groups, such as the International Department, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military were engaged in internal battles over 
                                                 
148 Shearman (1995): Shearman, Peter. ￿Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991￿, in Peter Shearman (ed.), 
Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p. 14.  
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foreign policy issues. Foreign policy making was subject to the ￿effects of 
bureaucratic politics￿. It was only in the late 1980s, under Gorbachev, that step-
by-step the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the initiative in foreign policy.
149 
Moreover, as Fainsod claims, there were substantial distortions in the 
perception of foreign events even in the highest echelons of the Soviet leadership. 
The screening staff responsible for the selection of information was preoccupied 
with the ￿image of the enemy￿ cultivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
normally transmitted only information confirming the Communist worldview. 
Therefore, the rulers were deprived of non-biased information about the situation 
in foreign countries.
150 
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Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 24-25.  
150 Fainsod (1963): Fainsod, Merle. How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1963, p. 341.  
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2.1. Agents in Russian Foreign-policy Making: Subnational 
Dimension 
Before examining the subnational foreign activities of the federated units 
of the Russian Federation, it would be helpful to recall the functions that various 
actors of foreign policy making process had on the federal level in the 1990s. The 
reorganisation of the foreign policy making was accompanied by inter-
institutional power struggle, political turmoil and economic deterioration. 
By decree of the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris Yeltsin, of 18 
December 1991, following the establishment of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) on 8 December 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the RSFSR, which had been established in 1990 and had a few hundred staff
151, 
was authorised to take over the work and facilities of the Soviet MFA. In a 
month￿s time, the personnel of the Soviet MFA had to be either re-employed by 
the MFA of the RSFSR or was obliged to leave.
152 Effectively, the staff of the 
Soviet MFA continued its work under a new name. 
The political vacuum that emerged after the putsch in August 1991 and the 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to dominate the foreign policy agenda. Other institutions dealing with foreign 
issues were obliged to consult the MFA in foreign affairs. Some authors believe 
that the MFA lost its dominant position after the establishment of an Inter-
                                                 
151 Dawisha/ Parrot (1994): Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrot.  Russia and the New States of Eurasia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 202. 
152 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, 15 Jan 1992, Nr. 1, p. 26   
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departmental Foreign Policy Commission inside the Security Council of the 
President￿s Office in December 1992, however.
153  
The new Constitution, valid since December 1993, furthermore 
undermined the positions of the MFA and the parliament in foreign affairs. It 
granted the President the right to ￿be in charge of the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation￿ (Article 86 [a]). Moreover, the President forms and presides over the 
Security Council and ￿conducts negotiations and signs international treaties of the 
Russian Federation￿ (Article 86 [b]). The parliament has the right to ratify and 
denounce major treaties and international agreements. In case of ambassadors, the 
President will ￿appoint and recall, after consultations with the corresponding 
committees and commissions of the houses of the Federal Assembly, diplomatic 
representatives of the Russian Federation in foreign countries and international 
organisations￿ (Article 83 [l].
154 
Since some of the Russian regions, most notably national republics, were 
actively pursuing their foreign policy goals, the issue of facilitating these 
activities grew in importance. Some of the national republics, such as Komi and 
Sakha, for example, had established the right for conducting independent foreign 
policy and signing foreign treaties in their regional constitutions. Moreover, some 
republics had appointed their own foreign ministers.
155 
 
 
                                                 
153 Malcolm (1990), pp. 27-28. 
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Moscow: Russia￿s Information Agency-Novosti, 1993, pp. 49-50.  
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Institutionalised Channels for Subnational Foreign Activities 
  This section will discuss how federal foreign policy institutions have 
responded to the emergence of new ￿ subnational ￿ actors in the process of 
foreign-policy making. What kinds of new institutions had been established to 
deal with this new feature of the Russian foreign policy? 
Russian subnational regional units had four main channels for articulating 
their external interests in the 1990s. Firstly, they could use various Committees 
dealing with foreign and security policy of both the Federation Council and State 
Duma. Second, the presidential administration, which offered a variety of 
institutions designed for articulating subnational interests. First of all, it had two 
councils, one for the republican leaders and the other for heads of administrations 
of non-republican federated units. The Council of Republican Leaders (Sovet glav 
respublik) was created in October 1992. This council became the main forum for 
republican leaders for communication with the President. In March 1993, the 
Council of Heads of Administration was established (Sovet glav administratsii). 
Additionally, the presidential administration had a plenipotentiary representative 
in every region. Those representatives were organised in the Council of 
Presidential Plenipotentiary Representatives. Moreover, the presidential 
administration had a special section, the Section for Work with the Regions. In 
order to avoid conflicts in terms of treaty-making and jurisdiction, a Commission 
was attached to the President, the Commission for the Preparation of Treaties 
about the Distribution of Areas of Jurisdiction and Authority between Federal 
Organs of State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the 
Russian Federation.  This commission was created in 1994 and became the main 
body for regions for bargaining for more rights in foreign policy issues. For  
 
 
 
 
 
106
example, the commission was responsible for drafting the agreements between the 
Russian Federation and Tatarstan signed in 1994. The third channel was the 
federal government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER) and the Ministry of 
Nationalities and Regional Policy. The MFA established in 1994 the Consultative 
Council of Russian Federation Components on International and Foreign 
Economic Relations. The other organ for the articulation of the interests of 
regions was the Council of Foreign Policy. In the MFER there was a Coordinating 
Council for the Regions, too. Additionally, both ministries had their local 
branches in some of the regions. The fourth available channel was the 
interdepartmental commission on regional issues of the Security Council.
156 
Some authors question the importance of some of these numerous 
institutions for the conduct of subnational foreign activities. Melvin doubts if the 
parliamentary commissions have at all articulated the regional interests in terms 
of foreign policy. In his view, the institutions that had been attached to the 
Presidential administration were the main platforms for the articulation of 
subnational foreign interests.
157 
Perovic is convinced the ministerial councils of the MFA and MFER were 
not in a position to coordinate subnational foreign activities. These ministerial 
institutions were of merely administrative nature, with no real leverage over the 
foreign activities of the regions.
158 However, Melvin points at an ￿emerging 
                                                 
156 For a comprehensive overview see Melvin (1995): Melvin, Neil. Regional Foreign Policies in the 
Russian Federation. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs (Post￿Soviet Business Forum), 
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157 Melvin (1995), pp. 31-32. 
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strategy￿ of the MFA to manipulate the regions in its own interests. Especially 
when dealing with CIS states, the Russian MFA uses the regions as mediums for 
foreign policy goals. By assisting specific foreign initiatives taken by the regions, 
the MFA is able to address effectively issues it would not be so convenient to 
address on the intergovernmental level. This practice, in Melvin￿s view, enables 
the MFA to both open a new channel for articulating Russian foreign interests and 
control the regional foreign activities. This strategy, on the one hand, enables 
Russia to become engaged with other states in a better-coordinated way. On the 
other hand, it effectively brings the regions closer to Moscow again.
159 
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2.2. Legal Framework for Subnational Foreign Activities 
Following a more general introduction on subnational foreign activities, 
this chapter will explain the political and legal environment, in which Russian 
regions operate in terms of foreign activities. Moreover, centre-periphery relations 
in the case of Russia will be discussed.  
The Russian Federation consists of 88 federated units, which have 
different rights in terms of foreign activities. The following article discusses the 
status of federated units in the Russian Federation, which is determined by the 
Constitution and federal laws. Moreover some regions, such as Nizhni Novgorod, 
for example, have managed to sign a separate agreement with the federal centre 
for the conduct of foreign activities. 
On the federal level, the Constitution and three federal laws regulate the 
conduct of subnational foreign activities in the Russian Federation. These federal 
laws are the law On Coordination of International and External Economic 
Relations of the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation, the law On 
international Treaties of the Russian Federation and the law On Regulation of 
Foreign Economic Activities. 
  
 
Constitution 
According to Article 71 (j) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
the Federation￿s jurisdiction encompasses ￿the foreign policy and international  
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relations of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian 
Federation; issues of war and peace￿, and, (k) ￿the external economic relations of 
the Russian Federation￿.   According to Article 72 (n), ￿the co-ordination of the 
international and external economic relations of the members of the Russian 
Federation, and the fulfilment of the international treaties of the Russian 
Federation￿ is under joint authority of the Russian Federation and the members of 
the Russian Federation.
160 
Interpreting the meaning of the Article 71 (j) of the Constitution, scholars 
underline that although the Federation is the sole entity responsible for the 
international relations of the Federation, federal subjects are entitled to engage in 
foreign activities. Nevertheless, the Federation must guarantee that subnational 
foreign activities are co-ordinated and are not in conflict with the interests of the 
Federation as a whole. Article 71 (k) indicates that members of the federation are 
entitled to maintain external economic links, but the federation must co-ordinate 
these as well.
161 
Commenting on Article 72, 1 (n) scholars indicate that the Federation as a 
whole must have a unitary economic policy, which includes external economic 
relations. Therefore, the Federation must jointly with members of the Federation 
co-ordinate the external economic relations of the members of the Federation. As 
far as the fulfilment of the international treaties of the Russian Federation is 
                                                 
160 Belyakov/Raymond (1993), pp. 40-44. 
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concerned, the members of the Federation must follow the Federation, as these 
treaties are of obligatory nature to both the Federation and its members.
162 
 
  
Federal Laws Regulating Foreign Activities of Federated Units 
There are three relevant federal laws that set the framework for the 
conduct of foreign and foreign economic activities of members of the Russian 
Federation. These laws are the law On international Treaties of the Russian 
Federation  adopted in 1995,  the law On Regulation of Foreign Economic 
Activities  adopted in 1995  and  the law On Coordination of International and 
External Economic Relations of the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation 
adopted in 1998. 
Out of these three laws the federal law On Coordination of International 
and External Economic Relations of the Constituent Entities of the Russian 
Federation specifically regulates the subnational foreign and foreign economic 
activities and therefore will be discussed here. This law was adopted by the RF 
State Duma on 2 December 1998 and approved by the President 4 January 1999 
(N 4-F3), refers to Article 72 of the Constitution and ￿establishes a general 
procedure for coordination of international and external economic relations of the 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation and contains legal guarantees to 
ensure rights and legitimate interests of the constituent entities of the Russian 
                                                 
162 Okunkov/ Krylov/ Pigolkin/ Postinkov/ Buloshnikov (1994): Okunkov, L. A., B. S. Krylov, A. S. 
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Federation in establishing and developing international and external economic 
relations￿.
163  
According to Article 1 (1) of the above-mentioned law, the federated units 
have the right to have international and external economic links with foreign 
federated units, provincial or regional units, and, with special permission from the 
Government of the Federation, with foreign states. Moreover, federated units are 
granted the right to join the specially created bodies for subnational units of 
international organisations. Article 1 (2) of the law defines international and 
external economic relations as contacts in international scientific, technical, 
cultural, humanitarian, ecological and other co-operation, performed by the 
constituent entities in the framework of federal and own programmes, as well as 
in implementation of foreign contacts that concern implementation of investment 
projects, external economic activity, technological co-operation, etc.   
Article 2 (1) grants the federated units the right to negotiate with foreign 
partners and to conclude agreements with them providing for international and 
external economic relations. Article 3 (1) requires federated units to ￿inform well 
in advance appropriate federal government bodies of the executive branch on the 
start of negotiations to conclude an agreement.￿  Moreover, draft agreements to be 
signed by subjects of the Federation should be submitted for co-ordination to the 
Federal Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other branches of the Federal 
Government, if necessary) not later than one month before their signing.  Article 5 
                                                 
163 Federal law On Coordination of International and External Economic Relations of the Constituent 
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holds that the Federal Government will establish the procedure of registering 
agreements on international or external economic relations. 
Article 8 of the law establishes that the Federation shall not bear any 
responsibility for international or external economic agreements of the members 
of the Federation, unless these agreements have been concluded with the special 
permission of the Federal Government. 
The Russian Constitution and federal laws establish the exclusive role of 
the federal centre in formulating the foreign policy and regulating all questions of 
strategy for the conduct of external relations of the subjects of federation. They 
grant the regions the right to participate in the implementation of the federal 
policy through signing external relations agreements and participating in other 
types of regional foreign activities.  In order to implement federal laws and 
coordinate the external relations of the regions, the federal government issues 
orders that specify in detail the law￿s implementation. 
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2.3. Russian Regions in the International System 
A favourite topic of the political debate in contemporary Russia is the 
relationship between the federal centre and the 88 federal subjects.
164 The rules 
for the foreign activities of the subjects of the federation, which are an important 
aspect of centre-periphery relations, need to be more clearly defined.  
Only few publications are available on the subject of foreign activities of 
Russian subnational units in general.
165 The main reason for this relatively small 
number of publications is the fact that Russian subnational foreign activities 
became a reality only in the last decade of the 20
th century, after the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist.  
Moreover, there are publications that address the foreign activities of a 
particular region. These publications will be discussed in this article, too, in order 
to place the study of Pskov subnational foreign activities in a comparative 
perspective. 
Authors in the field indicate several reasons why Russian federated units 
are interested in foreign issues. Melvin identifies two global incentives for 
Russian subnational units to become active in external relations. First, control 
over external issues, which grows in its political importance, especially in the 
                                                 
164 For more on various aspects of centre-periphery relations in Russia see Honneland/ Blakkisrud 
(2001): Honneland, Geir and Helge Blakkisrud. Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia: The Case of 
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Peter Reddaway (eds.). The Dynamics of Russian Politics. Putin￿s Reform of Federal-Regional 
Relations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 
 
165 For example, Granberg (2001): Granberg, A.G. Mezhdunarodnye I Vneshekonomicheskie Svyazi 
Subyektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2001 or Tolstykh (2004): 
Mezhdunarodnaia Deyatelnost Subyektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii.Moscow: Mezhdunardonye 
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fields of foreign trade and investments, and second, the rapid growth of links 
between subnational/supranational organisations, such as financial markets, 
multinational corporations, pressure groups and regional governments, in the last 
decades of the 20
th century.  In the case of Russia, Melvin argues, these two 
developments are combined with a highly unstable domestic environment, a fact 
that has virtually forced the Russian regions to become externally active.
166 
Sergounin identifies a number of ￿external determinants￿ for subnational 
foreign activities in Russia. First, global factors, such as the end of the Cold War 
and the weakening of the nation state. Second, economic factors: the disruption of 
economic ties from Soviet times has created a situation where sometimes 
economic co-operation with foreign partners is more useful than with other 
Russian regions. Third, territorial disputes, which affect a particular federated 
unit, for example the Maritime Province (the Primorskii krai) is affected by a 
border dispute between China and Russia. Fourth, environmental problems, which 
cannot be solved domestically. Fifth, societal challenges, such as the migration of 
the Russian-speaking minority from the former Soviet republics to Russia, 
fighting organised crime, etc.
167 
These reasons overlap to a great extent with reasons indicated by other 
authors for subnational foreign activities globally. The main difference between 
subnational foreign activities in Russia and Western Europe or North America is 
the domestic political instability and economic hardship in Russia. In Russia of 
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the 1990s subnational units had to define their foreign interests in an atmosphere 
of legal anarchy, economic decline and political turmoil. 
The study of subnational foreign activities of particular Russian regions 
has produced a limited number of publications. These publications focus on 
subnational foreign activities of the regional administration and normally do not 
include the local municipal/rural administrations, with the exception of 
Makarychev, who includes municipal authorities as well
168. 
In a recent publication on Kaliningrad oblast￿s future between Brussels 
and Moscow by Ingmar Oldberg, the regional administration is being seen as an 
object of the evolving EU-Russia relationship. According to the study, the oblast￿ 
is being subjected to decisions made in Brussels or Moscow. Oldberg sees the 
Free Economic Zone, a project that has failed, as the main manifestation of the 
foreign activities of the regional administration, beside participating in various 
Tacis projects of the EU.
 169 
Foreign activities of another North-western region of Russia, the republic 
of Karelia, have been examined by Oleg B. Alexandrov.
170 Similarly to the 
previous author, Alexandrov sees Karelian subnational foreign activities as being 
subordinated to the official Russian foreign and security policy to a great extent. 
However, he acknowledges the existence of Karelia￿s foreign activities 
autonomous from federal centre. More generally, Alexandrov writes that Russian 
regions have back-pedalled their foreign activities after an ￿initial rush￿, given 
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their economic immaturity, lack of legal base and lack of skills in terms of foreign 
activities. Karelia, on the other hand, deserves special attention since it has 
focused its foreign activities on the Northern Dimension of the EU. 
Alexandrov indicates three stages of ￿international interaction￿ of the 
republican administration. In the first stage, 1991-1993, Karelia entered the 
process of regionalization and established its right in the federation to interact 
with the outside world directly. The second stage, 1994-1998, was a period of 
economic deterioration in the republic, where the initial gains in terms of foreign 
activities were wiped out to a great extent. In the third stage, 1998-2001, the focus 
has been on attracting foreign investments, The federal centre, however, 
according to Karelian position, is not assisting regional foreign initiatives of its 
federated members in border areas. The reluctance of the federal centre to support 
initiatives such as the Northern Dimension makes it arguably impossible for 
Karelia to successfully participate in subnational foreign activities.
171 
The situation in terms of foreign activities in a region in the Russian 
heartland, Nizhni Novgorod, has been researched by Makarychev. In this case, the 
federal centre has granted the right to engage in subnational foreign activities 
specifically (an agreement between Nihzni Novgorod administration and the 
federal government from June 1996). Provided, however, that those agreements 
and treaties with foreign states and/or their subnational units do not contradict 
federal laws and are being overseen by federal authorities. Makarychev indicates 
that there are two departments dealing with foreign policy and foreign economic 
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affairs in the regional administration. Since their roles and jurisdiction has not 
been defined clearly, the work of these institutions is not effective, however.
172 
 
 
The Emergence of Regions as Political Actors 
The administrative units on the Soviet Union were not engaged in the 
foreign policy process.  In fact, the regions as entities had no political will and 
were not eligible to participate in political processes. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union introduced a new era for regional elites in terms of articulating their 
political interests. The start of this process was all but uncomplicated however. 
In Melvin￿s view, it was only in the last years of the perestroika period 
that a federal structure in the RSFSR began to emerge.  To be more precise, it was 
the elections of the Russian Congress of People￿s Deputies in 1990 that marked a 
turning point in centre-periphery relations. From then on, subnational regional and 
local interests in general, and in terms of foreign activities in particular, were 
articulated more openly. Subsequently, Melvin argues, foreign policy became the 
subject of a power triangular, consisting of Soviet authorities, democrats in 
Moscow and regional political groups.
173 
The classification of Russian regions using their foreign activities as the 
dependent variable is complicated because of the asymmetric nature of the 
federation. The regions are different not only in their legal status in the federation, 
but also in terms of their obedience to the federal laws, financial strength, ethnic 
composition, availability of natural resources for export etc.   
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Russian federated units have developed several approaches in terms of 
foreign activities.  Some authors have suggested dividing them into subgroups. 
Bradshaw uses the foreign economic activity as an indicator for dividing them 
into (1) ￿gateway regions￿, based on important ports and their hinterlands, and (2) 
￿resource-exporting￿ regions, big exporters of natural resources from Russia.
174 
Makarychev thinks there should be three groups: (1) export-oriented regions, (2) 
ethnic republics, and (3) border regions.
175   
Melvin focuses more on legal aspects of subnational foreign policy. He 
thinks the signing of the Federation Treaty created a hierarchy of the federated 
units￿ rights for the conduct of foreign activities. The most-privileged were 
national republics, followed by krais, oblasts and autonomous provinces. The 
least privileged in terms of foreign activities are the autonomous okrugs.
176 
In Mary McAuley￿s view the oblasts were not easily accepting their 
position as ￿lesser partners in a federation￿. In fact, they objected the Federation 
Treaty, which did not take into account the fact that in many cases, oblasts were 
bigger members of the federation, both in terms of economic output and size of 
the population.
177 
What were the main objectives of Russian subnational units when 
engaging in foreign activities? According to Melvin, Russian federated units were 
fighting, in many cases successfully, for more freedom in terms of foreign 
activities during the Yeltsin period. They began to attempt to act in the 
international system directly; a development not always welcomed by Moscow.  
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Regional elites could usually not count on the federal centre to bail them out; in 
times of economic deterioration they turned to foreign partners. Foreign trade and 
investments were expected to become a source of hard currency. The wish to 
expand foreign trade, mainly the export of raw materials, became the main driving 
force behind subnational foreign activities.   Moreover, the federated units￿ 
administrations were lobbying the central government authorities in various 
foreign policy issues, in order to achieve the representation of their specific 
interests. For example, stemming the migration from the former Soviet republics 
was an important issue. Hundreds of thousands of Russians arrived from the CIS 
states and the Baltic States in the 1990s. These new settlers were not always 
welcome in some Russian regions, which were suffering from the overpopulation 
and weak economic conditions, especially in southern regions of Russia.  In many 
cases, the regions used foreign policy issues as leverage in the internal power 
struggle with the federal centre or in regional election campaigns.
178   
Russian regions became directly involved in Russian foreign 
policymaking by participating in the work of the above-mentioned councils of the 
MFA, MFER and presidential administration. Russian central state institutions 
could no longer ignore the foreign and foreign economic interests of regions. In 
fact, representatives of regions were included in the delegations for official visits 
and negotiations abroad. Are these achievements of regions sustainable or of 
temporary nature? Will the central government continue to take into account 
subnational foreign interests?  
According to Melvin the external activities of Russian regions affect the 
Russian state in general and its foreign policy in particular in several ways. First, 
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the degree of success of regions when establishing direct foreign links is a helpful 
indicator for the analysis of the nature of federalism in Russia: how much real 
power does the federal centre delegate to subnational governmental units? Will 
the federal centre allow for more autonomy of regions when dealing with foreign 
issues or does it want to be the sole international actor in the federation? Second, 
when Russian regions succeed in establishing a network of partners in various 
parts of the world, the abstract discussions about the nature of Russia (is it 
European or Asian etc.) will become less important. It is clear that if Russian 
regions prefer to deal with European partners mainly one can hardly describe 
Russia as a Eurasian or Asian state. Third, foreign contacts would encourage the 
establishment of new economic groups outside the capital, whose reactions to the 
central government in foreign policy issues could be different from that of the 
federal centre. Probably an economic group of regions interested in the export of 
oil to Western markets has a different agenda than a group interested in securing 
fishing rights in international waters, for example.
179 
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Conclusion 
The number of players in Russian foreign policy has exploded since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Can we still speak of a ￿single foreign policy￿ of the 
Russian Federation￿, since there are so many new voices? 
The issue of subnational foreign activities has been controversial not only 
in Russia, but in the world at large. However, in Russia, in the aftermath of the 
systemic collapse, subnational foreign activities emerged in an atmosphere of 
constitutional uncertainties and overall political upheaval in the federation.  On 
the one hand, the legal anarchy that prevailed in Russia during the 1990s enabled 
regions to enter the international system without the explicit permission of the 
central government and develop direct contacts with foreign partners. On the 
other hand, the internal instability of the federation made developing the long-
lasting and mutually advantageous partnerships nearly impossible.  
In North-eastern Europe, cross-border cooperation takes place in the EU 
framework mainly. The European framework for cross-border contacts with 
Russia has had two central pillars: the Northern Dimension and the Eastern 
Dimension.
180 Russia is not participating in the more recent initiative, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy programme of the European Union, however. As 
an anonymous official from a Russian federal ministry put it in an interview, 
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Russia does not wish to be participating in a programme, where it is not involved 
in the decision-making process, but rather being subjected to decisions made by 
Brussels. 
President Putin￿s administration aims to strengthen its control over 
federated units, including their foreign activities. Important steps in this direction 
have been taken. In this light, some of the arguments used by authors in the 1990s 
seem somewhat outdated. Nevertheless, the developments that took place during 
the Yeltsin period will have an impact on the future of federalism in Russia and 
should, therefore, be studied in detail. 
Perovic argues that in the 1990s the Russian Federation has not collapsed 
only because the leaders of the federated units accepted the ￿practical 
independence despite formal membership of the association of states￿. Federated 
units have become ￿international players￿ with own ￿networks of diplomatic and 
external economic contacts without regard for the centre￿ he is convinced. 
Consequently, the fact that the federal centre has allowed for far-reaching rights 
in terms of subnational foreign activities has provided for relative stability in the 
relationship between the centre and regions.
181 
The institutional framework for the coordination of subnational foreign 
activities is rather weakly developed in Russia. Although there are several 
councils and other bodies that were created for this purpose, their work is not 
satisfactory. According to the federal law On Coordination of International and 
External Economic Relations of the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation 
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rules (Article 11)
182, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to outline a 
proposal to the President for procedure for the coordination of the international 
and external economic links of regions. The federal government fulfilled its 
obligation in the summer of 2000.  
Central government￿s control over subnational foreign activities was 
improved substantially when Kasyanov￿s government issued a decree on 26 July 
2000 that requires all agreements with foreign partners to be registered with the 
federal Ministry of Justice. This decree effectively invalidated the existing 
agreements. Moreover, it prevented new ones from becoming effective without 
federal centre￿s consent. Despite this, subnational units can use other tools than 
concluding agreements with foreign partners, such as participating in joint 
programmes. Therefore, subnational foreign activities will continue, but in a 
different format. 
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Chapter 3 Pskov Oblast￿ of the Russian Federation 
This chapter describes the historical background of the territory currently 
known as Pskov oblast￿. Several centuries ago, Pskov was not only an 
independent republic but had developed a special type of self-government, a 
rudimentary form of direct democracy. This form of direct democracy was 
accompanied by an independent foreign policy of Pskov. 
Our focus in this chapter is not the history of Pskov only, however. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is important to give an overview of the impact on Pskov 
economy of the radical changes that took place after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The following sections will examine how the introduction of democracy 
and market economy in Russia has affected the political and socio-economic 
situation in Pskov, and has set the directions for its subnational foreign activities. 
Pskov oblast￿ is one of the least explored North-western Russian regions 
by researchers. At first look, Pskov, indeed, is not a very promising research 
object. It has an average population number, average territory, no strategic natural 
resources and no ethnic conflicts worth mentioning.  There are, however, several 
special political, economic and geographical features of Pskov oblast￿ that make 
further research on this western part of Russia rather challenging.  
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Some authors believe that the case of Pskov is ￿especially instructive￿, 
because it lies ￿at one of Russia￿s critical junctures with post-Soviet Europe￿.
183 
Pskov region has common borders with three foreign states, the ex-Soviet republics 
of Belarus, Estonia and Latvia. Although the Pskov economy has suffered from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the potential of the region in terms of economic 
development should not be underestimated. Its geographical proximity to the 
European markets, the Baltic States, Moscow and St Petersburg, is bound to benefit 
the region in the long term. Pskov covers the whole of the Latvian-Russian border 
and the majority of the Estonian-Russian border. After these states joined the EU, 
Pskov meets one of the most important economic blocs in the world right on its 
doorstep. The current situation in terms of economic interaction of Pskov and its 
Baltic neighbours remains rather disappointing, however. 
 Estonia        →  St. Petersburg 
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Latvia
Estonia 
 PSKOV 
V. LUKI 
 IZBORSK 
 PECHORY 
    GDOV 
LAKE PEIPUS 
      →  Moscow 
 
                                          Byelorussia 
 
Picture No 1. Pskov Oblast￿.  
Source: the official website of the Pskov Oblast￿ administration at www.pskov.ru, English transcription 
by author. 
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3.1. History 
In the past, often Pskov found itself on the frontline between Russia and 
the West. The history of this part of Russia is as a history of resistance against 
Western invaders. But it is a history of direct democracy, subnational foreign 
activities, and self-government as well. 
Since ancient times, Pskov had been the Russian military outpost in the 
West. Back then, Germans, Danes, Poles or Swedish, who were seeking the 
eastern expansion, ruled the neighbouring Baltic territories. The Germans even 
conquered Pskov three times, but for brief periods only. 
Western warriors were not the only threat to the Russian state in general 
and Pskov in particular. From the East, Russia was permanently threatened, and 
finally conquered, to a great extent, by Mongols and Tatars. Pskov, however, was 
never actually conquered by the Asian troops. 
The history of Pskov does not consist of battles and wars only, however. 
Centuries ago, an interesting form of self-governance developed here. The Pskov 
Veche or public gathering was an early form of direct democracy, where the house 
owners in the town were able to directly participate in the political decision-
making process. Moreover, Pskov has a history of foreign policy institutions. The 
integration of Pskov in the centralist Russian state ended this practice abruptly in 
the 16
th century, however. 
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3.1.1. Ancient Times 
According to Pskov historians, the first Slavonic tribes appeared in Pskov 
in the middle of the first millennium, in the 6-7 century AD. Before that, the 
southern part of Pskov region was inhabited by various Baltic tribes, linked to the 
Latvians and Lithuanians of the present day. Baltic-Finnish tribes, linked to 
today￿s Estonians, inhabited central and northern parts. A chronicle first 
mentioned the town of Pskov in the year 903 as Prince Igor of Kiev was brought a 
bride from Pskov, named Olga. In the 10th century, the fortress Pskov expanded 
quickly. At the same time, the Troizkaya Church was built in the fortress, one of 
the first Christian churches in Russia.
184 
In the 11th century, Pskov was governed by Kiev. To be more precise, 
officials from Novgorod, which is located a few hundred kilometres northeast of 
Pskov, were representing the interests of Kiev in Pskov. Kiev was keen to protect 
this territory from the invaders from Baltic or Polish territories. In the year 1030, 
Pskov and Novgorod warriors, led by Prince Yaroslav of Greater Kiev, 
successfully attacked the Baltic territories. Subsequently, the inhabitants of these 
territories began to pay tribute to Kiev.
185 
According to Riasanovsky, Kiev suffered from the change in trade routes 
that began in the eleventh century. The activities of Italian merchants in the 
Mediterranean undermined Kiev￿s position seriously. Additionally, trade routes 
between western and central Europe on the one hand and Byzantium and Asia 
Minor on the other were established. Kiev lost gradually its dominant position in 
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East-West trade. For Russian towns like Novgorod, which benefited from the new 
routes, the weakening of Kiev offered a good opportunity to escape its rule.
186 
Novgorod seceded from Kiev and became a feudal republic in the end of 
the 11
th and the beginning of the 12
th century. Pskov became the ￿younger 
brother￿ of Novgorod, providing Novgorod with troops when needed. In 
exchange, the representatives of Pskov were allowed to take part in the public 
meetings, called Veche  in Russian, of Novgorod, when issues of general 
importance were discussed. Pskov enjoyed a relatively high degree of 
independence: it had its own Veche and government. According to Yanin, the 
Prince of Pskov became a de facto independent institution after the Novgorod 
uprising in 1136. It was after this uprising that Pskov invited Vsevolod 
Mstislavich as prince to govern it. This was a clear signal sent to Novgorod, as 
Mstislavitch had been banned by Novgorod previously.
187 
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3.1.2. The Feudal Republic of Pskov 
During the 12-13 centuries, Pskov was part of the Novgorod feudal 
republic. Although it was granted a certain degree of independence, it attempted 
to secede on several occasions, mainly for economic reasons. Pskov had more 
economic links with Baltic towns such as Tartu, Narva and Riga, than with 
Novgorod. And the military threat from the Baltic territories had lost its 
significance after the Ice Battle with the Teutonic order in the year 1242.
188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture No 2 The Kremlin of Pskov, the centre of the feudalist republic. 
The public meetings took place in the courtyard of the Pskov Kremlin, which was protected by high 
walls and two rivers. 
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The history of Pskov independence began with Prince Dovmont at the end 
of the 13
th century, who no longer depended on Novgorod in his decisions 
entirely, as his predecessors had done. On the contrary ￿ he even led wars against 
the Novgorod masters. In Pskov the class of boyars had grown stronger in 
numbers and wealth. Encouraged by its success, the local elite was poised to take 
the territory under its full control. In 1348, in the agreement of Bolotva, Novgorod 
recognized the independence of Pskov formally, with one exception: the religious 
affairs of Pskov remained under Novgorod￿s jurisdiction. The independent feudal 
republic of Pskov existed from the end of the 13
th century to the year 1510.
189 
The highest power in the republic was vested in the Veche. All questions 
of general relevance were decided in this public gathering in the courtyard of the 
Kremlin fortress. There were strict regulations as to who could participate in the 
Veche. Only grownup males, singles or heads of families, and house-owners were 
granted access. As the highest legislative body, the Veche could introduce new 
legislation and amend old laws. Its main duty was to regulate the domestic 
environment of Pskov. In 1467, the Veche adopted a collection of laws for Pskov, 
which served as the framework for further legislation.  The jurisdiction of the 
Veche was extended to declaring the state of war, accepting ambassadors to, and 
appointing ambassadors from Pskov.
190  
Some Western historians argue that despite the democratic concept of the 
public meeting, both in Pskov and Novgorod, the Veche was effectively an 
instrument of the oligarchs, i.e. the boyars.
191 
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The Prince was in charge of the military and the judicial system. His title 
was not hereditary; often a Prince was even banned during his reign by the people 
of Pskov. The highest judicial organ was the gospoda, consisting of the Prince, 
two representatives of the executive power and representatives of the common 
people from the outskirts.  The executive body consisted of posadniks (in the end 
of the 15
th century there were at least 16 of them).
192 
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3.1.3. Pskov as Part of the Centralist Russian State 
Pskov was one of the last independent Russian republics to join the united 
Russian state in the year 1510. However, dense relations between Pskov and 
Moscow had developed much earlier, already in the 15
th century. This had both 
political and economic reasons. As bilateral trade flourished and an intensive 
exchange of specialists took place, Moscow and Pskov became closer. Moscow 
needed Pskov as a military ally in its campaign against Novgorod, which Moscow 
was poised to conquer. Moscow, in return, supported Pskov in its battles against 
Lithuania and the Livonian Order.
193 
The relations between Pskov and Moscow were mutually advantageous, 
even though, in the year 1456, Pskov had made the ￿mistake￿ of sending its troops 
to support Novgorod boyars in their military campaign against Moscow. The 
Grand Prince of Moscow, Vasily II, and his troops defeated the combined forces 
of Novgorod and Pskov easily. Novgorod was forced to accept a humiliating 
peace. Pskov, for its part, had to send it￿s apologises to Moscow. The boyars of 
Pskov were forced to recognise the supremacy of Moscow from then on.
194 
After these events, the relations between Moscow and Pskov began to 
deteriorate.  Moscow began to send representatives to Pskov, without previous 
consultations with the rulers of the latter. The Grand Prince of Moscow took 
charge of Pskov￿s foreign affairs, too. The wars against Lithuania and the 
Livonian order in Southern Estonian and Northern Latvia were no longer led by 
Pskov troops with Moscow￿s assistance, but by Moscow￿s troops. Pskov only 
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provided its troops, but had no command. The Grand Prince signed the peace 
agreements for Pskov too, on conditions favourable to Moscow.
195 
The integration of Pskov into the centralist Russian state under Moscow￿s 
leadership was carried out with no bloodshed. In late 1509, the new Grand Prince 
Vasily III was planning his visit to Novgorod. As the boyars of Pskov heard about 
his intentions, they decided to use this opportunity to complain about the recently 
appointed representative of Moscow to Pskov, and asked for an audience. The 
Grand Prince let the people of Pskov know that he would not be able to meet them 
to hear their complaints before 6 January 1510.  When the Pskov boyars realized 
that the Prince was willing to meet them, they went en masse to Novgorod. On 6 
January 1510 the meeting between the Grand Prince of Moscow and the boyars of 
Pskov took place in the Kremlin of Novgorod. However, instead of listening to 
the complaints of the boyars, the Prince presented an unexpected ultimatum. He 
demanded that the Veche of Pskov be dissolved and the posadniks be replaced by 
the two representatives of Moscow in Pskov. In every suburb, one representative 
of the Moscow princedom would be in charge. To underline the seriousness of his 
demands, he threatened, in case of refusal to accept them, to enter Pskov with his 
troops. It was up to Pskov to avoid a bloodbath, Vasily III added. With their 
military leaders, the boyars and posadniks, arrested in Novgorod, the people of 
Pskov realized they had very few chances to reject the ultimatum. In the morning 
of the 13 January 1510, the Veche of Pskov gathered for the last time, only to 
accept the ultimatum. Immediately, the ambassador of Moscow ordered the 
removal of the bell of the Veche, which was being used to signal the start of the 
gathering. This has often been seen as the turning point in the history of Pskov. 
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The symbol of its independence, the Veche, had been forbidden and the remaining 
boyars were deprived of their estates and deported from Pskov. Around three 
hundred merchants from Moscow moved in to replace the former elite. 
Effectively, new people from Moscow-controlled lands replaced the upper class 
of Pskov. The new rulers tolerated one symbolic aspect of independence, 
however. The people of Pskov could still elect a representative body, which was 
called  izba. The izba consisted of 24 merchants and rich craftsmen, so-called 
starosts. This body had no real powers and was only granted the right to 
participate in the rulings of the court and collect taxes for the rulers in Moscow.
196 
Pskov became the military outpost of Russia on the north-western border. 
The permanent threat of attacks provoked a further fortification of Pskov. The 
fortress of Izborsk was modernized, the wooden walls and towers were rebuilt 
from stone (see map in the introduction to this chapter).
197  
In the 16-17
th centuries, the Pskov￿ military importance grew further. 
Pskov was crucial to the broader Russian aspirations to expand its zone of 
influence and to colonize new territories.  The main priority for Moscow was 
access to the Baltic Sea and reintegrating Byelorussian and Ukrainian territories, 
which were controlled by Lithuania and Poland at that time. Lithuania and 
Poland, in return, launched counter-attacks. Many of the battles took place on the 
territory of Pskov.
198 
The Northern War in the 18
th century gave Russia access to the Baltic Sea. 
For Pskov, the Northern War meant the end of the era of being a border region, 
because Peter the Great annexed the neighbouring Estonian and Latvian 
                                                 
196 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
197 Ibid, p. 16. 
198 Ibid, p. 60.  
 
 
 
 
 
136
territories. When the Baltic territories were incorporated into Russia, Pskov lost 
its significance as border region and customs point.
199 
Pskov did not benefit economically from the military success of the 
Russian troops. In fact, after the expansion of Russian territories was completed 
successfully, Pskov became just another province of the Russian Empire. It 
remained a rather backward, agriculturally dominated region, with a municipal 
share of population of 7 per cent in the end of the 19
th century.
200  
 
 
3.1.4. 20
th Century  
In the course of the 20
th century, Pskov twice became a border region of 
Russia again. Firstly, when the Baltic territories of Estonia and Latvia became 
independent from the Russian Empire in 1918. This period lasted until 1940, 
when the Soviet Union occupied all three Baltic States. And, secondly, when the 
Baltic States regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Pskov was not directly affected by the revolutionary events in 1905, 
mainly because there were few industrial workers in the province. The First 
World War also left the city of Pskov untouched, but western parts of the 
province were less lucky.  In fact, the frontline was only 250-300 kilometres from 
the city of Pskov. In April 1917, Pskov became the administrative centre of 
Soviets of soldiers, workers and peasants, for Pskov, Novgorod, Vitebsk, Tallinn, 
and Riga. The October Revolution turned Pskov into a battlefield. Ex-Prime 
Minister Alexander Kerensky and his allies occupied Pskov in order to launch a 
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counter-attack against Petrograd. This plan failed as the revolutionary forces 
retook control. From 31 October 1917, Pskov was under full control of the 
Bolsheviks.
201 
I 
 
Picture No 3 Lenin still stands proudly in front of the regional 
administration. 
 
In February 1918, the western neighbours of Pskov, Latvia and Estonia 
became independent from Russia. In the same year, war between Soviet Russia 
and the newly independent Baltic States broke out. As Russia was still recovering 
from the World War I, her smaller neighbours were successful in their military 
operation. Estonians and Latvians entered the territory of Russia and occupied a 
considerable part of it. Russia had to accept a humiliating defeat in 1920. The 
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peace treaties with its neighbours included loss of a substantial part of Russian 
territory. 
The Second World War was the most terrible and violent event for Pskov 
in the 20
th century. German troops entered Russian territory meeting little 
resistance. In the Pskov region, the Germans first took the city of Pskov without a 
real battle. Their luck changed later on, however. Fierce battles around Velikiye 
Luki in 1943 were a real bloodbath for both the German Wehrmacht and the Red 
Army. It was the battle of Velikiye Luki, which was a crucial railways hub, where 
the Soviet troops achieved an important victory over German invaders, although 
at an extremely high cost. By 11 August 1944, Pskov was freed from Germans 
troops.
202  
 
 
The Foundation of Pskov Oblast￿ 
Pskov oblast￿ was established during the Second World War by ukaz Nr. 
118/116 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR from 23 August 
1944. Pskov oblast￿ was the outcome of a merger of territories, ordered ￿from 
above￿. It includes former territories of the Leningrad oblast￿, Kalinin oblast￿, the 
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) and the Latvian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (LSSR). The ukaz stated that the town of Pskov, 17 districts of 
Leningrad oblast￿ and 3 districts of Kalinin oblast￿ would now form Pskov 
oblast￿. Additionally, the ukaz stated that ￿upon the recurring requests of the 
populations of the Pechorsky, Slobodsky, Panikovsky and Izbarsky localities of 
the Estonian SSR and the Vyshgorodsky, Kochanovsky and Tolkovsky localities 
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of the Latvian SSR￿, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, referring 
to the respective requests from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Latvian SSR and of the Estonian SSR, decided to include the above-mentioned 
territories in Pskov oblast￿. Only the parts of the territories that were mainly 
populated by Estonians remained part of the Estonian SSR.
203 
Given the totalitarian nature of the political regime of the Soviet Union 
during this period, it was not surprising that the Estonian SSR and Latvian SSR 
￿officially requested￿ parts of their territories to be included in Pskov oblast￿. As 
the German invaders were pushed further west, these republics became part of the 
USSR, and they had little choice than to obey orders from Moscow.  Naturally, 
the fact that the RSFSR de facto annexed these territories in 1944 was poisoning 
the relations of these two Baltic States with their eastern neighbour after regaining 
independence from the Soviet Union. Both Estonia and Latvia have officially 
given up all claims on these former Estonian territories, though.  As of September 
2006, the border treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian 
Federation had not been signed. Although the Estonian parliament has ratified the 
treaty, the Russian president has ordered to revoke the signature of the Russian 
minister of foreign affairs. Moreover, Putin￿s demand was that the border treaty 
negotiations with Estonia should be re-started from the beginning.
204 
Thirteen years after Pskov oblast￿ was established, its southern neighbour, 
oblast￿ Velikiye Luki, was dissolved. Ukaz Nr. 722/3 of the Presidium of the 
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Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 2 October 1957 declared Velikiye Luki oblast￿ 
to be dissolved and divided between Pskov oblast￿ and Kalinin oblast￿. The 
majority of the administrative units of the Velikiye Luki oblast￿ were incorporated 
into the Pskov oblast￿.
205  
These gains in territory and population could not prevent the subsequent 
socio-economic decline of Pskov oblast￿. In the 1970s and 1980s, during the 
period of stagnation in the Soviet Union, Pskov was losing both population and 
industrial base.  Many people migrated to other parts of the Soviet state. 
Additionally, the natural population growth slowed. Economic problems were 
caused mainly by the low quality of regional products. Even agriculture, the 
traditionally strong sector, stagnated. One of the reasons was that the Soviet Army 
recruited many agricultural specialists from the oblast￿. These young men did 
often not return to their home region after doing their duty.
206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 Emelyanov/Parakshina, p. 63. 
206 For more on the period of stagnation in Pskov, see Ivanov (1996), pp. 288-297.  
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3.2. Population 
Pskov is an almost homogenous Russian region, with 6 per cent 
minorities, mainly Ukrainians and Byelorussians. On 1 January 2000, 801,000 
people lived in Pskov, compared to 851,000 in 1979 and 845,000 in 1989. Thus, 
in just over 20 years, population had decreased by 5.9 per cent. In the capital, City 
of Pskov, 201.5 thousand persons lived, which equalled to approximately a 
quarter of the total population of oblast￿.
207 
Important developments in the structure of the population took place in the 
1990s. These changes are similar to those in the neighbouring NW regions. First, 
the municipalisation process in the oblast￿ has continued. In 1991, the ratio of 
municipal to rural population was 63.9/36.1. In 1999, the share of the municipal 
population had grown to 66.1. Second, the ratio of male/female population had 
changed as well. Relatively more men than women lived in 1999 in the region 
(47.2/52.8) than in 1991 (45.8/54.2). Third, the share of youth in the population 
had decreased from 21.2 to 18.7; the share of working population had grown from 
53.9 to 56.6. A decreasing segment were the elderly (from 24.9 to 24.7). Fourth, 
the life expectancy had fallen, for females by three years to 74.1 years in average 
and for men by nearly five years to 58.1 in 1998. Fifth, the natural ￿growth￿ rate 
                                                 
207 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskaya Oblast￿ v Tsifrakh. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2000, p. 15.  
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had fallen dramatically from ￿3.2 per 1,000 persons in 1990 to ￿14.4 in 1999, 
which is by far the lowest rate in NW Russia.
208   
According to the official figures, between 1996 and 2000, Pskov received 
42,154 refugees. Although this influx was not sufficient to stop or reverse the 
decline of the population, it has nevertheless helped to stabilize the situation. 
Among the countries of origin are all the former Soviet republics, including 
Russia. For example, from Latvia 8,393 and from Estonia 5,638 persons had 
arrived. Belarus is the country of origin for the smallest number of refugees and 
displaced persons (37).
209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 For a more detailed overview of demographic changes in the Pskov and the neighbouring North-
western regions see Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  
Severnovo I Severo-Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. 
Kaliningrad: Goskomstat RF, 2000, pp. 10-19. 
209. Goskomstat RF Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki. Pskovskaya oblast￿ v 
tsifrakh.. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2000, p. 24.  
 
 
 
 
 
143
 
 
3.3. Economic Geography 
Inside Russia, Pskov oblast￿ has common borders with four oblasts: 
Leningrad, Novgorod, Tver and Smolensk. Leningrad region and Novgorod 
region belong, like Pskov, to the north-western federal district, whereas Tver and 
Smolensk belong to the central federal district (okrug). The differences in the 
level of development of these five regions are remarkable. Some of them have 
managed to attract a considerable amount of foreign investments and tourists; 
others seem to be almost unknown among foreign investors. 
TABLE No 1 
COMPARISON OF PSKOV AND ITS NEIGHBOURING REGIONS (1998) 
 Pskov  Leningrad  Novgorod Tver  Smolensk 
 Population  811,100  1,673,000  733,900  1,613,000  1,142,000 
Pop. Density 
(pers./1000 sq km) 
15.2 74.1  13.0 19.2  23.0 
Growth of pop. 
(in thousands) 
-9.5 -14.5  -7.1 -18.0  -11.5 
Income per capita 
(in roubles) 
545 663  915 549  715 
Subsistence level 
(in roubles) 
405 718  438 403  385 
Foreign investments
(mn roubles)* 
3.4 91.3  40.3  18.4  17.0 
Foreign investments
(mn USD)* 
3.3 181.3  50.6  3.0  26.6 
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* The official statistics record foreign investments in two separate categories: foreign 
investments in roubles and foreign investments in USD. 
 
Source: Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999. pp. 193-194. 
 
Pskov oblast￿ covers a territory of 55,300 sq km. By size of population, 
Pskov region is slightly larger than the Novgorod region, but only half the size of 
Leningrad region. The capital of Pskov region, City of Pskov has over 200,000 
inhabitants. The other large town is Velikiye Luki, which has 117,000 residents 
and lies in the southern part of the oblast￿.  
 
 
3.3.1. Energy and Natural Resources 
Pskov possesses no known natural resources of strategic relevance, such 
as oil or gas. Its main natural riches are arable land, peat, clay, forests and fish. 
Consequently, Pskov is deprived of a rather convenient source of hard currency in 
Russia, energy exports. The region is almost entirely dependent on imports of 
energy, except electricity. In 1999, Pskov consumed 168,000 tons of coal, 876 
million cubic meters of natural gas, 124,000 tonnes of petrol, 116,000 tonnes of 
diesel and 151,000 tonnes of heating oil, which had to be imported to the 
region.
210 
 
 
                                                 
210 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, pp. 140-142.  
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Forests and Fishery  
Pskov has no significant fossils or other useable minerals, but its nature is 
rich in fertile land, forests and fish. The exploitation of these resources has been 
an increasingly important source of income to the budget of the regional 
administration. 
Forests are particularly important; they cover some 40% of the territory of 
the oblast￿ (2,450 million hectares).
211 Forestry employed 2,800 persons in 1998 
(3,900 in 1985).
212 The production of timber grew since 1997, after a sharp 
correction downwards in the first half of the 1990s. Despite recent growth, the 
output of timber in 1999 was only 62.5% of the output in 1990, which was 
864,000 cubic meters.
213 Altogether, the production of timber, paper and cellulose 
employed 8,000 persons in 1998. The output of the sector was 146 million roubles 
in 1998, and the total loss was 3.8 million roubles.
214  
The lakes Peipus and Pskovskoye contain large reserves of fish. The catch 
of fish from the double-lake Peipus/Pskovskoye totalled approx 3,500 tonnes in 
1999. According to the estimates by the regional administration, the ecologically 
sustainable amount of the annual catch would be even higher, up to 6,000-7,000 
tonnes. Additionally, the catch from other lakes and rivers, currently at 40 tonnes, 
could be increased to 1,200 tonnes a year without endangering the ecological 
                                                 
211  Administratsiya Pskovskoi oblast￿i, http://www.pskov.ru/region/region_info.html, accessed 8 Jan 
2000 
212 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 44. 
213 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskaya oblast￿ v tsifrakh.. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2000, p. 82. 
214 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik.. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 37.  
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balance.
215 The output of fish products has slumped from 8,500 tonnes in 1990 to 
3,100 tonnes in 1999.
216 
 
 
Agriculture 
The agricultural sector has traditionally played an important role in the 
Pskov economy. As of 1999, Pskov provided for half of the agricultural land of 
the Russian NW regions.
217 The Russian agriculture suffered severely during the 
transition period. Subsidised imported agricultural products flooded the Russian 
market before the rouble devaluation in 1998. After devaluation, Pskov was in a 
slightly better position than other Russian regions: it had a comparative price 
advantage domestically. Agricultural products made in Pskov were 10-15% 
cheaper than those from the neighbouring Baltic States or even St Petersburg.
218  
The agricultural sector has gradually lost its importance as an employer in 
the region. This process began in the Soviet period already. The number of 
persons employed in the sector has continued to fall since 1985. In 1985, 96,100 
persons were employed there. In 1999, however, only 39,700 persons were 
employed in agricultural enterprises.
219  
The devaluation of the rouble in August 1998 gave the local producers of 
food a comparative advantage. As imported food and beverages were less 
                                                 
215  
216 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 103. 
217 ￿Pishchevaya Promyshlennost￿. Pskovskii krai. Administratsiya Pskovskoi oblasti: 4 pages, 
http://www.pskov.ru/region/region_info.html , accessed 11 Dec 1999 
218 ￿Pishchevaya Promyshlennost￿. Pskovskii krai. Administratsiya Pskovskoi￿ oblasti: 4 pages. 11 Dec 
1999 <http://www.pskov.ru/region/region_info.html >. 
219 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik {Pskov Statistical Yearbook}. Vol. 2. Pskov: 
Pskovskiy oblastnoy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 44.   
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competitive given their high prices, the agricultural sector of Pskov was given a 
boost. In Pskov, in 1999 the agricultural production had increased from 2.1 billion 
in 1998 to 5.0 billion roubles. In contrast to other sectors of the regional economy, 
the agricultural sector of Pskov has experienced a remarkable revival. For 
example, in 1994 the output had been only 0.6 billion in new roubles.
220 
Despite the recent upturn, the overall fall of production in the sector has 
been dramatic. In the 1990s, the production of some agricultural products has 
fallen up to 10 times: eggs 2 times, milk 4 times, meat 3.5 times, grain 10 times 
and potatoes 10.5 times.
221 
The number of food processing companies in Pskov has doubled in the 
1990s. The number of employees, however, has fallen by 30%.
222 
 
 
3.3.2. Industry 
The industrial basis of the Pskov region is rather weak compared to some 
neighbouring regions. As earlier in the history of Pskov, agriculture still plays an 
important role in the regional economy. Industrial enterprises have struggled to 
cope with the introduction of the market economy. It was only after the steep 
devaluation of the rouble in 1998 that the output of the industrial sector began to 
grow. 
                                                 
220 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 104. 
221 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskaya oblast￿ v tsifrakh. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2000, pp. 96-97. 
222 Iibd., p. 41.  
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The industrial production in the oblast￿ has increased in nominal value.   
However, when we compare the industrial sector to agriculture, an interesting 
aspect draws attention. Although the total output of the industrial sector was 
higher than the agricultural production in the 1990s, a strange trend in this 
relationship can be singled out. The gap between the industrial and agricultural 
output has become narrower. In 1990, the industrial output was 37.5% higher than 
the agricultural output. In 1995, the gap had decreased to 32%. And, in the last 
year of the 1990s, it was only 29.5%. Consequently, the industrialisation of the 
region has been reversed.
223 
Measured by the value of production in roubles, the structure of the 
industrial sector has changed substantially during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1985, 
the machinery production and metal processing dominated the manufacturing 
sector of the oblast￿ with 45.1% of the total output, whereas light industry was the 
second-important with 22.1 per cent. Electricity generation represented a meagre 
0.1%. Fourteen years later, in 1998, the situation had changed dramatically. 
Electricity generating had jumped to the third place (15.3%).  Machinery 
production and metal processing were still dominating (30.9%) the industrial 
sector of Pskov, but had lost their undisputable leadership as food processing had 
moved much closer: from 15.5% in 1985 to 23.5% in 1998.
224 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 Ibid, pp. 29, 54. 
224 Ibid , p. 31.  
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TABLE No 2 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF PSKOV INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1985-2000 
 
  1985 1991 1994 1995  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Volume (bn 
RUB) 
1.9 5.3 943.5 2,328.6 3,337.9 3,555.8* 5,945.8*  7,731.4*
Number of 
enterprises 
1,956 2,203 2,281 2,216  1,889  1,949  1,754  2,098 
Number of 
employees  
(in thousands) 
136.4 120.4 84.3  75.5  59.1  61.4  56.8  - 
Profit (bn RUB)  0.2  0.9  119.0 224.5  188.6  152.5*  275.1*  460.3* 
Profitability  (%)  17.0 22.9 14.4 12.7  9.1  6.3  8.8  - 
* in mn RUB  
 
Sources: Promyshlennost Pskovskoy oblast￿i v 1985-1998 godakh. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy 
komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 4.  
Pskovskaya oblast￿ v tsifrakh. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 
2001, p. 91. 
 
As table No 2 indicates, between 1985 and 1999 the number of employees 
in the manufacturing sector has fallen by more than fifty per cent. The number of 
enterprises has remained almost unchanged during the same period, despite a  
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short upswing at the beginning of 1990s. The profitability of the manufacturing 
sector (in per cent) has fallen to little more than a third of what it was in 1985; in 
fact, Pskov enterprises have been struggling to make any profit at all. One reason 
behind this low profitability in the statistics might be the habit of hiding profits in 
order to reduce the tax bill. 
In the 1990s, the industrial enterprises of Pskov produced, for example, 
tape recorders (175,400 units in 1991/ 200 in 1998), washing machines (1,300 in 
1994/1.300 in 1999), refrigerators (160,000 in 1991/3,300 in 1998), carton (3,700 
tons in 1991/3,600 tons in 1999). The output of all above-mentioned products has 
either dropped dramatically or stagnated. The industrial output of other NW 
regions has followed a similar pattern.
 225 
To sum up, the path toward a modern, knowledge-based industrialised 
economy is still long for Pskov. A decisive departure from the agriculture-
dominated economic structure seems not realistic in the short term. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, pp. 93-95.  
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3.3.3. Ownership of Enterprises 
In Russia the question of ownership of enterprises cannot always be 
answered accurately. The practice of siphoning off cash and assets by the 
management of some state enterprises, and subsequent ￿privatisation￿ of these 
companies at artificially low prices through off-shore companies was widespread 
in the 1990s. Keeping the real owners secret was part of this scheme. 
The privatisation process has transformed the structure of ownership in the 
regional economy. In 1999, the federal government owned less than 6 per cent of 
enterprises in the Pskov region. The municipalities had increased their share of 
ownership of companies from 9.3 per cent in 1996 to 11.0 per cent in 1999. 
Private ownership, by far the largest segment, has, in fact, lost some ground. 
Between 1996 and 1999, its share has shrunk from 72.5 to 69.7 per cent. The 
federal subjects, including Pskov oblast￿, owned less than 2 per cent of enterprises 
in Pskov, and their share decreased as well. As far as the foreign owners were 
concerned, their share was almost non-existent. As of 1 January 1999, foreign 
states owned 0.02 per cent of enterprises in the oblast, whereas foreign private 
companies had a share of 0.54 per cent. Nevertheless, the share of foreign private 
ownership had grown by more than 50 per cent in three years. The share of joint 
ventures between Russian and foreign owners had shrunk slightly, to 1.5 per cent. 
In 1996, there were 5 joint ventures with CIS companies in Pskov, 4 Byelorussian  
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and 1 with Azerbaijan. In 1999, only two joint ventures, with Byelorussian 
companies, were left.
226 
  
 
3.3.4. Tourism 
Pskov offers a variety of tourist attractions: the Kremlin, monasteries, 
fortresses and churches. Its proximity to the wealthy Scandinavian countries and 
the Baltic States could make Pskov one of the main destinations for foreign 
tourists in north-western Russia. However, problems such as poor infrastructure 
and difficulties obtaining a Russian visa have discouraged tourists from travelling 
to Pskov. In the 1990s, some important steps have been made by the regional 
administration for boosting the development of this potentially lucrative sector. In 
the capital Pskov, public funds were used to finance the construction of a high 
standard international hotel, for example.
227  
The facilities for tourists (travel agencies, hotels, sanatoriums, etc.) had a 
combined turnover of 105 million roubles in 1999.  The total number of foreign 
citizens entering Pskov over the Estonian or Latvian border was 554,000, but just 
7,300 citizens of CIS countries and 6,900 citizens of other foreign countries 
stayed overnight in Pskov. The rest was using Pskov for transit or day-trips only. 
Nevertheless, compared to 1998, it was a 19 per cent increase.
228 For comparison: 
                                                 
226 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblastnoy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, pp. 16, 23.  
227 ￿Vtoroye dykhaniye ￿Inturista￿￿. Pskovskaya Pravda: 2 pages. Nr 22, 3 Feb 2000 
http://pravda.pskov.ru:8101/03_02_2000/list.htm, accessed 10 Feb 2000. 
228 ￿Аnaliticheskaya spravka statisticheskikh dannykh v sfere turizma za 1999 g. ￿ Komitet po 
vnezhnim svjazam I turizmu administratsii Pskovskoi oblast￿i: 5 pages. 
http://www.tourism.pskov.ru/statist/statist001.html, accessed 20 Jun 2001  
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In neighbouring Estonia 2.3 million foreign tourists arrived in the first 9 months 
of 1998.
229 
Another impediment to the development of tourism is the lack of a 
convenient transportation network. The case study ￿Raketa ferry ￿ will it travel 
again?￿ of this thesis will discuss some of the problems that prevent the region 
from opening up its Soviet transport infrastructure to the tourists. Although Pskov 
is not far from St Petersburg (300 km) or Moscow (700 km), this distance seems 
to be too great for tourists, given the poor state of the Russian transportation 
network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 ￿Tourism￿.  Aastaraamat. Eesti Vabariigi Majandusministeerium: 6 pages. 
http://www.mineco.ee/eng/turism.html, accessed20 Jan 2000  
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3.3.5. International Trade/ Transit 
In comparison to other NW Russian regions, Pskov foreign trade activities 
were below the average in the 1990s. For example, in 1999 the volume of foreign 
trade was in Novgorod region 370 million USD and in Leningrad region 1.9 
billion USD, whereas in Pskov this was only 257 million USD.
230 
 
TABLE No 3 
 
FOREIGN TRADE OF PSKOV OBLAST￿ (in million US dollars): 
 
 1990  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Turnover  243 32  200 171 164 180 257 
Exports  31 18 68 62 40 65 81 
Imports 212 14  132 109 124 115 176 
Balance -181  +4  -64 -47 -84 -50 -95 
 
Sources: Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 190. 
Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: 
Goskomstat RF, 2000, pp. 136-137. 
 
                                                 
230 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, pp. 137-138.   
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As this table indicates, the turnover of Pskov foreign trade begun to grow 
in 1998, the year the rouble was devaluated. However, this growth has been 
linked to the increase of deficit in foreign trade. The negative balance may harm 
the regional economy if the deficit is not covered by the influx of foreign 
investments.  
The Russian State Statistical Committee does not provide information on 
the countries of origin of imports to Pskov or countries of destination for its 
exports.
231 The Pskov Oblast￿ Statistical Committee only indicates the types and 
volumes of units in trade with foreign partners, but not in monetary terms. Pskov 
exports to the non-CIS countries mainly raw materials: wood and ferrous metals. 
To the CIS countries, it exports wood, wood products and metals. Pskov imports 
from non-CIS countries food products, mainly frozen fish, diary fat, and 
processed meat. Additionally, it imports furniture and oil products. Pskov imports 
from the CIS countries fish and fish products and dairy fat primarily.
232 
Another important aspect of foreign trade for Pskov is transit of goods to 
and from Russia. Pskov lies on one of the main Russian-Baltic transit routes. In 
1997 it handled some 60% of Russian freight shipments to the Baltic Sea region. 
The revenues from these activities contribute significantly to the federal budget. 
In the year 1997 alone, the customs office in the city of Pskov alone generated 5 
million USD of revenues to the federal budget, which exceeded the taxes paid by 
any industrial manufacturer.
233  
                                                 
231 Ibid., p. 138. 
232 Goskomstat RF. Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik {Pskov Statistical Yearbook}. Vol. 2. Pskov: 
Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, pp. 189-190. 
233 Alexseev/Vagin, pp. 47, 53.  
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3.3.6. Foreign Investment 
The overall ability of Pskov to attract foreign investment has been rather 
modest. In 1999, Pskov was able to attract 2.8 million USD of foreign 
investments in total, which makes 3.4 USD per head. The neighbours were far 
more successful. Leningrad region received 100 times more foreign money (288.3 
million USD/172.6 USD per head), whereas Novgorod attracted 88.1 million 
USD (120.7 USD per head).
234 
The bulk of foreign investments went into trade and catering (43.0 per 
cent) and construction (33.1 per cent).
235 Another interesting aspect is the virtual 
absence of foreign investments in the heavy industry sector of Pskov. In 1995, 
only 64,200 roubles of foreign money was invested in heavy industry (5.9% of the 
total foreign investments to the manufacturing sector), in 1997, 300 roubles 
(0.1%) and 500 new roubles in 1998 (0.2%). Out of the total amount of foreign 
investments in the manufacturing sector of Pskov in 1995-1998, only 6 per cent 
was invested in the heavy industry sector.
236 
 
 
                                                 
234 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 79. 
235 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 80. 
236 Ekonomicheskiy obzor po promyshlennost {Overview of the Manufacturing Sector}., Vol. 1. Pskov: 
Pskovoblkomstat, 2000, p. 8.  
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3.3.7. Communications 
Pskov has inherited a huge road and railways network from Soviet times. 
The telephone network of Pskov oblast￿ is more extensive than in some 
neighbouring regions. In the 1990s, the infrastructure has been largely neglected 
in terms of maintenance and investments. Substantial investments are needed to 
avoid a further natural deterioration of the existing infrastructure. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union the length of railways has decreased. In 
1990, the total length of railways in the oblast￿ was 1,465 km, whereas in 1999 it 
was 1,160. The length of roads has, on the other hand, grown from 10,345 to 
12,427 in the same time span.
237 This increase is obviously modest if compared to 
the exploding number of cars in Pskov region; the number of private cars has 
tripled to 138.1 cars per 1000 persons in 1999 compared to 1990.
238 
The intensity of use of transportation networks has fallen in some sectors 
between 1990 and 1999. The number of passengers on the railways of Pskov has 
fallen from 6.0 to 4.5 millions per annum. The transport of passengers by bus has 
grown, however. In 1990, 184.1 million passengers were carried by bus, whereas 
in 1999, the total was 223 million. The most dramatic slump has occurred in air 
transportation. In 1990, 120,000 persons travelled by air. In 1999, however, only 
20 persons (sic!) used civil aircraft as means of transportation.
239 This can be 
explained by the fact that, for economic reasons, no regular flights, neither 
                                                 
237 Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik {Pskov Statistical Yearbook}, Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy 
oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 99. 
238 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 133. 
239 Ibid., pp. 131-132.  
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domestic nor international, take place from Pskov airport. People of Pskov 
wishing to travel can easily use the relatively nearby international and domestic 
airports in St Petersburg, Moscow, Tallinn or Riga.  
As far as the transportation of goods is concerned, the railways have 
managed to increase their share. In 1990, 3.6 million tonnes were carried by rail, 
which had grown to 4.4 in 1999. Road transport has shrunk by eight times. In 
1990, 74.3 million tonnes were transported on the roads of the oblast￿. In 1999, 
the respective figure was only 8.7.
240 
 
 
3.3.8. Economic Performance 
The beginning of the decline of the Pskov economy did not coincide with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, by then the decline had lasted already for 
a decade. Nevertheless, the break-up of the Soviet Union triggered a steep 
recession in Pskov as in many other parts of Russia. Pskov region found itself in 
an exceptionally difficult situation. It had no significant raw materials to export, 
and it had almost no economically viable industrial enterprises either. The 
agricultural sector, which used to dominate the regional economy, was one of the 
first victims of the introduction of the market economy. 
According to the statistics of the Statistical Committee of Pskov oblast￿, 
the regional GDP grew from 4,600 billion old roubles in 1995 to 11,500 million 
new roubles in 1999.
241 Per capita, the growth in the same period was from 
                                                 
240 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
241 In 1998, the new Russian rouble was introduced. One new rouble was worth 1000 old roubles 
(1:1000).   
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5,500,000 old roubles to 14,500 new roubles.
242 In nominal terms, the growth 
seems rather impressive. However, rampant inflation and collapse of the rouble￿s 
foreign exchange rate should be taken into account when using official Russian 
statistics for the last decade of the 20
th century. The service sector has become the 
most important contributor to the regional GDP. The share of services has grown 
from 41% in 1995 to 49.7% in 1999, whereas the share of industrial production 
has shrunk during the same period, from 55.4% to 46.2%. The rest of GDP is 
covered by taxes on products. Between 1995 and 1999, the share of the GDP of 
Pskov in the total GDP in Russia has decreased from 0.33 to 0.26. Reflecting the 
economic decline of Pskov, the region has slipped among the 89 Russian regions 
from the 62
nd position in 1995 to the 70
th in 1998.
243 
As the statistics may not always be a totally reliable source, the electricity 
consumption can be used as an additional indicator for economic activity. The 
dynamics of the electricity consumption in the Pskov oblast￿ can offer some help 
in measuring economic activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
242 Pskovskaya Oblast￿ v Tsifrakh {Pskov Oblast￿ in Numbers}. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2001, p. 10. 
243 Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik {Pskov Statistical Yearbook}. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy 
oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2000, p. 13.  
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TABLE No 4 
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN PSKOV REGION (million kWh)
  
 
  1985  1990 1991  1995 1997 1998 
Con-
sumption
 
2,422.8  2,978.8 2,.974.5 2,176.5 2,086.4 2,061.5 
 
Source: Promyshlennost Pskovskoy oblast￿i v 1985-1998 godakh {Manufacturing in Pskov 
Oblast￿ in 1985-1998}. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, 
p. 105. 
 
The stagnation in the second half of the decade in electricity consumption 
might suggest that the economy has started to stabilize. A closer look, however, is 
rather disappointing.  Namely, whereas the manufacturing and agricultural sector 
have reduced their consumption by nearly 50 per cent, main growth in 
consumption comes from residential consumers and from losses of electricity in 
the power grid.
244 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
244 Promyshlennost Pskovskoy Oblast￿i v 1985-1998 godakh.  Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, p. 105.  
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Oblast￿ budget  
Given the poor state of the regional economy, the tax revenues of the 
oblast￿ administration were not sufficient to finance the expenditures. Therefore, 
the balance of the regional budget depended on external sources.  
 
 
TABLE No 5 
BUDGET OF PSKOV OBLAST￿ 1990-1998 (million roubles) 
 
 1990  1995  1996  1997  1998*  1999* 
Total revenues 
 
421 955,104 1,804,410 2,160,796 1,520,975 2,178,000 
Own income in percentage 
of total revenues 
351 
83.4 
557,363 
58.4 
670,442 
37.2 
779,745 
36.1 
752,116 
49.4 
N/A 
Expenditure  -391 -962,005 -1,846,603 -2,221,976 -1,549,200 2,213,000 
Deficit/surplus  30  -6,901  -42,193 -61,180 -28,225 -35,000 
* In thousand roubles. 
 
Sources: Finansy Pskovskoy oblast￿i. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy 
statistiki, 1999, p. 5. 
Pskovskaya Oblast￿ v Tsifrakh. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 
2001, p. 12. 
 
The oblast￿ budget ran a deficit, which has varied between 0.1 per cent of 
the regional GDP in 1995 and 1.0 in 1997. The share of the oblast￿ budget in the 
regional GDP has fallen rapidly since 1997, from 34 per cent to 18 per cent in 
1999.   
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The main non-federal sources of income of the regional budget in the 
1990s were the profit tax, value added tax (VAT), income tax and excise-duty. In 
1990, the highest amount was received from the income tax payers; in 1995, from 
the enterprises paying profit tax. In 1998, the biggest source was the income tax, 
again. Since 1995, the role of the profit tax has gradually declined as the profits of 
enterprises have slumped. The share of excise-duty and tax on the use of natural 
resources has grown. The federal contributions to the regional budget were made 
through the allocations for pensions, social security, employment, medical 
insurance, social insurance and environmental protection.
245 
As far as the structure of expenditures in the budget is concerned, the 
priorities of the regional budget in 1999 were the following: social security 
(47.0%), economical development (25.2%) and education (20.1%).  The 
neighbouring north-western regions had a similar hierarchy of priorities.
246 
 
 
Unemployment 
The official statistics paint a rather rosy picture as far as the 
unemployment is concerned, given the fast deterioration of the regional economy. 
Possibly, the number of registered unemployed persons does not accurately reflect 
the real number of people without a job.  
Both the number of registered unemployed and total unemployment were 
falling. The peak of the number of registered unemployed persons in the 1990s 
was reached in 1995, when, according to official statistics, 9.1 per cent of the 
                                                 
245 Finansy Pskovskoy oblast￿i. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, 
pp. 6-9. 
246 Goskomstat RF, Socialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei  Severnovo I Severo-
Zapadnovo rayonov, Kaliningradskoi I Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999 gg. Kaliningrad: Goskomstat 
RF, 2000, p. 67.  
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working population had registered their jobless status. After 1995, the number of 
registered unemployed continued falling, reaching 3.6 per cent in 1999. The total 
number of unemployed persons, both registered and not registered, was the 
highest in 1998, when 16.7 per cent of the working population had no 
employment. In 1999, this number had fallen to 14.0 per cent.
247 
As the regional economy remained agriculturally-oriented and no major 
investments have been received by the manufacturing sector, the perspectives for 
a quick turnaround in the job market are modest. 
 
 
Living Standards 
The decline of the regional economy and the overall recession of the 
Russian economy in the 1990s had a negative impact on the living standards of 
the Pskov population.  As a result, the number of persons living below the official 
minimal subsistence level in the oblast￿ is relatively high. 
According to data from Table No 6 below, the nominal level of the official 
minimal subsistence level in roubles increased between 1993 (21,200) and 1996 
(330,200). In reality, given the high inflation rate, it sank rapidly.  In 1997, a year 
before the collapse of the external exchange rate of the rouble, even the nominal 
amount decreased slightly (326,500). The amount of roubles in 1998 considered 
the official subsistence level equalled approx 16 USD. In fact, almost 40% of the 
oblast￿ population had only this amount of income, or even less, per person at 
their disposal. 
The percentage of persons living below the minimal subsistence level 
fluctuated between 25.1% and the maximum of 42.7%. In average, between 1993 
                                                 
247 Ibid., p. 25.  
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and 1998, 33.2% of the Pskov population were living below the minimal 
subsistence level.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE No 6  
 
POPULATION LIVING BELOW THE MINIMAL SUBSISTENCE LEVEL 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 
Official 
minimum (in 
thousand 
roubles) 
 
21.2 93.1 273.4  330.2  326.5  404.7 
Persons living 
below this level
(in %) 
 
30.6 25.1 42.7 34.2  28.6  37.8 
 
* in roubles 
 
Source: Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik {Pskov Statistical Yearbook}. Vol. 1. Pskov: 
Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999; pp. 80-81.  
 
When we compare Pskov region to its neighbouring regions in north-
western Russia, the percentage of the population living below the official minimal  
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subsistence level is particularly high. However, it should be taken into account 
that every region defines the level differently. For example, in 1998, the level in 
the Leningrad region was almost twice as high as in Pskov. Two neighbours of 
Pskov, on the other hand, had a lower level of minimal subsistence than Pskov 
(Tver and Smolensk).  
 
 
TABLE No 7 
 
 THE OFFICIAL MINIMAL SUBSISTENCE LEVEL IN PSKOV AND 
NEIGHBOURING REGIONS IN 1998 (IN THOUSAND ROUBLES) 
 
  Pskov  Leningrad Novgorod Tver  Smolensk 
Level 405  718  438  403  385 
Population living 
below 
this level (in %) 
38.2 35.3  15.6  27.6  19.1 
 
Source: Pskovskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Vol. 2. Pskov: Pskovskiy oblast￿noy komitet 
gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 1999, pp. 193-194. 
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3.4. Regional Regime 
Political developments in Pskov have been influenced by a variety of rapid 
geopolitical and geoeconomic changes, which are linked to the end of the Cold 
War mainly. Internally, four major factors determine the political life in the 
oblast: geographic location on the Russian external border, a high degree of 
military presence, and the introduction of democracy, and market reforms.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced a new era in the political life 
of Pskov. The regional elite was ￿left geopolitically shocked￿ by the collapse.
248 
Suddenly a border region again, Pskov faced huge tasks of erecting and 
maintaining the now Russian state border. This border was going to be as tight 
and unfriendly as the border between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world 
used to be. From Pskov perspective, on the other side of the border now were 
independent states poised to join the possibly hostile organisations of EU and 
NATO. Moreover, the Baltic neighbours had managed to increase their living 
standards, whereas in Russia in general and in Pskov in particular, the economy 
has deteriorated. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the relations between Russia and the western-oriented former 
Soviet republics of Estonia and Latvia were rather tense. The third neighbour, 
Belarus, was a different case, however. Its leadership seemed interested in good 
relations with Russia, including Pskov.  
                                                 
248 Alexseev/Vagin (1999), p. 43.   
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The following sections will look at how Soviet-era institutions were 
reformed in the oblast￿. Then the role of the newly appointed or elected 
personalities in high political positions in the process of defining the political 
landscape in Pskov will be examined. Furthermore, some explanations will be 
offered for the preferences of the voters of Pskov in the presidential and Duma 
elections. 
In Soviet times, the oblast was administered in the same way as other 
oblasts of the RSFSR.  The oblast￿ committee of the Communist Party controlled 
the political life. Legislative powers were vested in the Soviet of People￿s 
Deputies of the oblast￿ and the executive powers in the Oblast￿ Executive 
Committee (Oblispolkom). The Legislative elected the members of the Executive. 
Vitaly Pushkaryev was elected 30 June 1982 by the Pskov oblast￿ Soviet of 
People￿s Deputies as the chairman of the Oblispolkom. He remained in this 
position until April 1994.
249  
The functions of legislative and executive institutions were duplicated by 
the respective structures of the Communist party, which was effectively in charge 
of all relevant decisions. Therefore, the deputies elected by the voters of the 
oblast￿ had no real power.
250 In the 1990s, the situation began to change. The 
elections to the regional Soviets on 4 March 1990 introduced more liberal 
principles to the political life in Pskov. There were 396 candidates and 170 one-
mandate districts, i.e. more than two candidates per seat. These elections changed 
the composition of the oblast￿ Soviet radically, which then became dominated by 
                                                 
249 Emelyanov/Parakshina (1998)., p. 78. 
250 Razvitiye Narodovlastiya Na Pskovskoi Zemlye {Development of People￿s Rule in Pskov}. Vol. 1. 
Izdatelstvo organiconno-metodicheskogo centra: Pskov, 1995, p. 46.  
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￿white-collar workers￿ and not by workers and agricultural workers as 
previously.
251 
As Russia became independent, the Soviet-type legislative and executive 
institutions had to be reformed. On 9th October 1993 the President of Russia 
issued the decree Nr 1617 ￿On reform of representative bodies and institutions of 
local self-government￿. The decree underlined the need to reform the 
representative bodies of all federal subjects (the republics were advised to take the 
ukaz as a guideline only, however). New legislative bodies were to be elected. 
Those bodies were to consist of 15-50 members. They should exist on a 
permanent basis and be in charge of adapting federal laws in the respective 
federal subject. Moreover, they would be in charge of the budget of the federal 
subject.
252  
The Pskov oblast￿ Soviet of People￿s Deputies, referring to this 
presidential decree, decided on 29
th October 1993 to reform itself and call for 
early elections. In its decision, the Soviet declared that the new representative 
body would be called ￿assembly of deputies of the oblast￿ and the population of 
the oblast would elect it.
253  
In the city of Pskov, a similar process took place, a few weeks earlier. The 
presidium of the Soviet of People￿s Deputies of the city of Pskov decided to 
reform the Soviet, too. The new representative body of the city would be called 
                                                 
251 Razvitiye Narodovlastiya Na Pskovskoi Zemlye {Development of People￿s Rule in Pskov}. Vol. 1. 
Izdatelstvo organiconno-metodicheskogo centra: Pskov, 1995, pp. 45, 48. 
252 Ukaz of the President of the Russian Federation, ￿O reforme predstavitelnych organov vlasti i 
organov mestnovo samouprvlenija v Rossiiskoi Federtsii￿, Nr 1617, 9 Oct 1993, in Razvitiye 
Narodovlastiya Na Pskovskoi Zemlye. Vol. 1. Izdatelstvo organiconno-metodicheskogo centra: Pskov, 
1995, pp. 61-63. 
253 Resheniye Pskovskovo oblastnovo Soveta narodnych deputatov ot 29.10.93 g. ￿O reformirovanii 
oblastnovo soveta narodnikh deputatov i dosrochnikh vyborach novovo organa predstavitelnoi vlasti 
Pskovskoi oblasti￿, 29 Oct 1993, in Razvitiye Narodovlastiya Na Pskovskoi Zemlye.  Vol. 1. Izdatelstvo 
organiconno-metodicheskogo centra: Pskov, 1995, pp. 70-71.  
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￿city Duma￿ and it would consist of 15 members. Early elections to the city Duma 
were scheduled for the 12
th December 1993.
254 
Besides reforming the existing representative bodies, a new institution, the 
Head of Administration (Governor), was introduced by presidential decree. In the 
ukaz Nr 1723, the President of the Russian Federation outlined the organisation of 
state power in the non-republican federal subjects (for republics, the decree was 
of recommendatory nature only). The governor was to have far-reaching powers 
in an oblast￿. All legislative acts of the representative body were subject to the 
Governor￿s approval. When the Governor rejects a legislative act of the 
representative body, the body could overrule his decision by a majority of two 
thirds, however. Moreover, the provision established the right of the Governor to 
compose his team independently and propose a draft budget to the representative 
body. The field of responsibilities of the Governor was wide. He was in charge of 
the use of the budget and the property in the ownership of the federal subject. 
Additionally, he was required to design and implement economic, cultural and 
social policies for the region.
255  
It was only in 1996 that the voters of the oblast￿ were allowed to elect the 
governor or the mayor of the capital directly. Before that, the President of the 
Russian Federation had appointed two governors for the oblast￿ and the first 
mayor of the capital.  
The first governor of Pskov oblast￿ had been appointed few months after 
the putsch in August 1991 in Moscow. On 24
th October 1991, President Yeltsin 
                                                 
254 ￿V malom sovete Pskova￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 12 Oct 1993. 
255 An addenda to the ukaz the President of the Russian Federation Nr 1723 from 22 Oct 1993, in 
Razvitiye Narodovlastiya Na Pskovskoi Zemlye. Vol. 1. Izdatelstvo organiconno-metodicheskogo 
centra: Pskov, 1995, pp.  65-69.  
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appointed Anatoly Dobryakov, the general director of the Pskovnefteprodukt, a 
major oil products￿ distribution company in the oblast￿ the first governor of 
Pskov. At the age of 52 years he was a relatively young member of the 
nomenklatura.
256 Both in the region and on the federal level, the number of his 
political opponents grew rapidly. In April 1992, in a newspaper article, the 
possibility of a vote of non-confidence was thoroughly considered.
257 Dobryakov 
came under intense political pressure to resign, as both his competence and 
integrity were questioned. On 5 May 1992, he was relieved from his position by 
the presidential decree Nr 433 for various mistakes, including violating the laws 
on competition, on trade with the Baltic States and on export licensing.
258 His first 
deputy was released by the President accused of similar violations on the same 
day.
259 
A few weeks later, on 22 May 1992, the President appointed Vladislav 
Tumanov the second Governor of the oblast￿. Lawyer by education, Tumanov had 
worked before his appointment as the deputy head of the city of Pskov 
administration.
260 Tumanov remained in office for 4 years. 
The President had the right to appoint mayors of cities of federal 
importance. By his decree from 27 January 1992 Nr 54, President Yeltsin 
appointed Alexander Prokofiev as the mayor of the city of Pskov. Prokofiev was 
                                                 
256 Emelyanov/Parakshina (1998)., p. 80. 
257 Egorov, I. ￿O nedoverii glave administratsii￿, in Novosti Pskova, 2 Apr 1992. 
258 ￿Ukaz presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob osvobozhdenii ot zanimayemoi dol￿zhnosti glavy 
administratsii Pskovskoi oblasti￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 8 May 1992. 
259 ￿Rasporyashenie Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob otstranenii ot ispolneniya obyazannosti 
pervovo zamestitelia glavy administratsii￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 8 May 1992. 
260 Emelyanov/Parakshina (1998), p. 81.  
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engineer by education and used to work in a factory for radio receivers in the city 
of Pskov.
261 
After these appointments were completed, the political situation in the 
oblast￿ turned volatile. The following period in the regional political life was 
overshadowed by a sharp conflict between the regional and the city authorities: 
governor Tumanov and mayor of the Prokofiev had different views on how the 
financial resources in regional budget should be redistributed.  
Two towns, Pskov and Velikiye Luki, represent one-third of the oblast￿ 
population. These towns contributed most of the revenues to the regional budget. 
This fact led the authorities of those towns believe that should have more leverage 
over the redistribution of funds in the regional budget. The municipal budgets 
depended on the oblast budget, and therefore municipal officials demanded more 
generous allocations from the regional administration. Pskov and Velikiye Luki 
were not satisfied with the policy of the regional administration, which favoured 
poor agricultural areas. The regional administration, on the other hand, was keen 
to provide for a more sustainable development of the oblast￿ as a whole and saw 
no reason to increase the transfers to the relatively wealthy towns. The conflict 
became seriously unpleasant to both sides as journalists picked up the topic. The 
interest of journalists is not surprising as the main newspapers are owned by the 
regional and city administration respectively. Despite the long-lasting exchange of 
arguments, the municipal authorities failed to convince the regional 
administration and subsequently both sides downplayed the whole issue.
262 
                                                 
261 Ibid, p. 85. 
262 Interview No 1MS with Ms Margit S￿re, CEO of the Estonian-based Peipus Centre for 
Transboundary Cooperation, conducted 10 April 2002 in her office. 
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Picture No 4. The main building of the Pskov regional administration. 
The administration of Pskov region is located on the Street Nekrassova, Pskov. In the same building, in 
the right wing reside several federal institutions, including the local representation of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
The first directly elected governor of Pskov was Yevgenii Mikhailov. 
Mikhailov was elected in 1996 as a candidate of the LDPR. The elections took 
place in two rounds, as none of the candidates received more than 50% of the  
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votes in the first round. In the first round on 20 October 1996, the incumbent 
governor Tumanov, candidate of the then-￿power-party￿ Nash Dom Rossiya 
(NDR) of the then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, received most of the votes 
(30.9%). Mikhailov was far behind with 22.7 per cent. The second round took 
place two weeks later on 3 November 1996. Governor Tumanov was defeated. He 
received only 36.9 per cent, whereas his rival won the elections with 56.5 per 
cent. In this way, Pskov became the sole Russian region governed by a LDPR 
governor.
263 
The elections did not result in any major changes in the management style 
of the oblast￿￿ administration, however. After Mikhailov took office, 90% of the 
officials continued their work under the new LDPR governor.
264  
The legislative body of the oblast, the Duma, has 21 members. The Duma 
does not play an important role in the regional political life. The elections to the 
Duma were carried out twice in the 1990s, on 9 February 1994 and 29 March 
1998. Both times, the deputies choose Yuri Shmatov as their chairman. As 
Shmatov himself analysed the nature of the oblast￿ Duma, it was an assembly of 
￿specialists with similar mindset￿.
265 
 
 
                                                 
263 ￿Elektoral￿nyi pasport Pskovskoi oblast￿i. Tsentral￿naya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya￿: 2 pages. 
http://www.acc.ru/fci/rus_map/text060.html, accessed 19 Feb 2000. 
264 Alexseev/Vagin (1999), p. 47. 
265 ￿Pozlov, Shmatov ili tretii, kotoryi na zlo?￿, Novosti Pskova, 9 Apr 1998.  
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Support for National Politicians and Parties 
The first Russian presidential elections in 1991 brought Yeltsin in Pskov 
33.8 per cent of votes, whereas the national average was 57.3 %. The second 
presidential elections in 1996 were successful to the incumbent President Boris 
Yeltsin in Russia in general (53.8% in the second round), but not in Pskov. There, 
Yeltsin could not beat his main rival, the Communist Party leader Gennady 
Zyuganov. Pskov electorate gave its support both in the 1st and 2nd round to 
Zyuganov. In the first round Zyuganov received 30.4 per cent, whereas Yeltsin 
was second with 24.8. In the second round, Zyuganov was victorious again, with 
48.1. Yeltsin could nevertheless convince more supporters this time, receiving 
45.2 per cent. Another interesting aspect of the presidential elections in Pskov in 
1996 was that Mr Alexander Lebed￿, a former general, was remarkably successful 
there, being favoured by the 23.6% of voters in the first round
266, compared to 
14.5% nationally.
267  
The State Duma elections were a proof of the changes in political attitudes 
of the voters in Pskov. Voters seemed to support either radical/extremist views or 
the power-parties. Liberal and right-wing political forces, for their part, have 
struggled to get any votes at all in Pskov.  
In 1993, the first State Duma elections took place in Russia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The outcome of the first Duma elections in Pskov 
reflected the political mood, which was quite radical at that time. The extremist 
                                                 
266 ￿Elektoralnyi pasport Pskovskoi oblast￿i. Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya￿: 2 pages. 19 Feb 
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LDPR was the clear winner with 43.0 per cent of votes (national average 22.9%). 
Far behind were the pro-government Russian Choice-Vybor Rossii with 10.1% 
(15.5), followed by the Communists with 9.5% (12.4) and the Agrarian Party of 
Russia, which received 9.0% of the votes in Pskov (8.0).
268 
Two years later, in 1995, the Communists took revenge in Pskov oblast￿. 
But they could not imitate the crushing victory of the LDPR. This time, the votes 
were distributed more evenly. The Communist Party received 22.7% (national 
average: 22.3%), leaving the LDPR to the second place with 20.1% (11.2). NDR 
was left third with 6.0 percent (10.1), followed by Yabloko with 4.9% (6.9) and 
Women of Russia ￿ Zhenshchiny Rossii, which received 4.8% (4.6).
269  
In 1999, Pskov voters gave their support to the pro-Kremlin Unity-
Edinstvo, which received 38.4% of the votes (national average: 23.3%). The 
Communists were second this time with 23.5% (24.3). The List of Mr 
Zhirinovsky ￿ Blok Zhirinovskovo was supported by almost seven per cent of the 
voters (6.0), whereas Fatherland-All Russia was left on the fourth place with 5.1% 
(13.3) and Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) was fifth with nearly five per cent 
(8.5). 
270 
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Chapter 4 Subnational Foreign Activities of Pskov ￿ 
Regional and Local Units 
Pskov oblast￿, a border region of the Russian Federation, was a relevant 
actor in the international system in the 1990s compared to some other Russian 
regions. In the oblast￿, both levels of government ￿ regional and local 
municipal/rural - were developing foreign contacts. This Chapter will examine the 
subnational foreign activities of different levels of government in the oblast￿.  
This Chapter will try and find answers to the following questions: How 
did different levels of subnational government develop and manage their foreign 
activities after Pskov had become a border region again in 1991 when Estonia and 
Latvia regained their independence? How have subnational governmental units in 
Pskov coped with the collapse of the Soviet Union? What were their aims and 
motivations when engaging in subnational foreign activities? Which 
supranational, international, intergovernmental, regional or subregional 
organisations were operating in the neighbourhood of Pskov? Who were their 
foreign partners and what was their position after the end of the Soviet Union? 
And, last but not least, can we use existing concepts and theories to explain 
subnational foreign activities in the case of Pskov?  
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There were several technical obstacles to the examination of foreign 
activities of regional, municipal and local units in the Pskov oblast￿ by the author 
of this thesis. First of all, the overall state of documentation on these activities 
was rather chaotic. Access to the existing documents on subnational foreign 
activities was complicated, as neither the actors nor their supervisors, such as the 
regional branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
actually kept an accurate record of these activities. Partly, the texts of agreements, 
protocols of intention, etc. were missing or had restricted access. Without 
personal persuasion of relevant officials it would have been nearly impossible for 
the author to obtain more than a few of the relevant documents. 
 
 
Domestic and International Background 
In the year 2000, after Putin￿s arrival in the presidential office, the 
political situation began to change in Russia, especially in terms of centre-
periphery relations. The relatively high degree of freedom the subnational units 
had enjoyed in terms of foreign activities during the Yeltsin period was not 
tolerated by the new administration.  
The majority of Russian north-western regions ￿ Murmansk oblast￿, 
Republic of Karelia, Leningrad oblast￿ and Pskov oblast￿ - are located directly on 
the western state border of the Russian Federation. Most of the neighbouring 
countries of North Western Russia belong to the EU (Finland, Estonia, Latvia) or 
NATO (Norway, Estonia, Latvia). Officially Russia did not welcome NATO 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in general and to the Baltic States in  
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particular. The enlargement of the EU to the Baltic states, on the other hand, was 
not opposed by Moscow, however.  
Another relevant organisation operating in the Baltic Sea area is the 
Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which was founded in 1992 in Copenhagen. 
It became an important forum for the political elites of the Baltic, Scandinavian 
states, Germany, Poland and Russia for discussing different matters of 
importance.
271  
Moreover, Pskov region is a full member in the Organisation of Baltic Sea 
States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC), which was founded in 1993 in 
Stavanger, Norway. The members of this organisation are subnational federated, 
provincial and regional units from the member states of the CBSS. From Russia, 
beside Pskov, 4 other regions have joined: federal city of St Petersburg, 
Kaliningrad, Leningrad and Novgorod oblasts. Members finance the organisation. 
Its aims are promoting economic cooperation, education, culture and 
environmental protection.
  The president of the organisation represents the 
subregion of the Baltic Sea at the national and international level. The everyday 
work of the organisation takes place in working groups. The Council is the 
highest body of the organisation. From every country ￿ but not from every region 
￿ two members are delegated to the Council, in order to keep the equilibrium.
272 
The list of potential bilateral foreign counterparts of Pskov subnational 
units included, first of all, the former republics of the Soviet Union. In the case of 
the Baltic States, fresh memories of occupation were a serious impediment to 
                                                 
271 For an extensive overview of international organisations operating in the neighbourhood of Pskov, 
see Cottey (1999): Cottey, Andrew (ed). Subregional Cooperation In the New Europe. Building 
Security: Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea. London: Macmillan Press, 1999. 
272 Mezhevitch (2000): Mezhevitch, Nikolai. Mezhdunarodnie Organizatsii Regiona Baltiiskovo 
Morya: Osnovnye Napravleniye  Deyatel￿nosti i Rol￿ v Formirovanii Sistemy Mezhdunarodnykh 
Otnoshenii. St Petersburg: KultInformPress, 2000, pp 27-29.  
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cooperation. Despite this, subnational governmental units developed contacts with 
their counterparts in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Nevertheless, Ukraine seemed 
less interested in cooperation with Russian regions, including Pskov, than its 
Northern neighbour, Belarus. Belarus indicated strong interest in developing 
contacts with Russian subnational units, especially Pskov. Byelorussian central 
state institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and subnational units targeted 
Pskov, a direct neighbour.  
Wealthy Nordic countries were the other potentials. As we can read 
below, Sweden and Denmark and Finland have been fairly successful in 
developing contacts with Pskov. Norway, on the other hand, a member of NATO, 
seems to have been less keen on developing closer relations with Pskov. 
Subnational actors from Pskov targeted more distant EU members, 
especially Germany, too. Contacts with Germany had a strong emphasis on socio-
economic aspects. There were even partners in faraway countries such as the 
United States of America and the People￿s Republic of China. 
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4.1. Subnational Foreign Activities: Different Levels of 
Government 
This section will present an in-depth overview of subnational foreign 
activities of two subnational levels of government in the Pskov oblast￿, i.e. on the 
regional and local level. On the local level, two subgroups exist: municipal local 
government  and  rural local government. The subgroup of municipal local 
government is limited to the City of Pskov and Velikiye Luki, whereas the 
subgroup of rural local government includes those districts that are located on the 
external border of the Russian Federation.   
So far, researchers of subnational foreign activities have ignored the local 
level to a great extent. In the case of Pskov, the two levels of local and regional 
government differ significantly in terms of the nature of their subnational foreign 
activities. Not only the current activities differ on both levels of subnational 
government but their previous experience is different, too.  
In Soviet times the regional administration was not allowed to engage in 
foreign activities of any kind. The capital of the oblast￿, the City of Pskov, on the 
other hand, has a long track of foreign relations as it was allowed to have foreign 
partner-towns in the former Soviet bloc or even Finland. Local units, for their 
part, were not allowed to have direct foreign contacts either. 
When it comes to local units, a distinction should be made between local 
municipal units and border-located local rural units since their behaviour in 
terms of subnational foreign activities differs to a large extent.   
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This section will give an overview of different subnational units engaged 
in subnational foreign activities on the territory of the oblast￿, which is followed 
by a characterisation of the types of activities those actors were engaged in. 
Subsequently, subnational foreign activities on both levels of government in the 
Pskov region will be described and analysed. For this analysis the concept of 
measuring the international actorness of subnational units developed by Hocking 
will be used, which was discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis (1.4. Conceptual 
Framework ￿ Types of Subnational Foreign Activities). 
In Pskov oblast￿, both levels of subnational government were to some 
extent engaged in subnational foreign activities in the 1990s. The problems of 
those units have been largely similar: lack of experience, lack of resources and 
legal uncertainty. The scale and scope of their activities varies, however.  
In the following sections I will identify various actors in the field of 
subnational foreign activities. Moreover, I will enlist their responsibilities and 
rights.  
 
 
Regional Administration 
The head of administration (Governor) is the highest official of the 
Executive in the oblast￿. He effectively sets the directions for subnational foreign 
activities of the oblast￿ administration. The governor is the most important single 
foreign policy actor in Pskov at the regional level. It depends to a great extent on 
his political taste and preferences with whom foreign contacts are developed. 
Until 2005, one of the vice-governors is involved with external issues as well. The 
Governor effectively controls the subnational foreign activities of the oblast￿,  
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since these are financed from the budget line ￿other expenses￿, without a specific 
control of the Legislative.
273 
The oblast￿ administration, with its diverse departments, sub-divisions and 
services implements the policies designed by the Governor.  Two departments 
were directly involved with subnational foreign activities until 2006. These were 
the  Department for Foreign Links  and Tourism and Department for External 
Economic links. As the names indicate, the first department was responsible for 
the protocol and tourism promotion. The second department dealt with external 
economic links only, with special emphasis on attracting foreign investment.  
The structures for subnational foreign activities of the regional 
administration were reformed fundamentally in 2005-2006. In that year, the 
current Governor Mikhail Kuznetsov introduced his new administration, which 
had been reduced considerably. 
 
 
Municipal Authorities 
Municipal authorities were entitled to use more limited options deals with 
foreign partners than the regional authorities. They could not conclude treaties 
with foreign partners, but only agreements regulating issues of cooperation. The 
focus of municipal subnational foreign activities was normally on socio-economic 
issues. As far as the financial options or personnel are concerned, municipal units￿ 
resources are more limited, too. 
                                                 
273 Interview No 2VL with Mr Vadim  Laptev, Head of Committee, Committee of Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Administration of the Oblast￿ Pskov, conducted 29 June 2001, in his office. 
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The mayor represents the city abroad. Additionally, one of his deputies is 
dealing with foreign issues as well. There are two relevant departments in the city 
administration, the ￿City Links and Protocol department￿ and the ￿Investment 
Policy and Foreign Economic Links department￿. The first department is 
responsible for maintaining foreign partnerships, whereas the second department 
focuses on attracting foreign investment to the city. City administration files 
annually a report on the results of subnational foreign activities. 
 
 
Local Governments 
Local rural governments, which represent the lowest level of government, 
mainly deal with issues affecting the everyday lives of people living on their 
territory. However, especially the border localities have shown some interest in 
subnational foreign activities.  
Limited finances set the framework for local rural foreign activities. 
Nevertheless, by participating in various networks, programmes and initiatives 
financed from external sources they can make their voice heard abroad.  
 
 
Types of Foreign Activities 
The types of foreign activities of different levels of government in the 
region can be divided in the following main categories: (1) political contacts, (2) 
socio-economic links, (3) foreign trade/business links, and, (4) 
cultural/educational exchange.  
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Political motivations played an important role behind subnational foreign 
activities of the oblast￿ administration in the 1990s. External economic 
cooperation was limited to Belarus mainly. Until recently, the regional 
administration, for example, was not actively seeking foreign investment. Instead, 
the Governor made comments like ￿Pskov airborne division could take Estonia 
within 48 hours￿.
274 Obviously, such comments were unlikely to encourage 
foreign investors.  
Socio-economic contacts, especially humanitarian aid, were an important 
motivator for all subnational governmental units in Pskov. This was one of the 
reasons why partners in wealthier countries were targeted. 
Foreign trade/business links received relatively little attention. 
Cultural/educational exchange, on the other hand, took place on all three levels of 
government. The manifestations were exchange of students or pupils, cultural 
events abroad, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
274 Press-relis administratsii Pskovskoi oblasti Press Release of the Administration of Pskov Oblast￿}. 14 
Nov. 2000.  
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4.2. Regional Unit 
By definition, the Pskov oblast￿, which is a subject of the federation, has 
the broadest rights when engaging in subnational foreign activities compared to 
municipal or rural local governmental units. As a member of the federation, the 
regional unit was allowed to conclude treaties with foreign partners without the 
federal centre￿s specific approval in the 1990s. 
Pskov oblast￿ did not follow the pattern of some other Russian regions 
which took advantage of the weakness of the federal centre during the Yeltsin 
period in terms of subnational foreign activities. For example, some regions 
opened their missions abroad. This does not make the regional administrative an 
inactive foreign actor, however. 
The geographic focus of foreign activities of the Pskov regional 
administration was on countries in the direct neighbourhood, i.e. the republics of 
the former Soviet Union and Scandinavia. The main foreign partner of the oblast￿ 
administration has been the geographically closest neighbour, the Republic of 
Belarus.  
The following sections will offer some answers to the following questions: 
Why did Pskov decide to favour these particular partners? What was the political, 
economic and cultural return of subnational foreign activities for the regional 
administration? 
In the early 1990s Pskov oblast￿ began to ￿discover the world￿. In the 
years 1992-1999, the oblast￿ administration signed nearly twenty legal documents  
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with foreign partners. Their nature and impact will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
The decree No 551 issued by the government of Kasyanov on 26 July 
2000 abruptly ended the period of laissez-faire in subnational foreign activities in 
Russia.
275 It required all treaties agreements between Russian federated units and 
foreign partners to be registered with the federal Ministry of Justice. This 
requirement affected both existing and the future treaties and agreements. It 
effectively invalidated all existing treaties and agreements, as some of them stood 
in contradiction to the federal laws or even Constitution and could, therefore, not 
be registered in Moscow. 
Surprisingly, Pskov regional administration, which had been quite active 
in terms of subnational foreign activities in the 1990s, managed to cope more 
effectively with this new requirement compared to other regional administrations 
in Russia. As of early 2003, Russia-wide only five subnational foreign agreements 
had been officially registered in Moscow. Of these, two agreements were of 
Pskov origin.
276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275 For an analysis of the decree see the following section of this thesis 2.2. Legal Framework for 
Subnational Foreign Activities. 
276 Presentation by Vice-Governor Dmitri  Shachov 5 April 2003.  
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4.2.1. Directions 
There were three main directions of subnational foreign activities of the 
oblast￿ administration in the 1990s, the Byelorussian direction, the Scandinavian 
direction and the Baltic direction.  
If we examine the nature of foreign contacts of the regional 
administration, we discover an inclination towards Belarus. Other former Soviet 
republics considered less pro-Russian like Estonia, Latvia or Ukraine, on the other 
hand, have received considerably less attention from the governor and his office. 
The governor is the most important single foreign policy actor in Pskov. In the 
1990s, the governor was seemingly favouring Belarus as the main partner, with its 
pro-Russian and pro-Soviet attitudes.  
The Scandinavian direction included countries like Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland. Of these countries, relations with a regional unit (Dalarno) in Sweden 
were the most developed.  
There was much less activity in the Baltic direction in the 1990s. This is 
not surprising given the fact that Russian-Baltic relations in general were 
relatively tense. The LDPR party of Mr Zhirinovsky backed the present Governor 
Yevgenii Mikhailov in the gubernatorial race in 1996. This party is known for its 
anti-Western and anti-Baltic attitudes.  
From the year 2000 on, however, two of the Baltic states, Estonia and 
Latvia, replaced Belarus as the main target of the regional administration abroad. 
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4.2.2. Partners 
There were 5 types of partners with which the regional administration of 
Pskov oblast￿ was engaged in subnational foreign activities.  The list of these 
partners included (1) foreign states and their institutions  (Ministry of Transport of 
Finland; Republic of Latvia; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus), (2) 
subnational regional units (Tartu county administration of Estonia; Vıru county 
administration of Estonia; Pılva county administration of Estonia; the Land of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania of Germany; border-located regions of Belarus 
and Ukraine; Vitebsk region of Belarus; Siauliai county administration of 
Lithuania), (3) subnational local municipal units (Valmiera of Latvia; Minsk; City 
of Tallinn), (4) subnational local rural units (Nordborg community of Denmark; 
Kopparberg community of Sweden) and (5) subnational private/transnational 
units (Estonian-Russian Chamber of Trade; the German electronics company 
Siemens). 
277 
Belarus was clearly the focal point for subnational foreign activities of 
Pskov regional administration in the 1990s. This state has been one of the closest 
allies of Russia among former Soviet republics since the end of the Soviet Union. 
Pskov region as a direct neighbour of Belarus developed a dense framework of 
cooperation with Belarus, both on the economic and political level. Different units 
of government were targeted there: Belarus as a state, and both its subnational 
regional and municipal units.  
                                                 
277 The list of documents signed with foreign partners was compiled by Vadim Laptev, Head of Foreign 
Links and Tourism Department of the Pskov regional administration.   
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In the 1990s the relations of Pskov region with its Baltic neighbours, 
Estonia and Latvia, were rather ambiguous. For the Baltic States, the military 
capacity concentrated in the Pskov oblast￿ posed a serious psychological obstacle 
in relations with their Russian neighbour.
  For people in Pskov, on the other hand, 
the rapid economic development on the other side of border was a source of envy. 
Moreover, the state-controlled media often reported on the discrimination against 
the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic States. 
  
The former Soviet republics of Estonia and Latvia had defined 
membership in the EU and NATO as their main foreign policy goals. The fact that 
Estonia and Latvia had clearly indicated their Western orientation, on the one 
hand, made their relations with Russia somewhat clearer. On the other hand, 
NATO membership of those countries was considered a security threat by some 
political forces in Russia. Therefore, the aspiration of Estonia and Latvia to join 
this military alliance was criticised by Russian hardliners. 
The wish of Estonia and Latvia to join the EU was not considered a threat 
by Russia, however. Before joining the EU these countries needed to adapt EU 
laws and regulations. One of the requirements of the EU for the applicant 
countries is to protect their borders effectively. This meant that the procedure of 
simplified border-crossing for inhabitants of the border areas had to be abolished, 
for example.  
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4.2.3. Chronology  
In the period between 1992 and 1999, the representatives of the Pskov 
regional administration signed 19 documents with foreign partners. This section 
will describe some of those documents. 
The first document in the field of subnational foreign activities was signed 
by the Pskov regional administration on 23 August 1993 with the Vitebsk oblast 
of the Republic of Belarus. It was an agreement on ￿developing mutually 
advantageous cooperation￿. The duration of the agreement was not limited. Other 
agreements with Byelorussian partners included a memorandum signed by a 
representative of the oblast￿ administration and representatives of 
Byelorussian/Ukrainian border regions on 22 Nov 1994. This memorandum dealt 
with the common interests of the border regions of the three countries. On 26 
March 1996 the capital of Byelorussia, Minsk, and Pskov oblast￿ signed a 
cooperation agreement. With Baltic partners, several documents were signed. On 
30 January 1995, a trilateral protocol on measures necessary for the opening of a 
representation of the Pskov Chamber of Commerce in Tallinn was signed between 
the oblast￿ administration, administration of the Estonian capital of Tallinn and 
the Pskov Chamber of Commerce. On 15 April 1999, Pskov region and the town 
of Valmiera of the Republic of Latvia signed a memorandum on development of 
economic, cultural and tourism links. With Estonian regional units, four 
documents were signed, among them a protocol on mutual interests with the Tartu 
between Pskov and Tartu) from 16 May 1997. Six years later, the ferry-link was  
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re-launched. A similar document aiming at improving transportation links was 
signed with the Finnish Ministry of Transport on 12 September 1995. The goal: 
establishing an air link Pskov-Kuopio (Finland). As of 2003, there was no air link 
between these towns, however.
278 
 
 
4.3. Local Municipal Units 
This section will give an overview the subnational foreign activities of 
municipal authorities in the Pskov oblast￿ in the 1990s. There were two major 
towns in the oblast￿ engaged in subnational foreign activities worth mentioning, 
Pskov and Velikiye Luki. Out of these two, the scope of activities of the capital of 
the oblast￿, City of Pskov, was remarkable. Velikiye Luki, a town in the southern 
part of the oblast￿, had contacts with a Finnish town, Sein￿joki. 
As far as the nature of subnational municipal foreign activities in the 
Pskov region is concerned they are mainly cultural and humanitarian. As 
municipal units cannot participate in the process of foreign-policy-making of the 
federation, their main focus was on the search for ways of improving the socio-
economic situation in their constituency.  
The administration of the City of Pskov was fairly successful in attracting 
foreign aid to a variety of humanitarian projects. These projects have been aimed 
at improving the quality of life of disabled persons, orphans and low-income 
groups mainly. 
 
                                                 
278 List compiled by Laptev.  
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4.3.1. Directions 
In Soviet times, the City of Pskov had established foreign contacts with 
Gera (GDR) in 1958, with Kuopio (Finland) in 1966, with Arles (France) in 1976, 
with Nijmegen (Holland) in 1987, with Neuss (FRG) in 1990 and with Perth 
(Scotland) in 1990. Velikiye Luki had one foreign partner: Sein￿joki in Finland. 
This partnership was established in the early 1970s. 
Back in Soviet times, cooperation focussed on cultural exchange and 
exchange of representatives of same professions mainly (fire-fighters, for 
example). Joint actions were organised. For example, Gera, Kuopio, Arles and 
Pskov signed a common declaration demanding world peace in 1983.
279 
In the early nineties there was a major change of direction of foreign 
partners. Scandinavia and Western Europe became the main direction for 
subnational foreign activities for the City of Pskov, thereby replacing the former 
partners from the Communist bloc.
280 There emerged some contacts in 
geographically distant countries, such as the People￿s Republic of China and the 
United States of America, too.  Those contacts were less intense, however, 
primarily because of the high travel expenses.
281 
Currently, the list of foreign partners of the City of Pskov includes 
Belostok (Poland), Valmiera and Daugavpils (Latvia), Vytebsk (Belarus), Gera 
and Neuss (Germany), Myanyan (China), Nijmegen (Netherlands), Norrt￿lje 
(Sweden), Perth (UK/Scotland), Roanoke (USA), Tartu (Estonia), Chernigov 
                                                 
279 ￿V imya mira na zemlye Gera-Kuopio-Arl￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 24 Apr. 1983 
280 Interview No 1AB with Alexander Bisyayev, Head of Department, Department for Foreign Links, 
Pskov City Administration, conducted 12 May 2000, in his office. 
281 Interview No 1TR with Ms Tatyana Rumyantseva, Head of Department, Department for Foreign 
Links and Tourism, Pskov City Administration, conducted 28 June 2001 in her office.  
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(Ukraine). Joint activities with some of the partners are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
 
4.3.2. Partners 
 
German Partners 
In Germany, the City of Pskov has several partners in Soviet times 
already. Gera, an East German town used to be a partner of the City of Pskov 
since the 1960s. After the Soviet bloc ceased to exist, the City of Pskov shifted its 
focus from the East German partner to partners from the Western part of the 
unified Germany, however. This shift had a pragmatic reason: the Western 
German partners were wealthier and could rather afford to offer humanitarian aid. 
What was more, they could cover the travelling costs of delegations of both 
parties. East German towns, on the other hand, were less interested in partnerships 
with former Soviet towns and preferred to focus on their Western counterparts 
after the re-unification.
282 
An important peculiarity of the cooperation with German partners was a 
strong emphasis on humanitarian aid. For example, German partners were 
engaged in the project of opening a school for disabled children.   
In the 1990s, beside the old Eastern German partner Gera, there were three 
other German partners: M￿hlheim auf Ruhr, Neuss and Wassenberg. In 1998, 
                                                 
282 Interview N0 1TR with Ms Rumyantseva  
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German partners were the largest sponsors in financial terms. They contributed 
500.000 roubles for social projects in the City of Pskov.
283 
A recent publication by the city administration enlists two German towns 
as current sister-towns of Pskov, Gera and Neuss. The relations with Gera, a town 
in the former German Democratic Republic have evolved from exchange of 
delegations for celebrations of socialist anniversaries to youth exchange and 
cultural cooperation. In the last years, Gera town administration has helped to 
organise joint chess competitions and pupil exchange. The authors of the booklet 
complain however that the interest in Gera in cooperation with the City of Pskov 
has decreased after the re-unification. The reason for the loss of interest lies in a 
general reorientation in favour of Western partners.
284 
 
 
Finnish Partners 
In Finland, the City of Pskov had a partner already in Soviet times, too, 
despite the fact that Finland was not a socialist country. The town of Kuopio and 
Pskov became partners in 1966, which made Kuopio the first sister-town of the 
City of Pskov. 
In Soviet times, contacts between Pskov and Kuopio developed on 
different levels. For example, the fire-fighters or medical workers of both towns 
                                                 
283 Otchet (1998): ￿Iz otcheta Mera g. Pskova za 1998 g: Sotrudnichestvo s gorodami partnyorami 
Pskova￿. A copy of the report obtained from Head of Department, Department for Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Pskov City Administration. 
284 Antipov/Matsevich/Kalinin (2004): Antipov, V. S., S. F. Matsevich and I. Ye. Kalinin. Porodnennye 
Goroda Pskova. Pskov City Administration: Pskov, 2004, pp 26-27.   
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met often. Different cultural events introducing Finnish culture in Pskov and vice 
versa took place.
285 
In 1990s, the nature of cooperation between the City of Pskov and its 
Finnish partner changed. City of Pskov suffered from deterioration in living 
standardss in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cultural exchange 
was no longer the highest priority. Humanitarian aid was the new keyword: in 
1998, 12.355 USD was raised by the people of Kuopio for orphans in City of 
Pskov. This money was used for inviting orphans from City of Pskov to Kuopio 
for a summer camp. Moreover, a sauna was built for orphans.
286 
In the last years, cooperation with the administration of Kuopio has 
intensified, however. Recent cooperation projects were carried out in the cultural 
field. Moreover, a joint project with Kupoio in the framework of Tacis 
programme of the European Union provided for cleaner drinking water for the 
inhabitants of the City of Pskov.
287 
 
 
American Partner 
City of Pskov administration officials spent a week in Roanoke, Virginia 
in 1992 in order to find an American partner. Head of Pskov delegation was 
Mayor Prokofiev, who signed an agreement of mutual cooperation. The central 
cooperation project between City of Pskov and Roanoke is student exchange. The 
Pskov State Pedagogical Institute has sent students to the Ferrum-College in 
                                                 
285 Pavlov, S. ￿Vstrechii Kolleg po Professii￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 15 July 1987. 
286 Otchet (1998): ￿Iz otcheta Mera g. Pskova za 1998 g: Sotrudnichestvo s gorodami partnyorami 
Pskova￿. A copy of the report obtained from Head of Department, Department for Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Pskov City Administration. 
287 Antipov/Matsevich/Kalinin (2004), p. 36.  
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Roanoke. Other cooperation projects take place in the form of exchange of 
people, too. Medical workers, artists and political scientists from Pskov and 
Roanoke have visited their sister town.
288 
A short history of the relations has been compiled by the Roanoke/Pskov 
Oblast￿ Sister City Organization. The organisation has initiated several aid 
programmes in the City of Pskov, for example soup kitchens.
289 
 
 
Estonian Partner 
Tartu, the second-biggest Estonian town, is geographically the closest 
foreign town of comparable size. In Soviet times, there were numerous ferry, train 
and bus connections a day between the towns. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
separated the two cities and it took nearly 10 years before a cooperation 
agreement was signed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
288 Ibid. p. 59. 
289 More information on joint projects of Pskov and Roanoke, Virginia can be found at 
http://www.rvsci.us/html/pskov2.html.  
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Picture No 5 The Town Square of Tartu. 
The second-biggest Estonian town, Tartu, was influenced by German rule. 
With its Rathaus (Town Hall) Tartu contrasts with Pskov and its Kremlin.  
 
Regularly, the ￿Days of Pskov￿ are organised in Tartu. This is a two-day 
event, where intensive cultural exchange takes place. Moreover, for Tartu and 
Pskov business circles, an annual fair is organised.
290 The relationship with Tartu 
is quite new compared to some other partnerships, which were launched in Soviet 
times. Therefore, the list of joint projects is relatively short. 
 
                                                 
290 Antipov/Matsevich/Kalinin (2004), p. 63.  
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4.3.3. Chronology 
As far as the number of documents signed with foreign partners is 
concerned, the City of Pskov was a less active player than the regional 
administration.
291 
On 3 June 1994 the City of Pskov, the Pskov rayon (local unit) and the 
Swedish Falun commune (local unit) signed an agreement on cooperation. 
Cooperation between Pskov and its Estonian neighbour, Tartu, was slow 
to develop, despite geographical closeness. It was only in the year 2001 that a 
cooperation agreement between the two towns was signed. The agreement from 
17 May 2000 foresaw cooperation and exchange of information between the 
towns￿ administrations for the following 2 years. Proposals for specific 
cooperation projects should be discussed bilaterally. However, special emphasis 
was put on cooperation in the field of economy and entrepreneurship. The 
agreement did not include any financial commitments. As a follow-up of the 
previous agreement, 25 September 2003 a cooperation declaration was signed by 
deputy mayors of Tartu and Pskov, which had a similar content 
292 
Every year joint actions were organised with foreign partners of the City 
of Pskov. These actions had a strong social emphasis.  The year 1998 was 
declared the ￿year of youth￿ by the city administration and the town of Gera and 
                                                 
291 List compiled by Laptev. 
292 ￿Koost￿￿ ja sıbralike suhete arendamise lepe Pihkva linna (Vene F￿deratsioon) ja Tartu linna (Eesti 
Vabariik) vahel {Agreement on Cooperation and Development of Friendly Relations Between Pskov 
(Russian Federation) and Tartu (Republic of Estonia)},  www.tartu.ee 
http://www.tartu.ee/?lang_id=1&menu_id=2&page_id=302, accessed 06 Jan 2006.
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Kuopio. Youths from Gera, Kuopio and City of Pskov travelled to an island in 
Lake Ladoga in order to help and rebuild a monastery there. Some Pskov youths 
went to Gera to assist the reconstruction of an old farm, which became a youth 
centre afterwards. In the same year ten years of friendship agreement with 
Nijmegen (Holland) were celebrated.
293
  
 
 
4.4. Local Rural Units  
Subnational foreign activities of border-located rural units or districts 
(rayon) in Pskov were focussing on Scandinavian and Baltic subnational units. 
The main body for the conduct of subnational foreign activities for local units was 
the Council for Cooperation of Border Regions of the Republic of Latvia, the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia. Beside the Council, bilateral 
documents were signed with foreign counterparts. The following sections will 
describe those activities, with special focus on the work of the Council.  
Most prominently, border-crossing problems have forced subnational local 
rural units in the border area to deal with foreign issues. A large number of people 
living in the border areas were affected by the end of the Soviet Union and 
subsequent emergence of a state border between Pskov oblast￿ and its Western 
neighbours. People wishing to visit their relatives or maintain the graves of their 
relatives experienced the border as an impediment to their everyday lives.  The 
                                                 
293 Otchet (1998).  
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insufficient number of checkpoints on the border, problems with the Estonian or 
Latvian visa and poor public transport were central.
294 
The main body coordinating and facilitating subnational foreign activities 
of local rural units in Pskov oblast￿ is the Council for Cooperation of Border 
Regions of the Republic of Latvia, the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Estonia.
295  
The list of documents signed with foreign counterparts is quite long.
296 On 
4 February 1994 Tolochinskii rayon of the Vitebsk oblast of the Republic of 
Belarus and Velikolukskii rayon of the Pskov oblast￿ signed an agreement on 
cooperation, friendship and mutual help. On 3 June 1994 the City of Pskov, the 
Pskov rayon (local unit) and the Swedish Falun commune (local unit) signed an 
agreement on cooperation. On 28 Nov 1994 heads of border-located local units 
Pytalovo, Sebeshk, Palkinsk and Krasnogorodsk signed a memorandum ￿On main 
directions for economic and humanitarian cooperation￿ with Latvian counterparts. 
This memorandum was the predecessor of the Council for Cooperation. On 21 
December 1994 Strugokrasnenski rayon of the Pskov oblast and Kraslavsk rayon 
of the Republic of Latvia signed an agreement. The founding act of the Council 
for Cooperation of Border Regions of the Republic of Latvia, the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Estonia was signed on 7 June 1996 in Pskov. On 
12 May 1998 Pechory rayon co-signed with the Committee for Social Policy of 
                                                 
294 An extensive study on cross-border cooperation was financed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and published by the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute. (Mikenberg, Eero (ed.)., Ehin, Piret., 
Dmitri, Lanko., and T￿￿r, Karmo. The Reasons for the Low Level of Cross-Border Activities: South-
Eastern Estonia analyses the reasons for the low degree of activities in the Estonian-Russian border 
area. Estonian Foreign Policy Institute: Tartu, 2003.) 
295 For a more detailed overview of the Council see the first case study in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
296 List compiled by Laptev.  
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the Pskov oblast￿ administration a protocol on fields of cooperation with the town 
of Nordborg (Denmark).  
As will be discussed in the case study on the birth of a euroregion and in 
the conclusion of this thesis, although subnational rural units were not as active as 
regional or municipal units in the Pskov region in terms of foreign activities, 
studying subnational rural foreign activities offers interesting insights into 
motivations behind relationships with foreign partners at different levels of 
government. 
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Chapter 5 Case Studies 
Two case studies were chosen to illustrate subnational foreign activities of 
Pskov oblast￿ administration and local councils located on Russian-Estonian 
border. The first case study, ￿Euroregion vs. Council for Cross-border 
Cooperation￿, focuses on a conflict of interests between the Pskov regional 
administration (regional unit) and the local councils (local rural units). The issue 
that caused the conflict was the creation of a euroregion with Estonian and 
Latvian partners.   
The second case study ￿Raketa-ferry ￿ will it travel again?￿ describes and 
analyses a specific project. In Soviet times, passengers could travel between Tartu 
in Estonia and Pskov on a ferry. It was a rather popular way of travelling among 
both the Estonians and Russians. Both Pskov oblast￿ administration and Tartu 
County, i.e. two regional units, were committed to the revival of the ship link. 
Despite the bilateral commitment, no progress was made. This case study 
examines the reasons behind that failure and the capabilities of subnational units 
in the conduct of cross-border cooperation. 
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5.1. Case Study No 1 Euroregion vs. Council for Cooperation 
of Border Regions 
The low level of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian border 
area has encouraged several researchers to try and find out possible reasons for 
this inactivity. A recent study by the researchers of the Estonian Foreign Policy 
Institute, including the author of this thesis, singles out main reasons for the low 
degree of activity.  
The above-mentioned study argues that the expectations towards cross-
border cooperation are high despite several setbacks that have occurred during the 
last decade. The post-imperial background of Estonian-Russian relations creates 
both incentives and obstacles to cross-border cooperation. The history of 
￿borderless￿ interaction and interdependence in Soviet times has not provided for 
a basis for cooperation between Estonian and Russian border regions, however. In 
the past decade, border-creating practices have clearly prevailed over border-
crossing practices in the area. The creation of the physical border, which was 
followed by a tightening of the visa regime and abolishment of visa-free border-
crossing for inhabitants of the border area, has caused socio-economic problems. 
Border areas are typically characterized by high unemployment, low incomes, and 
migration. Increasingly, on both sides of the border, cross-border cooperation is  
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seen as offering more effective solutions to shared problems and as compensating 
for the adverse effects of a rigorous border regime on the local populations.
 297 
Four groups of reasons for the low level of cross-border cooperation were 
singled out by the authors of the study. The first group ￿ political reasons - 
includes the overall state of Estonian-Russian relations (status of the Russian-
speaking minority in Estonia, tightening of the visa regime in the wake of the EU 
accession, different security orientations, absence of relevant interstate treaties, 
such as border treaty). Another political obstacle to cross-border cooperation lies 
in centre-periphery conflict of interests. According to the study, national 
governments in both Tallinn and Moscow are reluctant to promote cross-border 
cooperation, because it is in conflict with their ￿high politics￿ agenda of national 
security, which mean, among other things, hard borders. The so-called low-
politics agenda of subnational units of government, on the other hand, includes on 
economic, cultural, environmental and kinship contacts across the border. 
According to the study, the second group of obstacles to cross-border 
cooperation is of economic nature. The central economic reason lies in the 
difference level of economic development of Estonia and Russia. Estonia has 
opened up its markets, joined the WTO and the EU, whereas Russia lags behind 
in this respect. What is more, Pskov region￿s development level is below the 
Russian average. Estonian private businesses are reluctant to engage in cross-
border activities because of the uncertain business environment across the border. 
Despite economic obstacles, Estonia ranks 1
st in the top of foreign investors in 
Pskov region, followed by another neighbor, Latvia. 
                                                 
297 Study by EVI: Mikenberg, Eero (ed.)., Ehin, Piret., Dmitri, Lanko., and T￿￿r, Karmo. The Reasons 
for the Low Level of Cross-Border Activities: South-Eastern Estonia analyses the reasons for the low 
degree of activities in the Estonian-Russian border area. Estonian Foreign Policy Institute: Tartu, 2003.  
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Thirdly come psychological obstacles, which derive from Soviet heritage 
mainly. Mutual suspicion is deeply enrooted both sides of the border. Moreover, 
the Estonian side is preferring Western partners to Russian ones in cooperation 
schemes for a simple reason: cooperation with the West brings aid, both financial 
and technical, whereas Russian partners have much less to offer. 
Psychological reasons are followed by technical/administrative obstacles 
to practicing cross-border cooperation. The administrations of subnational local 
units lack the resources to engage in cross-border activities. Beside the lack of 
funds, the absence of competent personnel hinders cooperation. The study 
concludes that on the Estonian side, the perception prevails that cooperation with 
the Russian side means doubling your own efforts, since the partners across the 
border are rather passive and do not seem to contribute on an equal basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Picture No 6 The Koydula border station, built with assistance from the 
EU, waits for an upswing in cross-border trade  
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. 
The search for the optimal form for organising cross-border cooperation 
between Pskov oblast￿, Estonia and Latvia reached a new level in 2001, when the 
idea of establishing a euroregion was proposed by Pskov regional administration. 
For several reasons that are discussed below, this proposal received a mixed 
response from the beginning, both domestically and internationally.  
This case study will analyse a conflict between a subnational regional unit, 
i.e. the Pskov oblast￿, versus several border-located subnational local rural units in 
the Pskov oblast￿, Latvia and Estonia. The subnational municipal unit involved, 
the City of Pskov, was offered the opportunity to choose between sides, as it was 
a new player in the field of cross-border cooperation. The source of conflict was 
the birth of a euroregion and the control over it. 
At the beginning of this decade, it became more likely that the EU￿s 
eastern enlargement would take place rather sooner than later, which meant that 
Pskov oblast￿ would soon be located on the EU￿s new eastern border. The wish to 
gain access to the EU funds that become available on the new border, after the 
enlargement activated both levels of subnational government in the region, i.e. 
regional and local levels. Several subnational units in the oblast￿ were poised to 
position themselves as preferred partners for future EU projects. Euroregion was 
the grand prix in this gamble. Sometimes, my personal impression was that 
￿euroregion￿ had become the synonym for ￿euro-cash￿ for some officials. 
The idea of establishing a euroregion was opposed by the then-incumbent 
organisation for cross-border cooperation, the Council for Cooperation of Border 
Regions, which held a quasi monopoly. Later on, however, the council promoted 
its own version of a euroregion in order to derail the regional administration￿s  
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plans.  Let us first take a look at the history, structure and activities of the Council 
for Cooperation of Border Regions. In the conclusion of the case study, an 
assessment can be found, whether the conflict has caused damage to cross-border 
cooperation or, rather, helped to lift the cooperation to the next level.  
 
 
Council for Cooperation of Border Regions - CCBR 
The Council for Cooperation of Border Regions of the Republic of Latvia, 
Russian Federation and Republic of Estonia (CCBR) was established 19-20 April 
1996 in Pskov. The idea to create such an institution was born one month earlier, 
in Karlskrona, Sweden. There, two Estonian counterparts and one partner from 
both Russia and Latvia signed a letter of intent for establishing a trilateral 
organisation. In the letter, euroregion was mentioned as the model for the new 
organisation, though it was not supposed to become a euroregion itself. 
298 
 
 
 
Picture No 7 
The emblem of the CCBR combines the three national flags of Estonia, Russia and Latvia, 
encircled by 7 yellow stars. 
 
                                                 
298 Homepage of the Council for Cooperation of Border Regions, 
http://www.aluksne.lv/cbc/EN/Padome.htm, accessed 2 February 2003.  
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The organisation￿s main goals were cooperation on joint regional 
programmes and projects and representing its members￿ interests both 
domestically and internationally. And, last but not least, ￿developing an institution 
that creates a participatory network of partners that optimises all the opportunities 
created by this co-operative environment￿.
299  
The council was founded 7 June 1996 in Pılva (Estonia). The founding 
members were Aluksne and Balvi local units (Latvia), Palkino, Pechory and 
Pskov local units of Russia and Pılva and Vıru regional units (Estonia). It is 
worth mentioning here that the founders had different status: the Russian and 
Latvian founders were local units, whereas the Estonian partners were regional 
units. Later the Latvian Ludza rayon joined the Council. The main aims of the 
Council included 1) joint regional programmes, 2) representing its members both 
domestically and internationally, and 3) developing a participatory network for 
Council￿s members. 
300 The main form of work was initiating and implementing 
projects on various topics, such as international ecological children summer camp, 
VISION 2010, or learning foreign languages.
301 
The highest decision-making body of the CCBR body was the council. 
The council consisted of elected political leaders of its members. In addition to 
full members, there were observers in the council, from the Latvian Ministry of 
Environment, the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Pskov Regional 
Administration, and the MFAs of all three countries.  
The executive body was the secretariat. Each member nominated 2 
members from its administration to the secretariat. In 1998, three executive 
                                                 
299 The Quarterly Report of the Council for Cooperation of Border Regions, 2000 No 1, p. 1. 
300 Ibid, p. 1. 
301 Letter by the Russian CEO of the Council Novoshinski to Dr Kraa.  
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directors were selected in an open competition. The Estonian executive director 
was working full-time and paid by the national border programme. The Latvian 
and Russian executive directors were working part-time and paid by the 
respective members. In order to reduce costs, the secretariat was in 2000 replaced 
by a board.
302 The board consisted of three executive directors. Beside the 
secretariat/board, everyday work was carried out in 8 permanent working groups. 
Topics such as transport, transit, culture, etc were discussed there.  
Commenting on the experience of cooperation, the representatives of the 
CCBR claim on their web page that joint projects have been both satisfying and 
disillusioning. Members are critical of most foreign aid programmes, as they only 
offer seminars and consultants, i.e. no investments are allowed. The main 
document produced was VISION 2010, financed by PHARE Credo programme.  
This paper outlined the future vision for the region, focussing on the need to 
develop the infrastructure linking the three states.
 303 
 
 
EUROREGION Pleskava vs EUROREGION Pskov-Livonia 
The concept of euroregion is not unfamiliar in north-western Russia. Two 
euroregions existed there, one in Kaliningrad and the other in Karelia, before the 
Pskov-based euroregion was born. The fourth euroregion with Russian 
participation was established in Pskov in November 2003. 
The ￿saga￿ of the Pskov euroregion began more than two years before its 
birth. 19 July 2001, the vice-governor responsible for foreign links and 
investments, Vladimir Blank, proposed the creation of a trilateral euroregion 
                                                 
302 Members finance the CCBR. Every member contributes 1000 EUR on an annual basis. 
303 www.aluksne.lv/cbc/EN/padome_V.htm   
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between Pskov, Latvia and Estonia during a meeting with the Estonian minister 
for regional policy. Both sides agreed that cross-border cooperation should be 
deepened. No specific conditions were discussed, however.
304 
The Pskov oblast￿ administration, the initiator of the euroregion, argued 
that the euroregion was the right organisation to solve problems in the border 
areas of all three countries. In its proposal, the administration claimed that 
guaranteeing employment should be the first priority of all three partners. By 
guaranteeing employment, migration from border areas could be stopped, if not 
reversed.
305 
The initial idea of having a trilateral euroregion between Pskov, Latvia 
and Estonia was abandoned later given the unenthusiastic reaction from Estonia. 
The main argument against the trilateral version was, according to an expert 
masterminding the process on behalf of the regional administration, the fact that it 
is more complicated to reach an agreement between three parties than between 
two.
306 Instead, the regional administration of Pskov began to promote two 
separate euroregions, Pskov-Estonia and Pskov-Latvia.  
As late as December 2003, on the homepage of the regional 
administration, the creation of two separate euroregions was promoted, ￿Estonia-
Pskov oblast￿￿ and ￿Latvia-Pskov oblast￿￿. The euroregion with Estonia would 
have included 5 Estonian counties (via Associations of Local Authorities). From 
Pskov side, the City of Pskov and three rayons would have participated. The 
Estonian executive body would have been the South-eastern branch of the 
                                                 
304 Pskovskoe Agenstvo Informatsii, http://informpskov.ru/business/24.html, accessed 30. Nov. 2003. 
305 Pskov region official server ￿ Pskov online, www.invest.pskov.ru/euroregion.php?lang=ru, accessed 
30. Nov. 2003 
306 East-West Institute￿s Russian Representation￿s Head Alexei Ignatiev in his interview to Pskovskoe 
Agenstvo Informatsii, http://informpskov.ru/interviews/7361.html , accessed, 30.11.2003.  
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Estonian Entrepreneurship Foundation ￿Enterprise Estonia￿. In Pskov similar 
functions would have been given to the Agency for Regional Development of the 
Pskov Oblast￿, an institution established by the City of Pskov. 
The euroregion ￿Latvia-Pskov oblast￿￿ would have included 5 Latvian 
districts and 5 Pskov districts, plus the City of Pskov. The Latvian executive body 
would have been the Latgale County Regional Development Agency and/or 
Vidzeme Regional development Agency In Pskov, again, the Agency for 
Regional Development of the Pskov Oblast￿. 
In the final proposal, autumn 2003, however, the concept of a trilateral 
euroregion re-emerged. 
The Pskov regional administration was eager to push forward with the 
euroregion, despite the fact that the incumbent organisation ￿ Council for 
Cooperation of Border Regions ￿ had serious doubts about it. The cautious 
attitude of the CCBR towards a new structure was understandable. The CCBR 
would have been marginalized. Therefore, it perceived the idea of the regional 
administration as a threat to its existence. Moreover, the fear was that the regional 
administration would try - with the assistance of the euroregion ￿ to increase its 
power over subnational municipal and local units in the border region of the 
oblast￿.
 307 
The CCBR had rejected the idea of establishing a euroregion, claiming 
that the CCBR itself was already functioning as a euroregion without carrying the 
proper name. In spite of this, necessary measures were taken by the CCBR in 
order to reinvent itself as a euroregion, if necessary.   
                                                 
307 Interview No 1AK with Mr Andy Karyus, Manager of the Council for Cooperation between Border 
Regions of Estonia, Latvia and Russia, conducted 12 Dec 2003, by telephone. 
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Comparing the statutes of the two competing euroregions promoted by the 
regional administration and the CCBR it becomes evident that there only minor 
differences. The overall objectives of the two euroregions are almost identical, i.e. 
promoting cross-border cooperation in different fields. The structures differ 
somewhat, however. The CCBR￿s proposal foresees an additional body, the 
presidium. The decision-making process differs too. In the CCBR￿s euroregion 
decisions require the approval of the majority of attending delegations. The 
delegation decides internally by majority, too. In the euroregion proposed by the 
regional administration, however, a consensus of all attendees is required.  
Finally, two concepts of euroregions were circulating in the 
administrations of the border districts and towns in the summer and autumn of 
2003: (1) Pleskava: a trilateral euroregion Latvia-Estonia-Pskov with the 
involvement of the Pskov regional admini stration; (2) Pskov-Livonia
308: a 
trilateral euroregion Latvia-Estonia-Pskov, based on the existing Council for 
Cooperation of Border Regions, without the direct involvement of the Pskov 
regional administration. 
Pskov regional administration, having failed to convince Latvian and 
Estonian counties, was targeting Estonian and Latvian towns located close to the 
state in the summer of 2003. As the CCBR and its members were opposing the 
new euroregion, the oblast￿ administration was poised to find new allies. 
Therefore, it tried to replace the counties and districts with towns. For this, the 
regional administration sent the founding agreement and the statute of the new 
euroregion to 6 Latvian towns and 5 Estonian towns.  
                                                 
308 Livonia is the ancient name for the once united territories of southern Estonia and northern Latvia.  
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The initiative turned out to be a failure. A new euroregion was not 
established with the involvement of regional administration, mainly due to the 
requirement of allocating 0.2 of the budget to the organisation.
309 In the case of 
Tartu, this would have meant 16 million Estonian kroons (1.2 million USD). 
Firstly, it was unclear what for this sum would be used. Secondly, it was 
approximately a hundred times more than the CCBR had requested from its 
members  (1000 EUR per year). 
The CCBR￿s concept was the winner and on 25 November 2003 the 
organisation was transformed into a euroregion, named ￿Pskov-Livonia￿. It 
included the same districts involved in the CCBR before, plus the City of Pskov, a 
newcomer. The respective national sections of the CCBR were transformed as 
sections of the new euroregion. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In my view, the regional administration did not fully grasp the meaning of 
the term ￿euroregion￿. The proposal to establish a euroregion with Estonian and 
Latvian counterparts was made in the hope jumping the train of cross-border 
cooperation, when it was already moving.  
The discussion whether euroregion is a suitable concept for Russia 
continues. Some views on this subject will be discussed below. 
The euroregion should represent one of the highest stages of cross-border 
cooperation. The administration lacked the necessary network in both in Estonia 
and Latvia and was, therefore, unable to attract partners for its project. Moreover, 
                                                 
309 Interview No 1SI with Vice-Mayor of Tartu, Mr Sven Illing, conducted 18 May 2003, in hotel 
Barclay, in Tartu..  
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the fact that the regional administration wished to create a new body 
circumventing the Council for Cross-border Cooperation was bound to cause 
animosities and conflict.  
Why did the Estonian side not appreciate this initiative?  Although the 
Estonian minister for regional policy had welcomed the initiative to deepen cross-
border cooperation, the idea of establishing a euroregion was largely ignored. 
Estonia￿s two main newspapers did not even mention the word ￿euroregion￿ in 
2001-2003. Insiders argue that the main reason was the existence of the CCBR. 
Estonian side saw no need for a new structure.  
Competition between institutions in the border area has in this case not 
only strengthened cross-border ties, through increased communication and 
interaction. What is more, the creation of a euroregion, the fourth in Russia, paves 
the way for new development projects in the area. The term ￿euroregion￿ is known 
in the European Union and its use will help attract both attention and financial 
support. 
Several Russian scholars have examined the suitability of the concept of 
euroregion for Russia in general and for Pskov in particular. The central message 
of these studies seems to be that the concept of euroregion should be further 
developed in order to meet the needs of Russian border areas. 
A publication by the Institute for Regional Economy of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences underlines the Soviet heritage of weakly developed border 
areas as the main impediment for cross-border cooperation. Furthermore, they see  
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cross-border cooperation as a common feature of international relations, from 
which Russian regions have been excluded to a great extent.
310 
A Pskov-based NGO, Centre for Social Projecting ￿Revival￿ has compiled 
an extensive study about the right model for cross-border cooperation for the 
Pskov region. According to this paper, most experts on cross-border issues in 
Pskov believe that Pskov region should have been included in corpore. In other 
words the regional unit and all local units, both municipal and rural, should have 
formed the Russian partner in the project. The authors of this study argue that 
Russian side has misinterpreted the euroregion as a strategic aim. In fact, it is an 
instrument that can only be useful if cross-border cooperation has become a 
priority for Russia￿s regional policy. Before that attitude changes,  any euroregion 
in Russia is doomed to failure.
311 
An Estonian think tank, the Centre for Academic Baltic Russian Studies 
based in Tartu, Estonia, has put the question directly: is an Russian-Estonian 
euroregion necessary?
312 In their article, two experts of cross-border cooperation 
from Estonia and Russia warn that euroregion has taken the form of ￿officials￿ 
tourism￿ in Russia. On the other hand, they argue, although creating a euroregion 
will not help the border area automatically, it will help to draw attention of the 
EU. 
The overall media coverage of the euroregion has been modest compared 
to regular coverage of cross-border activities in Estonian and Pskov media. Pskov 
media brought report occasionally, which were rather sceptical of the plan. For 
                                                 
310 Litovka/Mezhevitch (2002), pp. 68-69. 
311 Shlosberg (2004): Shlosberg, Lev (ed.). Modelirovaniye evroregiona dlya Pskovskoi oblasti. Pskov: 
Tsentr socialnovo proiektirovaniya￿Vozhroshdenie￿, 2004, pp. 67, 84.  
312 ￿Nuzhen li rossisko-estonski evroregion?￿, in PAI, 04 Feb 2003, 
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example, in a report from May 2003, the author suspected that it was Estonians 
and Latvians, who needed a euroregion, not Russians. In his view, the Baltic 
neighbours were determined to demonstrate that they were engaged in a good-
neighbourly relationship with their large eastern neighbour in order to join the 
European Union. Furthermore, he cautioned that the project euroregion was a 
means for the Baltic neighbours to gain access to European aid programs.
313 
According to the study by the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, the fact 
that the development of cross-border cooperation is linked to the state of 
intergovernmental relations between Estonia and Russia makes it more difficult to 
offer quick solutions to the stalemate. Most existing obstacles, such as double 
import tariffs on Estonian goods or the missing border treaty can only be solved 
by national governments in Moscow and Tallinn. Cooperation between border 
regions is hindered by policy stalemates with a long history. EU enlargement is an 
important step in the right direction, because it could re-define the framework for 
bilateral relations between Estonian and Russia. Quoting the study: ￿Thus, the 
overall climate of Estonian-Russian bilateral relations should be seen as an 
important intervening variable in assessing the effects of EU enlargement on 
cross-border cooperation. Estonia￿s accession to the EU will not have any major 
direct, immediate impact on the border regime or the overall situation of the 
border regions. The widely held view that the upgrading of candidate country 
Eastern borders into the external border of the EU will increase barriers to 
interaction with non-EU neighbors does not apply to Estonian-Russian relations 
where barriers have been high already since the early 1990s. Instead, Estonian 
                                                 
313 Pskovskoye Agenstvo Informatsii. Alexandr Zakharov, ￿Yevroregion ili yevrotupik?￿, Pskov, 
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accession to the EU is likely to improve the overall climate of bilateral relations 
through correcting regional power imbalances, relieving security concerns, 
facilitating economic contacts and providing opportunities to develop the treaty 
basis of interstate relations.￿
314   
In my opinion, the complicated birth of the euroregion between Pskov, 
Latvia and Estonia was a reflection of underlying political tensions and economic 
imbalances between the Baltic and Russian neighbours. Political tensions derive 
not only from regional animosities between Pskov region and Eastern parts of 
Estonia and Latvia, but from the general state of Estonian-Russian and Latvian-
Russian relations. Economic differences should not be overseen, either. Estonia 
and Latvia have opened up their markets, joined the WTO and EU, whereas 
Russia is keen to protect its market, especially the so-called strategic enterprises. 
The emotions were running high during the preparations for the 
establishment of the euroregion. However, after the euroregion was created this 
topic has all but vanished from the media coverage. Moreover, officials on both 
sides of the border appear to have lost their interest in the project. The Estonian 
CEO of the CCBR Mr Andy Karyus, who was the main mastermind, has left the 
organisation because its financial situation had deteriorated dramatically. 
 
                                                 
314 Mikenberg, Eero (ed.)., Ehin, Piret., Dmitri, Lanko., and T￿￿r, Karmo. The Reasons for the Low 
Level of Cross-Border Activities: South-Eastern Estonia analyses the reasons for the low degree of 
activities in the Estonian-Russian border area. Estonian Foreign Policy Institute: Tartu, 2003, p. 29.  
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5.2. Case Study No 2 ￿Raketa￿-ferry ￿ Will it Travel Again? 
The second case study illustrates the evolving relationship between a 
subnational regional unit in Russia, i.e. Pskov region, and a subnational regional 
unit in Estonia, i.e. Tartu County. This relationship had a direct impact on the 
activities of subnational private units, i.e. private companies, on both sides of the 
Estonian-Russian border.  
The broader framework for this case study is cross-border economic 
cooperation between Pskov oblast￿ and south-eastern Estonia. In this case, the 
interaction of the Pskov regional administration and Tartu county administration 
was aimed at enabling private companies from both Russia and Estonia to carry 
out a mutually advantageous business project. Unfortunately, as of December 
2005, joint efforts have produced a minimal amount of tangible results. 
The central question of this case study is, why has cross-border 
cooperation failed to materialise despite the proclaimed wish of all interested 
parties? What role was played by the overall political climate in the bilateral 
relations between Russia and Estonia? Could the failure have been prevented if 
some actors had have behaved differently? What general conclusions for the 
capabilities of subnational regional units for the conduct of foreign activities can 
be drawn from this case study? 
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Background Information  
The geographic scope of inland waterways in the region Pskov-Estonia is 
noteworthy. The Velikaya River links the Estonian-Russian double lake 
Peipus/Pskovskoye, which is the 7
th largest in Russia
315, with the capital of the 
oblast￿. On the Estonian side, the river Emayogy links Lake Peipus with the 
second-biggest town, Tartu.  The two rivers and lakes could become a link 
connecting Pskov with its Estonian neighbour. Moreover, it could become an 
additional transportation link, for both passengers and goods, between Pskov and 
Scandinavia, via Estonia. 
Regular ship traffic between Tartu and Pskov was introduced after the 
World War II. Back in 1957, Pskov newspaper Pskovskaya Pravda published a 
report on the ferry travelling between Tartu and Pskov, which described the trips 
on the passenger ferry ￿Yoala￿ between Tartu and Pskov.
316 In 1965, the first fast 
ferry equipped with underwater wings arrived in the port of Pskov.
317 The first 
Raketa-ferry, which was to become the standard ship-type used on this route, 
arrived in July 1967 from Feodosia via Novgorod.
318 
In 1970s and 1980s there were daily trips by ship over the Emayogy River 
in southern Estonia from the town of Tartu (Estonia) first to Lake Peipus, then 
southbound to Lake Pskovskoye and, subsequently, on the Velikaya River to the 
city of Pskov. The port of Pskov on the Velikaya River linked via water Pskov 
and the Estonian SSR. Not only tourists but also construction materials, especially 
sand, and other goods were transported via this port. For example, in 1982, 
                                                 
315 Karpukhina (1994): Karpukhina, M.N. (ed.). Rossiiskaya Federatsiya: Atlas. Moscow, Kartografiya, 
1994, p. 71. 
316 Naimukshin, I. ￿O reisakh passazhirskovo parokhoda ￿Yoala￿, .Pskovskaya Pravda, 8 June 1957.  
317 Mikhailov, V. ￿Strela￿ letit na Velikom￿,Pskovskaya Pravda, 13 Aug 1965.  
318 Vinogradov V. ￿Raketa￿ na Velikom￿, Molodoi Leninets, 6 July 1967.  
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450.000 tons of building materials were transported on inland waterways of the 
oblast·.
319 In 1990, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the respective 
number was 950.000 tons.
320  
Additionally, internal waterways were used to maintain connections 
between Pskov and several remote islands in Lake Pskov. Altogether, tens of 
thousands of passengers and hundreds of thousands of tons of materials were 
transported annually using this route. 
 
 
 
 
Picture No 8 A fast ferry on the river Emayogy 
 
                                                 
319 ￿Na golubykh magistralakh￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 4 July 1982. 
320 ￿Navigatsiya-90 otkryta￿, Pskovskaya Pravda, 14 Apr 1990.  
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In Soviet times the Tartu-Pskov river link was an inland waterway 
connecting two Soviet republics. There were no physical borders inside the Soviet 
state. Both Estonian and Russian ferries could seamlessly cross the administrative 
border between the Estonian SSR and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR). The end of the Soviet Union changed the situation 
dramatically.  
In early 1990s, the regained independence of Estonia made the further use 
of the waterway between Tartu and Pskov no longer feasible, neither 
economically or politically. Before the Soviet Union had ceased to exist officially, 
the administrative border became an international state border between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia. Ships could no longer just cross 
the border with no formalities. The ship link became subject to bilateral 
agreements between the national governments of Estonia and Russia.  
Beside political changes, the economic framework changed too. Now only 
a few of the Estonians or Russians could afford to use these ships, because living 
standardss had deteriorated sharply on both sides of the new border. Foreign 
tourists were just beginning to discover Estonia, let alone Pskov. The costs of 
running the ships, on the other hand, increased swiftly as the price for fuel moved 
towards world market levels. The demand for the transportation of sand collapsed 
too with the market for new buildings and roads. The outlook could not be worse. 
In the second half of the 1990s the situation began to change. In 1997, in 
Pskov on the regional level a discussion began whether it would be possible to re-
launch the ship link between Tartu and Pskov. Everybody agreed that the link 
would be mutually advantageous to both Pskov and Estonia. The oblast￿ 
administration then gave high priority to the development of internal waterways  
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in the region. In spite of all efforts of the administration, however, international 
traffic on the rivers and lakes of the oblast￿ failed to materialise.
321 
From the Pskov perspective, without gaining access to Estonia the use of 
inland waterways was not attractive economically. Both the regional 
administration and local businesses lacked the financial resources to operate a 
domestic-only service on a regular basis. Only if the traffic became international, 
would it have made economic sense for private companies to launch commercial 
services.   
Ferries are a rather inexpensive and environmentally-friendly means of 
transportation. Both the Estonian and Pskov regional economy would benefit 
from the ship link. The reopening of the waterway to Estonia would provide 
foreign tourists visiting Estonia with easy access to the ancient City of Pskov, a 
tourist attraction. As for the Estonian side, tourists would spend an extra night in 
the hotels of Tartu with the perspective of making a one-day trip to Pskov on the 
following day.  
The international transportation of goods and materials on the waterways 
would bring mutual benefits, too. Bulk items such as timber, fertilizers and sand 
could be transported at much lower cost than on the road or railways. Moreover, 
the Pskov economy would obtain a route to export its goods more easily. The 
regional administration in Pskov, which imposes a tax on the use of natural 
resources, would gain in higher tax revenues from the export of wood and timber.  
Beside economic considerations, the potential political profit was not to be 
underestimated. After years of distrust and mutual neglect between the 
                                                 
321 In ˜rip￿ev- Estonian Business Daily, 19 May 2003.  
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neighbours, the reopening of the ship link is a political enterprise: a symbol of 
cross-border cooperation. 
 
 
Interested Parties 
Let us consider more closely the relationship between the four subnational 
units involved with the reopening of the ship link: a regional unit of the Russian 
Federation and a private unit, on one side, and a regional and a private unit of the 
Republic of Estonia, on the other.  
On Russian side, the regional unit involved is the administration of Pskov 
oblast￿ and the private unit is called GdovInvest Ltd, a holding company.  On 
Estonian side, the regional unit is Tartu county administration and the private unit 
involved is Transcom Ltd., an holding company.  These four subnational units 
were the main actors in the attempt to revive the ship link. The list of other 
interested parties playing a role includes regional, municipal, local and private 
units and the national governments of Russia and Estonia. The main targets of the 
activities of actors were the central governments of Russia and Estonia, as only 
they could sign bilateral agreements crucial to the success of the project. 
The Russian subnational regional unit involved, Pskov oblast￿ 
administration, was interested in the project in general. However, there were 
periods of disinterest, too. Officially, the project received full support from the 
regional administration; privately, however, some officials admitted their 
reluctance. As one oblast￿ official put it: ￿Pskov has an international airport, but 
nobody uses it￿ Why on earth should anyone want to use our international river- 
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port, if we had one?￿
322 The oblast￿ administration could not do considerably 
more than lobby the central government in Moscow to sign the necessary bilateral 
agreements with Estonia. 
Tartu County, a subnational regional unit in Estonia, was the third actor 
interested in this project. The Emayogy River, which links the town of Tartu with 
Lake Peipus, runs through Tartu County. On Estonian side, Tartu county 
administration was one of the loudest supporters of the project. However, the 
jurisdiction of county administrations in Estonia is restricted to representing the 
central government. County administrations cannot influence the decision-making 
process on the central state level significantly.  
Despite the restricted room for manoeuvre, the county administration 
launched a project called the ￿River-state Emayogy￿, supported by the Phare 
programme of the EU.
323 This concept promotes the tourist facilities and other 
attractions on the banks of the river, including the ship link with Pskov.   
Moreover, the head of the county administration submitted annually requests to 
the draft state budget in order to obtain financing for dredging works on the 
ground of the Emayogy River and Lake Peipus. Those requests were regularly 
declined, however.  
In both countries, there were two subnational private units involved. The 
Estonian subnational private unit behind the project was a holding company; the 
Estonia-based Transcom Ltd. Among some other Estonian ports, Transcom owns 
the river port of Tartu and of the vessels capable of travelling over Lake Peipus. 
                                                 
322 Interview with Vadim Laptev No. 2. 
323 The official promoter of the project is Tartumaa Turism, a tourism agency co-owned by Tartu town 
administration and Tartu county administration. A short summary in English can be found on 
http://turism.tartumaa.ee/docs/development_corridor_summary.doc.  
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The company belongs to an Estonian businessman Mr Rein Kilk. Moreover, 
Transcom co-owns the second-biggest Estonian port Parnu, which is the main hub 
for wood and peat exports from Estonia. The chairman of the supervisory board of 
Transcom, Mr Kilk, has actively promoted the idea of reactivating the ship link on 
both sides of the border. 
On Russian side, the subnational private unit involved was a holding 
company, too. The owner of the Port of Storojinetsh, Gdov-Invest ltd, has 
interests in other sectors, such as oil-producing and petrol retailing in the Siberian 
part of Russia. The headquarters of the company is in St Petersburg. The 
company￿s functioning was, and still is, hindered by an internal power struggle of 
some leading personalities in top positions. Unfortunately, internal problems took 
their toll on the performance of the company management. 
 
 
Chronology 
 
According to a former Estonian consul in Pskov, Mr Vladimir Redpap, 
unofficial discussions to re-launch the ship link had begun in 1993 between the 
Tartu County￿ and Pskov regional administration officials.
324 The unofficial phase 
of preparations lasted four years. 
On 16 May 1997 a protocol of intention was signed between the regional 
administration of Pskov, and the county administration of Tartu, aimed at 
reactivating the ship link. Mr Kilk, commenting on the observed document, that 
the main problem was the Russian visa, which could only be obtained in Tallinn. 
                                                 
324 Mr Vladimir Redpap in his speech on the Peipus Forum/Forum Balticum 9-10 September 2005 in 
Tartu, Estonia.  
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Back in 1997, he had hoped that the ship link would be reactivated within a week 
or two.
325 
On 20 June 2000 the first experimental trip took place on the route Tartu-
Storojinetsh-Pskov. No regular international traffic followed. The explanation:   
the routes for ship traffic and the location of border-crossing points must be 
agreed upon between Estonia and Russia.
326 
The year 2002 was an important milestone: the legal basis for ship traffic 
was formulated. In that year, the necessary bilateral agreements were signed 
between authorities of the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation. 
Moreover, the subnational private units from Estonia and Russia involved, 
Transcom and Gdov-Invest, formulated their intentions in terms of developing the 
necessary infrastructure in the form of a bilateral agreement. 
On 20 March 2002, Estonian Minister of Roads and Communications and 
her Russian counterpart signed in Moscow an agreement (soglashenie) on 
regulation of ship routes. The agreement regulates the routes for ship traffic over 
the Estonian-Russian border on Lake Peipus. In this agreement, specific points 
where ships are allowed to enter the territory of the neighbouring state, were 
agreed upon. The article 2 of the agreement requires both sides to open special 
border-stations for ships at those entry points. 
327 
The Article 4 of the agreement stipulates that any vessel will be subjected 
to the laws and regulations of the state in which￿ waterways it travels. In other 
words an Estonian ship would come under Russian jurisdiction by default when 
entering Russian territory and vice versa. This article was more favourable to the 
                                                 
325 Mr Kilk in his speech on the  III Peipus Forum, 22 August 2003 in Tartu, Estonia. 
326 In ˜rip￿ev ￿ Estonian Business Daily, 19 May 2003, 
327 A copy of the text obtained by author from the CEO of the Port of Tartu, Mr Ain Adamson.  
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Russian side, since Russian laws ban foreign vessels from offering services in its 
internal waterways, whereas Estonian laws do not. Therefore, later on, this part of 
the agreement became a source of conflict since the Estonian ship owners were 
discriminated against. 
Subnational private units involved signed a bilateral agreement four 
months later. On 7 June 2002, in Gdov (Russia) the representatives of the operator 
of the port of Storojinetsh, Gdov-Invest Ltd, and its Estonian counterpart, Port of 
Tartu Ltd (100% owned by Transcom Ltd), signed an agreement on Joint Action 
of Interested Parties for the Constructing and Equipping the Multilateral 
Checkpoint ￿Praaga-Storojinetsh￿. The agreement No 01/2002 refers in its 
preamble to the agreement of transportation ministries from March of the same 
year. The signing parties agreed on cooperation in all aspects of guaranteeing the 
readiness of technical infrastructure of the two ports for the transportation of 
passengers and goods. The construction of border stations or providing the 
technical equipment to those stations was not part of the agreement, however. As 
will be discussed below, the financing of the construction of border checkpoints 
and the necessary technical equipment will become the main source of conflict on 
both sides of the border. Subnational private units resisted consequently the 
demands from state and regional officials to build the border checkpoints.
328 
Following the signing of the agreement between transportation ministries 
from March 2002, on 16 June 2002, Estonian Foreign Minister and Ambassador 
of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Estonia signed in Tallinn an 
agreement on international border crossing points for ships on the Estonian-
Russian border. In this agreement, three border checkpoints were agreed upon: on 
                                                 
328 A copy of the text obtained by author from the CEO of the Port of Tartu, Mr Ain Adamson.  
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the Estonian side, the village of Praaga in the mouth of the river Emayogy, and, 
on the Russian side, the port of Storojinetsh and the port of Pskov. 
329 
An important change in the agreement was that on the Estonian side, only 
one border checkpoint (Praaga) was chosen. Earlier, there were speculations that 
Estonia could have a checkpoint in Tartu, too. Having two checkpoints to choose 
from would have allowed for more flexibility for picking the optimal location on 
the Estonian side of the border. Praaga is a tiny Estonian village in a swamp in the 
mouth of the river Emayogy. Being located in a swamp, Praaga is only accessible 
via water or air, except in the wintertime. Previous considerations to open the 
checkpoint in Tartu had been abandoned since the Estonian Border Guard insisted 
that the border formalities should take place as close to the physical border as 
possible. This was arguably a requirement of the Schengen visa regime, which 
Estonia is about to join.
330 
After the agreements had been signed, a period of confusion followed. 
Apparently nobody, neither in Russia, nor Estonia, had expected that these 
agreements would be signed so swiftly. Because of this, neither the Russian nor 
the Estonian side was actually technically prepared to let foreign vessels cross the 
border on Lake Peipus. A long list of preconditions had to be met on both sides, 
before the first ship could travel across the state border. The Russian side claimed 
it was better prepared than the Estonians, however. The port of Storojinetsh could 
arguably offer the border guards and customs officers satisfactory working 
conditions after some minor reconstruction works.  In Estonia, a discussion 
emerged whether Praaga was the best location for a border checkpoint. Several 
                                                 
329 A copy of the text obtained by author from the CEO of the Port of Tartu, Mr Ain Adamson. 
330 Interview with former CEO of the Port of Tartu, Mr Ain Adamson, 18 May 2003.  
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small villages and towns on the shores of Lake Peipus claimed that they would, in 
fact, be more suitable. This discussion was bound to be meaningless since the 
agreement had been signed already and none of the signing parties was prepared 
to restart the negotiations. 
 
 
Problems and Possible Solutions 
This section will analyse the specific problems that subnational units, both 
governmental and private, needed to solve on both sides of the border in order to 
restart the ship service. Despite the fact that Russia is a federal state and Estonia a 
unitary one, problems are relatively similar. Moreover, some solutions proposed 
by different actors will be discussed.  
Let us first examine the problems on Russian side. Pskov oblast￿, a land-
locked region, was interested in developing its inland waterways. With federal-
level and foreign assistance, international ferry transport on the lakes and rivers of 
the oblast￿ linking it with Estonia could have become a lucrative business in the 
region. Several problems on the federal and bilateral level with Estonia can be 
singled out that delayed the re-launch of the international service, and which the 
oblast￿ administration was incapable of solving independently. 
The first problem was the lack of permission to handle international traffic 
in the Port of Pskov, which is situated in the centre of the City of Pskov. There 
was an alternative to circumvent the bureaucratic hurdles of applying for such 
permission for the port of Pskov, however. The most realistic alternative 
considered by oblast￿ officials was the port of Storojinetsh on Russian side of 
Lake Peipus, which had the permission to handle international traffic of persons  
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and goods already. This port is located on the shore of Lake Peipus some 50km 
north of Pskov and capable of serving both passenger ferries and cargo ships. 
There were suitable facilities for both customs and border guard in the port that 
could have been upgraded at acceptable cost.  
The idea was to divert passenger traffic on the route Tartu-Pskov to the 
port of Storojinetsh, where the customs and border officials would check the 
passengers. Subsequently, passengers would have re-boarded the ship and 
continued their journey to Pskov. The main disadvantage of this alternative route 
was that the port of Storojinetsh is not located on the shortest possible ship route 
from Tartu to Pskov. The additional distance makes the trip longer by an hour. 
Moreover, it adds to the fuel costs and makes travelling less convenient for 
passengers.  
A serious obstacle to foreign tourists was the Russian visa, which was not 
easy to obtain. Many tourists were not willing to take the burden of applying for a 
visa and refrained from visiting Russia. The problem was partially solved in the 
late 1990s, when Western tourists were allowed to apply for a visa directly on the 
border. This practice was abolished later.  
In addition to general problems like international status or Russian visa 
emerged the issue of technical preparedness of the port of Storojinetsh. The 
owners of the port had invested some 100 million RUB (3 million USD) in the 
port of Storojinetsh under obscure circumstances. Despite this huge investment in 
what had been a tiny fisherman￿s village, the port was still not in a condition to 
handle international traffic.
331  Since there was no dispatcher service available, no 
communication was possible with the Estonian side. And last but not least, there 
                                                 
331 Information from Oleg Melnikov, Representative of the Port of Storojinetsh in Estonia.  
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were no facilities suitable for the customs or the border guards. To put it bluntly, 
there was a huge empty building standing on the shore of the Lake Peipus, called 
￿port￿.  
The owners of the port were reluctant to pour any new funds in the project 
because of its unclear future perspectives. A vicious cycle: the port could not be 
used for handling traffic before the investments had been made. 
On Estonian side, the problems were similar. First, the port of Tartu 
lacked international status, too. Second, obtaining an Estonian visa was not easy 
for Russians either. Additionally, the level of technical preparedness was as low 
as in Pskov. The initial idea of having a border checkpoint for ferry passengers in 
Tartu was rejected by the border guards. They demanded that the border station 
should be located as close as possible to the physical state border.
332 
Consequently, the location of Praaga was chosen. Praaga, which lies in a swamp 
at the mouth of the river Emayogy, and is not accessible via land.  
No public money was made available for the construction of a new border 
station on the Estonian side initially. The port of Tartu had no other option than 
trying to seek financial contributions from aid programmes. Since port itself was 
not eligible for such aid programmes, a foundation was established in cooperation 
with the port of P￿rnu. The Foundation for Development of Estonian Inner 
Waterways had the task of attracting public interest and media attention to the 
problems of use of inner waterways. 
Several attempts were made to raise funds for the construction of the 
border checkpoint.  There was money available from the European Union for the 
assistance of cross-border cooperation. However, those funds were designed for 
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so-called ￿soft￿ activities, i.e. no investment component was allowed. To put it 
ironically, there was money to discuss the need for a border checkpoint but not a 
single euro to build one. 
After the potential financial sources of the EU had been examined without 
success, attention was diverted to national aid programmes. The state-funded 
vehicle for assisting infrastructure and tourism projects is called Enterprise 
Estonia and it operates under the Ministry of Economy and Communications. 
Prolonged negotiations with the political members of the Council of 
Enterprise Estonia produced an offer which was extraordinary in its nature. One 
member of the council declared that Enterprise Estonia would only be willing to 
participate in the financing of the checkpoint if the applicant would contribute at 
least 50% of the cost (the regular degree of self-financing was 10-20%).
333 
Since no other options were available, the Foundation of Inland 
Waterways accepted the offer instantly. The border station in Praaga became 
operational in May 2003. The port of Tartu financed 50% of the costs via its 
foundation. The remaining 50% came from the Enterprise Estonia.  The total cost 
was 1.24 million Estonian kroons EEK (ca 80.000 EUR). 
In fact, neither in Russia nor in Estonia was the state willing to bear the 
costs of building a border station. Normally, a border checkpoint on waterways 
would be built by the operator that needs it. The state finances the construction of 
checkpoints on land only. The checkpoints on inland waterways are not in the 
category of waterway checkpoints, however. Inland waterways are considered an 
extension of land in this context and, therefore, the state should finance the 
                                                 
333 A telephone conversation between the author and an official, Mr Raul Malmstein, of the Enterprise 
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construction of border checkpoints there. This fact was left unnoticed by the 
national governments on both sides of the border. 
 
 
Media Coverage 
Without the intention of giving the full picture of media coverage of the 
￿saga￿ of the re-launch of the ship link, some trends can be singled out. In general, 
media coverage of the ship link has been extensive on both sides of the border.  
The Estonian daily Postimees, based in Tartu, was a very close follower of 
the events in the late 1990s. Earlier reports were overly optimistic. The 
enthusiasm of journalists faded away in the course of time, however. Positive 
reports on benefits for the local economy from the ship link were replaced by 
stories blaming different actors involved for the failure to make the project a 
success. 
In 2002, after several bilateral agreements had been signed between the 
states and subnational private actors but no actions followed, reports in Postimees 
turned sarcastic. The head of Tartu county administration was the main target for 
accusations. In an editorial from July 2002, Postimees accused the head of 
administration of pretending not being involved and trying to decline any 
responsibility.
334  
In April 2004, Postimees brought a sensational report that Mr Kilk, the 
owner of the Port of Tartu, has abandoned the ship link between Tartu and Pskov 
altogether. Citing bureaucratic hurdles and incapability of the Russian 
government ￿ both national and regional ￿ the businessman declares that the 
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project has been put on ice for the foreseeable future. He would not move a finger 
to put more pressure on Russian officials involved, since there are more 
rewarding business opportunities around.
335 
The second-biggest Estonian daily Eesti P￿evaleht, which is based in the 
capital Tallinn, was less interested in the early phase of the project. Later, 
however, reports become more frequent. In August 2005, the newspaper reported 
on plans of the Port of Tartu to boost traffic on Estonian inland waterways as an 
alternative to waiting for the Russian border to open up. For this purpose the port 
intended to invest in a cruiser with up to 30 cabins.
336 
More recently, media focus in Estonia and Pskov has shifted from 
domestic scapegoats to foreign ones. Estonian media have brought stories on how 
the Russian side had failed to make the necessary preparations and vice versa. The 
reports reflect the level of frustration that was growing on both sides of the 
border. Reports have become less frequent and especially cautious about 
predicting when the ships would cross the border again. 
 
 
Outlook 
The prospect of a quick reactivation of the ferry link between Pskov and 
Tartu is rather dim. ￿High politics￿ between Estonia and Russia continue to 
interfere with the project. On Russian side, the incapability of subnational actors 
to find the necessary financial means to upgrade the port of Storojinetsh is another 
obstacle. On Estonian side the fleet needs an upgrade. 
                                                 
335 Niitra, Nils. ￿Rein Kilk lıi b￿rokraatia vırgus siplevale laevaliinile k￿ega￿ {Rein Kilk Has Dumped 
the Ship Link Caught in a Bureaucratic Trap}, Postimees, 16 April 2004. 
336 ￿Rein Kilk plaanib osta Peipsile kruiisilaeva￿ {Rein Kilk Plans to Buy A Cruise Ship}, Eesti 
P￿evaleht, 3 Aug. 2005.  
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Despite the difficulties, in the next two or three years things will change 
for better.  Russian-Estonian relations have become part of the broader Russian-
EU relationship. Both sides, Russian and Estonian, have developed a more 
business-oriented approach to cross-border activities. A ferry link between the 
two countries would fit in this new paradigm and serve mutual business interests. 
Moreover, EU programmes that become available to Estonia from 2004, such as 
INTERREG IIIC, will probably give a boost to the project. 
However, given the political tensions in the aftermath of the non-
ratification of the border treaty with Estonia in the Russian Duma in the summer 
of 2005, the outlook for Russian-Estonian relations in general remains bleak. A 
Russian diplomat has admitted privately to the author that there is a strong 
political dimension of the ship link. Therefore, recent political turmoil in the 
capitals has put the ship link project on ice for the foreseeable future. 
On the grass-root level, problems persist, too. Since the owners of the 
relevant ports can not be certain that the border will open up for their vessels, they 
are reluctant to invest in new ships. The existing fleet grows older and will soon 
not be able to travel such long distances.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This case study examined the difficulties that derive from general political 
constellations, which interfere with the conduct of subnational foreign activities. 
As the relationship between the two states, the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Estonia, were far from friendly in the 1990s, some difficulties at the 
subnational level might reasonably have been expected. What was surprising,  
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however, was that problems on the inter-state level led to a de facto blockade of a 
cooperation project at the subnational level. 
In spite of declarations from both sides of the border aiming at deepening 
cross-border cooperation, very little progress was made in this particular case. 
Attempts by subnational units to carry out foreign projects without a federal or 
national centre￿s direct help are bound to fail.   
One should not overestimate the economic importance of reactivating the 
fast-ferry link between the second-biggest town in Estonia and the capital of one 
of the economically weakest regions of Russia. But it is a litmus test for Russian-
Estonian relations in general. 
 
 
 
Conclusion ￿ the Theory and Practice of Cooperation Projects 
The media hype surrounding main cross-border cooperation projects 
between Pskov and its Baltic neighbours is only partly justified. As our two case 
studies have illustrated the results of such cooperation projects are of questionable 
value.  
The term ￿officials￿ tourism￿, i.e. cooperation projects serve the purpose of 
legitimising the travel expenses of administration officials mainly, seems applies 
to most cases of cross-border cooperation projects between Estonian and Pskov￿ 
subnational units. Nevertheless, bringing together key figures from administration 
and business circles can contribute to a better understanding of partners from the 
other side of the border.  
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Mezhevitch and Litovka believe that Russian border regions, because of 
their weakly developed economies, have failed to follow a worldwide trend in 
cross-border and trans-border cooperation. Namely, many other border regions 
have been able to benefit from globalisation and increase their economic activity. 
They have discovered cross-border and trans-border cooperation as a source for 
economic growth. Transportation of goods and passengers, joint use of natural 
resources and environmental protection are the fields, where Russian regions 
could benefit from their location on the state border. In the Russian case, 
however, the location in the border area is rather a disadvantage from economic 
point of view.
337 
The authors believe that the self-isolation imposed by the Soviet Union is 
to blame for socio-economic weakness of Russian border regions presently. 
Unemployment rate is up to two times higher in border regions than in the inland. 
Personal income, on the other hand, is up to two times lower. Mezhevitch and 
Litovka cite Pskov as the classic example for their hypothesis.
338 
Apparently, both Pskov￿ and Baltic subnational units need to adopt a new 
strategy in order to achieve success in cross-border cooperation projects. 
Currently, cross-border projects carry the by-taste of improvisation. The ad-hoc 
approach does not provide for sustainability in cross-border cooperation, which 
certainly is needed. The inadequacies of communication between parties and lack 
of regular contacts between neighbours are the impediments that can be solved on 
the grass-root level, without any assistance from the central government.. 
                                                 
337 Mezhevitch/Litovka (2002), p. 69. 
338 Ibid, p. 69.  
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The overall political climate between states involved plays central role in 
cross-border cooperation projects. Recent events, such as the non-ratification of 
the border treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation in 
the Russian Duma, are heralding future difficulties facing cross-border projects. It 
is highly unlikely that any of these projects between Pskov and its Baltic 
neighbours can become a success without the political climate improving.  
Political tensions between Russia and the Baltic states are not the only 
obstacle to cross-border cooperation created by central governments. Russian 
state has rejected the New Neighbourhood initiative of the European Union, 
which would have increased cross-border activities. The rejection has caused 
further uncertainty for cooperation projects.  Currently, there are attempts to 
interlink INTERREG in the EU projects with TACIS projects in Russia. 
However, there is no evidence of successful attempts in this field. 
An the theoretical level, it could be argued that in spite of the perception 
of subnational units on both sides of the Estonian-Russian border that they can 
engage in subnational foreign activities independently from the central 
government, Moscow and Tallinn are ever-present. The capabilities of 
subnational units, both governmental and private, are limited when it comes to 
creating the optimal framework for cross-border cooperation projects. 
Until political tensions have been reduced between the neighbouring 
states, successful cross-border cooperation projects remain an anomaly in 
Russian-Estonian relations. Subnational units must rely on respective central 
governments for removing political, legal and financial obstacles.  
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Chapter 6 Making Sense of Subnational Foreign Activities: 
the Case of Pskov 
The theoretical framework for the academic research of subnational 
foreign activities is far from complete. In this Chapter, an attempt has been made 
to make use of the available theories, especially the theory of international 
actorness developed by Hocking. More specifically, the validity of those theories 
in the case of Russian subnational units in general Pskov subnational units in 
particular will be examined.  
Mainly, the research focus in the field of subnational foreign activities has 
been on describing this new phenomenon in the field of international relations. 
The theoretical framework for explaining subnational foreign activities has been 
proposed by a limited number of authors only, most prominently Brian Hocking 
and Feldman & Feldman. Those theories are far from perfect, since they do not 
provide sufficient tools for evaluating the phenomenon of subnational foreign 
activities. 
In my view, the most comprehensive attempts to explain subnational 
foreign activities have been made by Brian Hocking. His theory has been 
discussed in detail in the section 1.4. Conceptual framework: types of subnational  
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foreign activities of this thesis.  Hocking refers to his model as the concept of 
￿international actorness￿.  
A team of authors, Feldman & Feldman, have made a similar attempt to 
describe the subnational foreign activities. Their concept has been discussed in the 
above-mentioned section of this thesis, too. Feldman & Feldman do not offer any 
evaluation of models either. Although they offer a tool for collecting and 
systemising information about subnational foreign activities, there is no indication 
as to how this information could be used. 
Theories of international relations focus on states as actors. From the 
viewpoint of those theories, there is little room for alternative players on sub-state 
level, such as regions or cities. Interestingly, the available theories on subnational 
foreign activities follow a similar pattern. These theories do not deal sufficiently 
with the local level of government, i.e. towns and districts. Instead, the theories of 
subnational foreign activities focus on regions, and large cities to a great extent. 
In my view, for a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of subnational foreign 
activities it is necessary to cover all levels of government, including towns and 
districts, i.e. local municipal and local rural units, too. 
Three levels of analysis are relevant for the study of international relations. 
The first is the level of international system, which puts the emphasis on long-
term trends and the ￿continuities￿ of international relations, such as imperialism, 
balance of power, international law, attempts at international cooperation, etc. The 
second level of analysis is called the national level. When focussing on the 
national level, the specific characteristics of a state take centre stage. The  
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individual level of analysis, for its part, focuses on who personally is in charge of 
the foreign policy making in a particular state.
339  
Those three levels of analysis are relevant for the analysis of subnational 
foreign activities too. The first level, the level of international system, affects, 
especially via international law, the ability of subnational units to engage in 
foreign activities. As was written in Chapter 2 of this thesis, from the viewpoint of 
international law it is up to national constitutions to define the rights of 
subnational units in terms of foreign activities.  The international system affects 
the subnational foreign activities of local municipal and local rural units to a 
lesser extent, since they are not subjects of the federation. 
The national level, in the case of subnational units, is concerned with 
special features that characterise and eventually make a subnational unit distinct 
from the others.  Especially in Russia, where the regions, not to mention towns 
and districts, differ to a great extent, this level is important.  Ethnic composition, 
economic wealth and geography are the main determinants of subnational foreign 
activities that should be analysed on the subnational level. 
Last but not least is the individual level of analysis. In subnational units, 
particular personalities play an important role when it comes to defining the aims 
of foreign activities. The national-level features mentioned above, such as 
geographic location, availability of natural resources and socio-economic 
situation, predetermine the room for manoeuvre of any regional political leader to 
a large extent, however. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, it is the 
                                                 
339  Bealey/ Chapman/ Sheehan (1999): Bealey, Frank, Richard A. Chapman and Michael Sheehan. 
Elements in Political Science. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 299.  
 
 
 
 
 
242
personalities in charge of political decision-making who give the direction for 
subnational foreign activities of a particular subnational governmental unit.. 
 The following sections will make an attempt to apply Hocking￿s theory of 
measuring the international actorness to the analysis of the subnational foreign 
activities of regional, local municipal and local rural units in the Pskov oblast￿.  
Using the criteria form his theory, the information on subnational foreign 
activities of the above-mentioned governmental units in the oblast￿ has been 
systemised.  
 
 
6.1. Analysis of Regional Foreign Activities  
An attempt to measure the foreign economic activity of Russian regions 
has been made in a comparative study by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in 2001.
340  The study found that foreign economic relations play a relatively 
modest role in the Pskov regional economy, compared to other North Western 
regions of the Russian Federation. 
Our aim in this thesis is not to focus on economic inputs only, but to take 
the overall foreign activities into account when assessing subnational foreign 
activities of an actor. This section will make use of the inputs proposed by 
Hocking in his concept of measuring international actorness of subnational 
                                                 
340 The study found that the foreign economic activity index was 8.0 in the case of Pskov. For 
comparison, the indexes for other Russian North Western regions were 17.9 (Arkhangelsk oblast￿), 
15.4 (Republic of Komi), 14.9 (Novgorod oblast￿), 13.0 (Leningrad oblast￿), 11.7 (Vologda oblast￿), 
10.8 (City of St Petersburg), (4.9 Tver oblast￿). The index indicates the importance of foreign economic 
activity for the socio-economic situation in the region. The comparison included inputs such as (1) 
development index, (2) state of the manufacturing sector, (3) financial strength of the region, (4) 
investment activity, (5) income by the population, (6) employment level, (7) social security of the 
population, (8) ecological situation. Granberg (2001): Granberg, A.G. Mezhdunarodye I 
Vneshekonomicheskie Svyazi Subyektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2001, pp. 
167-173.  
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governmental units for the evaluation of the nature of subnational foreign 
activities of the regional administration of the oblast￿ Pskov.  In the case of the 
Pskov regional administration, the information on foreign activities is often 
incomplete. This complicates the use of Hocking￿s concept, since information on 
some inputs is not available. Often, data is only partly accessible as archives are 
poorly maintained and not being updated. What is more, detailed information on 
the financial commitments for foreign activities is not available. Especially, 
compared to the main local municipal unit in the region, the city of Pskov, the 
information on the foreign activities of the regional administration was 
insufficient.  
An alternative to the less-than-accurate official record of subnational 
foreign activities is the use of print media, which give a good coverage of events. 
For background information, extensive interviews with relevant officials and 
other actors were invaluable. Media reports were another source of relevant and 
timely information. 
Before applying Hocking￿s concept in the case of Pskov regional 
administration, some clarifications are necessary. Explaining his concept, 
Hocking underlines that the asymmetric nature of a federal system should be kept 
in mind when measuring the international actorness. The Russian Federation is an 
asymmetric federation, where federated units differ not only in terms of territory, 
population and economic wealth, but also in terms of their legal status as 
members of the federation. Moreover, the political and economic weight of 
Russian regions differs vastly. As explained by Melvin, in Russia there is a 
hierarchy of federated units as far as their rights to engage in subnational foreign 
activities is concerned (see section 2.3. of this thesis Russian regions in the  
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international system).  In Melvin￿s view, oblasts as a type of subnational 
governmental units in Russia have fewer rights when engaging in subnational 
foreign activities than national republics. This should be kept in mind in future 
research of Russian subnational foreign activities.  
 
 
Aims and Motivations 
What were the main aims and motivations of Pskov regional foreign 
activities in 1991-2000? In Hocking￿s view, in Europe the main motivations of 
subnational foreign activities are trade issues, access to structural funds of the 
European Union and building alliances with foreign regions. Let us examine in 
this section whether those motivators were behind Pskov regional foreign 
activities too.  
Economic or trade considerations and  political motivations seem to have 
fought for a dominant position in the case of Pskov regional administration during 
the 1990s. Apparently, the political agenda was more important. It was only in the 
end of the last decade economic considerations began to dominate the conduct of 
regional foreign activities. 
Let us first compare the quantity of documents signed with foreign 
partners with the participation of the regional administration. The total number of 
such documents reached 19 in the 1990s. Among these documents, there was only 
one treaty and one agreement, both signed with a Byelorussian partner. The 
remaining 17 documents represented less binding types of agreements: 
memorandums, joint action plans, protocols of visits abroad, etc. This fact  
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supports the case that the regional administration was favouring Byelorussia as a 
partner. 
As far as the qualitative data is concerned, in interviews and conversations 
with participants the author of this thesis discovered a clear preference for 
contacts with Byelorussian partners during the 1990s. Both economic and 
political considerations played a role. Political and economic circles in Pskov 
missing the old Soviet times preferred Byelorussia. In terms of external trade, it 
made sense to cooperate with Byelorussia. Byelorussian products were less 
expensive than Russian. As one interviewee put it: if a bottle of Byelorussian beer 
costs 4 roubles, then a bottle from St Petersburg costs 8 roubles and a bottle from 
the Baltic states costs 10 roubles.
341 
One could argue that in the long term it would have made more sense 
economically for the region as a whole to seek cooperation with Western partners, 
including the Baltic States, rather than with politically and economically isolated 
Byelorussia. Apparently, the regional administration came to that conclusion 
somewhere in the late 1990s, too. Indeed, as Vice-Governor Blank put it in 2002: 
the Pskov region can only attract Western investments and know-how via the 
Baltic States and this should be the top priority of the regional foreign 
activities.
342 Currently, Estonia and Latvia are the biggest trading partners and 
foreign investors in the regional economy. 
Access to structural funds of the European Union became a relevant aim in 
the late 1990s as the regional elite began to grasp the inevitability of the EU 
                                                 
341 Interview No 1 AA with Mr Alexander Andreyev, Vice-Rector of Pskov State Pedagogical Institute, 
conducted 11 May 2000 in his office. 
342 Presentation by Vladimir Blank, vice-governor of Pskov region, on a seminar introducing 
investment opportunities in Pskov region to Southern-Estonian business leaders, organised by Tartu 
County administration, in April 2002 (attended by author).  
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enlargement to Pskov￿ doorstep. Throughout the 1990s, however, the availability 
of EU funds was too modest to attract the attention of the regional 
administration.
343 
 The intra-regional struggle for access began in the year 2000, when the 
regional administration made an attempt to become a player in cross-border 
cooperation schemes by establishing a euroregion. This attempt has been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (case study on the birth of a euroregion).. 
The third motivator indicated by Hocking seems not to apply in the case of 
Pskov regional administration in the 1990-s. In his view, subnational units tend to 
build alliances with similar partners, i.e. regional units, in other states. Those 
alliances would be aimed at making the voices of subnational units heard 
internationally. In the case of Pskov, no such alliances with other regional units 
existed, however.  
The situation changed after the turn of the century, however. From then 
on, Pskov regional administration diversified its partnerships.  A Polish county 
and a Swedish county became partners of Pskov regional administration, with 
whom it signed official cooperation agreements. With other partners, cooperation 
took place in the framework of specific projects, such as Tacis, INTERREG or 
projects financed by foreign states, such as Denmark. Since the registration of 
official agreements with foreign partners had been made more complicated and 
time-consuming by the federal government, cooperation in the form of aid 
projects became an attractive alternative.
344 
                                                 
343 Interview No 1VL with Mr Vadim Laptev, Head of Committee, Committee of Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Administration of the Oblast￿ Pskov, conducted 16 May 2000, in his office. 
 
344 Interview No 1VL with Laptev.  
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Extent and Direction of Involvement 
The second input of Hocking￿s theory is extent and direction of 
involvement. According to Hocking, it is the main criterion for assessing the 
international presence of a subnational unit. The main questions are here: where 
are the foreign partners located geographically and what are the topics in which a 
particular subnational unit is taking an interest in its foreign activities. 
As Hocking explains, several factors set limits to the involvement of a 
subnational unit in international affairs. Firstly, geography predetermines the 
scope of involvement. Cross-border linkages would be preferred to geographically 
distant partners. The second limitation is the availability of bureaucratic resources 
for the conduct of foreign activities.  
The direction of involvement of the Pskov regional administration was 
mainly westbound, in the geographical rather than the political sense. Geographic 
extent of involvement was less impressive than in the case of the City of Pskov, 
for example. Pskov region had its eyes on neighbouring or geographically not 
distant countries, such as Poland, Sweden or Byelorussia, of which two are Slavic 
states. During the 1990s, two of the direct neighbours, the Baltic States, which are 
non-Slavic, received less attention.  
Hocking draws our attention to the location in a policy environment as one 
of the defining elements for the geography of foreign activities, citing the 
examples of EU and NAFTA. Pskov regional foreign activities were to a large 
extent influenced by the eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO. Therefore, the  
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location in the policy environment of the EU and NATO has shaped the 
subnational foreign activities of the Pskov regional administration.
345 
As was mentioned in the previous section on aims and motivations, 
securing access to structural funds of the European Union is a motivator for 
subnational foreign activities. As we can read in the case study ￿Euroregion vs 
Council for cross-border cooperation￿ of this thesis, EU funds were, indeed, an 
important driving force for regional foreign activities. In order to gain access to 
the EU funds available for cross-border cooperation, the regional administration 
began to take interest in the Baltic neighbours, especially in the local municipal 
and local rural units in the border area. 
Officials from the regional administration were participating in numerous 
international seminars and conferences on cross-border cooperation in both Pskov 
and abroad. The so-called conference diplomacy was conducted by vice-
governors, head of department for external economic links and head of 
department of foreign links and tourism; considerable bureaucratic resources were 
available for the conduct of foreign activities. This is no longer the case after the 
overhaul of the regional administration by the new Governor Kuznetsov, 
however. 
 
 
Structures and Resources 
The availability of financial and bureaucratic resources is the main 
limitation to subnational foreign activities. In the case of Pskov regional 
administration, measuring these inputs was complicated by the fact that the 
                                                 
345 Governor Mikhailov￿s remarks that Pskov Airborne Division could take Tallinn in 48 hours are an 
example for the attitude of the regional administration.  
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regional budget did not clearly indicate this sum. The amount of financial 
resources in the regional budget allocated for subnational foreign activities was 
hidden behind articles such as ￿other expenses￿, etc. Moreover, persons dealing 
with foreign activities were not easy to identify because of the diversity of ￿ 
partly over-lapping - structures dealing with foreign issues.  
As far as the financial resources available for the conduct of regional 
foreign activities are concerned, it was not possible to identify the exact amount 
of money allocated in the budget of the regional administration. Officially, there 
was no article for expenses on subnational foreign activities in the regional 
budget. Such costs were covered from the article ￿other expenses￿ and therefore, 
the officials dealing with foreign issues in the administration could not name the 
exact figure. However, in the year 2000 1 million roubles (ca 40.000 USD) was 
allocated for attracting foreign tourists.
346  
The bureaucratic resources of the regional administration for the conduct 
of foreign activities included several institutions. The following institutions dealt 
with foreign issues: the Governor, one Vice-governor, Department for External 
Links and Tourism and Department for External Economic Links. Altogether, in 
those departments 6-7 persons were employed.
347 T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t o t a l ,  u p  t o  9  
officials dealt directly with foreign issues in the oblast￿ administration in the 
1990s and early this century.  
Other resources of the regional administration in terms of foreign activities 
include its ability to assist federal government in foreign policy issues. Hocking 
argues that, often, subnational units are able to provide assistance to the federal 
                                                 
346 Interview No 2VL with Mr Vadim  Laptev, Head of Committee, Committee of Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Administration of the Oblast￿ Pskov, conducted 29 June 2001, in his office. 
347  Interview No 2VL with Mr Vadim  Laptev.  
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government with expertise in specific policy areas. Pskov regional administration 
could assist the central government in Moscow in issues of cross-border 
cooperation. Governor Michailov accompanied President Putin on some of his 
foreign visits. 
 
 
Levels of Participation 
The levels of participation of the regional administration in foreign 
activities were limited to bilateral partnerships. It preferred bilateral relations to 
participation in international or transnational organisations. Additionally, the 
regional administration was operating in informal networks and was engaged in 
￿conference diplomacy￿. 
Pskov region was a member in one international organisation in the 1990s. 
This was a transgovernmental organisation, namely the Organisation of Baltic Sea 
States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC). Beside Pskov oblast￿, this organisation 
included 4 other north-western Russian regions, St Petersburg, Kaliningrad, 
Leningrad and Novgorod oblasts.
348 
As far as potential partners were concerned, Pskov region did not focus on 
partners with equal status, i.e. subnational regional units, only.  The regional 
administration, represented by the Governor, officially met ministers of national 
governments or even the president in neighbouring countries on several 
occasions.
349 Moreover, some agreements of the regional administration with 
                                                 
348 An overview of the history, structure and activities of the BSSSC can be found in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
349 For example, on 17 Oct 2000 Governor Mikhailov was received by the President of the Republic of 
Belarus Alexander Lukashenka. The topic of discussion was boosting mutually advantageous  
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foreign partners had a national government as the other party (cooperation 
agreement with the Republic of Belarus). 
Conference diplomacy as an instrument of subnational foreign activities 
was widely used by the regional administration. Participating in international 
conferences enabled the officials of the regional administration not only to 
promote the region as an investment opportunity but also to counterbalance the 
negative publicity the region had received in the international media after the 
LDPR￿s victory in 1996 governor elections. Especially vice-governors and heads 
of departments for external and external economic links were actively 
participating in conferences and seminars with foreign participants both in Russia 
and abroad. 
 
 
Strategies 
Hocking argues that there can be two types of strategies for subnational 
foreign activities. Firstly, a mediating strategy, which supports the foreign policy 
line of the federal government. Secondly, the so-called primary strategy, refers to 
the direct involvement of a subnational unit abroad, i.e. establishing 
representative offices, signing bilateral cooperation agreements, etc. 
In his view, subnational regional units located on the political periphery 
were more likely to seek a direct presence abroad, since they do not perceive the 
foreign policy of the central government as representing their interests. 
Paradoxically, those units happened to have the least resources for being able to 
                                                                                                                                           
cooperation on the basis of the recently signed agreement between the parties. (Pskov Region News, 17 
Oct 2000, www.pskov.ru/region/171000.html, accessed 18 Oct 2000).  
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follow primary strategies, which is more resource-consuming than the mediating 
strategy.
350  
In the case of Pskov, which is a region on the periphery of the Russian 
federation, the opposite seems to be the case. The regional administration was not 
only supporting official foreign policy but was even in some cases more 
conservative and reactionary than the central government. Clear preference for 
Belarus as the main foreign partner, visit of Governor Mikhailov to Kosovo to see 
Pskov troops located there were supportive of the foreign policy line of the 
federal government in the 1990s.
351 
There was no official strategy for the subnational foreign activities of the 
region in the 1990s. The need for a strategy was being discussed in April 2003.
352  
As of spring 2006, the strategy had not been approved, however. Neither was a 
draft of the strategy available. In an interview, Vadim Laptev, head of the 
department for external links and tourism of the regional administration pointed 
out that cooperation took place on case-by-case basis. With every partner, specific 
goals were followed. As changes in federal legislation obliged members of 
federation to go through a complicated registration procedure for cooperation 
agreements with foreign partners, regional administration began to prefer 
participation in concrete aid projects without a legally binding document between 
the parties. 
                                                 
350 Hocking (1999): Hocking, Brian. ￿Patrolling the ￿Frontier￿: Globalization, Localization and the 
￿Actorness￿ of Non-Central Governments,￿ in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.). 
Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999, p. 30. 
351 Pskov Regional Administration￿s press-release at www.win.pskov.ru/events/kosovo/, accessed 18 
Oct 1999. 
352 Speech by Dmitri Shachov on a seminar orgaised by the Lake Peipus Project, a Pskov-based NGO, 
5 April 2003 in Pskov.  
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For the promotion of external economic links, a law on attracting foreign 
investments to regional economy of Pskov was adopted by the Pskov Oblast￿ 
Duma on 31 January 1996. This law was replaced by a new version on 19 March 
1998. This law foresaw several guarantees for investors by the head of the 
regional administration and by heads of local municipal/municipal units of 
government. Article 10 of the law addresses a sensitive issue: abuse of power and 
other illegal actions taken by state authorities/officials. Investors are promised full 
compensation for losses incurred due to such actions. Further in the law, tax 
incentives were made available and the creation of free economic zones was 
allowed.
 353 
In general, the information obtained from interviews with regional and 
federal officials located in Pskov leads to the conclusion that in the 1990s the 
main strategy of the regional administration in terms of foreign activities was to 
boost cooperation with politically close partners abroad. Economic considerations 
did not dominate the agenda. This pattern began to alter in the beginning of the 
current decade when new members entered the team of governor Mikhailov, such 
as vice-governors Vladimir Blank and Dmitri Shahhov.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
353 ￿Zakon o privlecenii investitsii￿, {Law on Attracting Investments}, 
www.win.pskov.ru/money/invest/invest_en.html, accessed 18 Oct 1999.  
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6.2. Analysis of Local Municipal Foreign Activities  
Applying the concept of measuring the international actorness in the case 
of the administration of the City of Pskov is more accurate than in the case of the 
regional administration. The information on municipal foreign activities is better 
systemized and access to it is less restricted. Especially, detailed information on 
financial aspects of foreign activities provides important insights. 
 
 
Aims and Motivations 
The central aim of foreign activities of the City of Pskov was improving 
living standardss in the city, especially by assisting projects designed for the less-
protected members of the society, i.e. socio-economic type of contacts 
dominated.
354 Orphans and disabled persons received special attention; 
humanitarian aid was one of the key issues in foreign activities. Student, pupil and 
youth exchanges with foreign partners were organised by the city administration. 
Youths from foreign cities came to the city to work voluntarily on the 
construction of churches etc. In return, youths from the City of Pskov assisted 
similar projects abroad. 
                                                 
354 Interview No 1TR with Ms Rumyantseva.  
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The city administration measured its success in the field of subnational 
foreign activities in monetary terms. As one can read in the report for the year 
1998, the city had received from foreign partners 40.420 DEM, 40.258 USD, 520 
FIM, 12.914 RUB; 8 trucks with humanitarian aid (total value: 34.957 DEM), 1 
container (value: 7060 RUB)￿.
355 In 2000, the financial gains had increased even 
further. The total monetary value of income from foreign activities had increased 
to nearly 12 million roubles, whereas ca 90% of aid originated from Germany.
356 
 
 
Extent and Direction of Involvement 
The City of Pskov was acting globally, in the geographic sense. Sister-
towns of the City of Pskov were located on several continents. The intensity of 
contacts depended on the geographic distance to the partners and their ability to 
finance the cooperation, however. 
As it was mentioned in the section 4.3.1 of this thesis, there was a major 
change in the direction of local municipal foreign activities after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The City of Pskov, which was able to develop contacts with foreign 
partners in Soviet times already ￿ in contrast to the regional administration -, 
began favouring Western partners at the expense of towns from the former Soviet 
bloc.  
In the 1990s, the administration of the City of Pskov had partners in such 
distant countries as the United States of America (Massachusetts and Roanoke, 
                                                 
355 Otchet (1998): ￿Iz otcheta Mera g. Pskova za 1998 g: Sotrudnichestvo s gorodami partnyorami 
Pskova￿. A copy of the report obtained from Head of Department, Department for Foreign Links and 
Tourism, Pskov City Administration. 
356 Otchet (2000): ￿Otchet otdela zarubezhnykh svyazei za 2000 g {From the Report of the Foreign 
Links Department}￿. A copy of the text obtained from Head of Department, Department for Foreign 
Links and Tourism, Pskov City Administration. 
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Virginia) and in the People￿s Republic of China. Contacts with geographically 
distant partners were much less intense than with European partners, however. 
This can partly be explained by high travelling costs. 
The direction of foreign activities was clearly western, both in political 
and geographical sense. Contacts with West European partners were the most 
rewarding financially. Since the City of Pskov administration measured its 
success in the field of foreign activities in financial terms mainly it can be argued 
that Western European partners were the preferred ones. 
 
 
Structures and Resources 
The information on the financial aspects of subnational foreign activities 
was more accurate than in the case of the oblast￿ administration. The city 
administration not only counted every rouble spent on foreign activities, but 
also gave an estimate of how much the city had gained financially from foreign 
activities.  
In 2000, for example, the administration spent 250.000 roubles (nearly 
10.000 USD) on foreign activities. The direct financial return, however, was 
much higher, 12 million roubles.
357  
As far as human resources were concerned, there were 6 persons dealing 
with foreign issues in the city administration in the 1990s. There was a 
Department for Foreign Links and a Department for Foreign Economic Links, 
both employing two persons. Moreover, the mayor and one of his deputies were 
in charge of foreign relations.  
                                                 
357 Otchet (2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
257
  
 
Levels of Participation 
The city did not participate in international organisations for local 
municipal units, except for one organisation, the Sister Cities International.
358 It 
preferred bilateral or multilateral forms of cooperation. Those cooperation forms 
included the possibility of the inclusion of regional units, such as Pskov regional 
administration or local rural administrations. 
The bilateral form of cooperation was based on equal partnership, i.e. 
foreign counterpart was a local municipal unit, not a regional unit. Some of those 
bilateral relationships had already been established in the 1960s, i.e. in Soviet 
times, which was the main difference to the pattern of foreign activities of the 
Pskov regional administration. 
The proposal made by the Pskov regional administration to establish a 
euroregion envisaged the inclusion of the City of Pskov. A case study on the birth 
of a euroregion between Pskov, Estonia and Latvia (Chapter 5 of this thesis) 
explains the reasons why this project failed, however. 
 
 
Strategies 
Pskov city administration had no officially approved strategy for foreign 
activities in the period 1991-2000. According to city officials, with every partner, 
plans were discussed for the following year individually.
359 Those discussions 
                                                 
358 For more information on Sister Cities International visit http://www.sister-
cities.org/sci/aboutsci/faqs#faq1. 
359 Interview No 1TR with Ms Rumyantseva.  
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took place on a regular basis annually. Financial aspects were the main factor 
deciding the extent and intensity of contacts with any particular partner. 
Individual plans for bilateral relations were worked out in a dialogue with 
the particular partner annually for the following year. The intensity of relations 
with geographically distant partners was lower given the higher travelling costs.  
The main strategic aim seems to have been increasing the financial 
benefits from subnational foreign activities. For this purpose, partners willing to 
cover the travelling costs of participants from the City of Pskov were preferred. 
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6.3. Analysis of Local Rural Foreign Activities  
Border-located local rural units in Pskov region were not engaged in 
regular foreign activities in Soviet times. In this respect they were unfamiliar - 
similarly to the regional administration - to the subnational foreign activities. The 
start of local rural foreign activities in the Pskov region coincided with severe 
economic hardship in the entire country, which affected local rural units too.  
The end of the Soviet Union exposed the now border-located local rural 
units of the Pskov region to the outside world. In Soviet times, when Estonia, 
Latvia and Byelorussia were still Soviet republics, the situation was quite 
different. 
It is not possible to measure the international actorness of local units 
nearly as accurately as in the case of regional or municipal units, since the 
availability of data is poor. In fact, Hocking does not foresee the option of using 
his concept for measuring the international actorness of local rural units. He 
focuses on regional units and, in some cases, on large cities. Despite this, I am 
going to go beyond those limitations and apply the concept of international 
actorness in the case of local rural units too. 
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Aims and Motivations 
The main aim of foreign activities of local units in the Pskov region was 
easing the impact of the newly erected state border on the local economy.
360 A 
physical border between the local units of the oblast￿ on the one side and the 
respective units in the neighbouring former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia 
and Belarus caused not only economic problems. What was more, the state border 
separated communities that used to live in a single state in Soviet times. Enabling 
local residents to cross the border more easily in order to visit relatives etc was 
another aim. 
On the other side of the border, in the Baltic States, living standardss rose 
quickly. Cross-border cooperation with Estonian and Latvian counterparts was 
seen as a means of attracting foreign capital and know-how, i.e. developing socio-
economic contacts and foreign trade/business links. Several local rural units were 
keen to attract foreign investors in the framework of cross-border cooperation. 
Moreover, access to EU structural funds, as indicated by Hocking, was not to 
underestimated 
  
 
Extent and Direction of Involvement 
The main direction of foreign activities of border-located local units was 
neighbouring countries, Estonia, Latvia and Belarus. However, contacts were 
developed with trans-border partners such as Swedish and Danish local units, too. 
Moreover, there were trans-governmental cooperation schemes with foreign 
partners. 
                                                 
360 Study by EVI.  
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The extent of involvement was modest compared with the regional or 
local municipal units, given the limited financial and personal resources of the 
local rural units.  Nevertheless, from the Pskov oblast￿, only the local rural units 
were participating in the Council for cooperation of border regions, a trans-
governmental organisation. The newly established euroregion continues this 
tradition. 
 
 
Structures and Resources 
Scarce information was available on the financial aspects of subnational 
foreign activities of subnational local rural units. As far as human resources are 
concerned, in the rayons the head of administration dealt with foreign issues, i.e. 
one person was in charge. 
The financial aspects of foreign activities were less clear. Participation in 
the Cooperation council for border regions cost 1000 EUR per participant 
annually. The new euroregion proposed by the Pskov regional administration 
would have demanded 0.2 per cent of the budget of each participant. 
 
 
Levels of Participation 
The Council for Cooperation of Border Regions of the Republic of Latvia, 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia was the main body for 
coordinating the subnational foreign activities of local units.  
Additionally, subnational local rural units were engaged in multilateral 
cooperation schemes with foreign partners. For example, in 1998, a cooperation  
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protocol was signed between the district Nordborg of Denmark, Pechory district 
of Pskov oblast￿ and the Pskov regional administration￿s social security 
department. 
 
 
Strategies 
In the 1990s, an outline strategy for subnational foreign activities of the 
local rural units in the Pskov region emerged. However, after studying official 
documents and interviewing the relevant persons, the elements of a strategy can 
be identified.
361 
The main priority was to promote cross-border cooperation, a fact 
illustrated by the existence of the Council. However, the mere existence of the 
council did not provide for a boost for cross-border cooperation with 
neighbouring local rural units. The overall level of cross-border activities was 
low. 
Nevertheless, in the framework of a Tacis programme, all local rural units 
of the Pskov oblast￿ were invited to outline their ￿strategic development plans￿. 
Those development plans included foreign components, such as attracting foreign 
investments or using foreign expertise. All border-located local rural units 
indicated attracting foreign investors as one of their main priorities.
362 
For example, Gdov district saw foreign markets as the main destination for 
its production, especially fish products and timber. Moreover, the district 
                                                 
361 From a letter sent by Dmitri Novoshinski, the Russian CEO of the CCBR  to Dr Detlev Kraa, long-
term expert of the Tacis Programme. A copy was obtained by the author from Dr Kraa in Pskov in 
2000. 
362 Kontseptsii Strategicheskovo Rasvitiia Munitsipalnykh Obrazovanii na Primere Pskovskoi Oblast￿i. 
Sbornik Materialov. Moscow: Tacis, 2001.  
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administration was hopeful that foreign investments would finance the 
reconstruction of tourist facilities in the area. Another district, Pechory, hired 
foreign experts to work out a strategic plan for attracting tourists from abroad. 
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Summary: a Pskov-made Foreign Policy? 
The purpose of this thesis is not to compare different actors in the Pskov 
oblast￿ in terms of their international actorness. The aim is to describe and analyse 
those actors and their subnational foreign activities in order to examine the 
usability of existing theories on subnational foreign activities, among them the 
concept of measuring international actorness developed by Hocking in the case 
of Pskov regional, municipal and local foreign activities. Moreover, in the 
conclusion suggestions will be made as to how this concept could be modified for 
a more accurate evaluation of the subnational foreign activities units, with a 
special emphasis on Russian subnational units. 
For a comparative approach, further research is necessary on other 
Russian regions￿ subnational foreign activities. Future researchers on other 
subnational governmental units￿ subnational foreign activities are welcome to use 
data from this thesis.  
Several conclusions can be drawn based on the findings of this thesis. First 
of all, just as Russia speaks with many voices abroad so does Pskov as a 
subnational unit. Both subnational levels of government, regional and local, have, 
indeed, different aims and motivations for their foreign activities. Moreover, on 
the local level of government, municipal and rural units differ to a great extent in 
terms of their foreign activities. 
What makes the case of Pskov peculiar in the worldwide context? 
Previous research on subnational foreign activities has focussed on North  
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America and Western Europe mainly, i.e. on states with a relatively long tradition 
of democracy and federalism. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, where the 
members of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic were not allowed to 
interact with the outside world directly. The central government was in control of 
all foreign contacts of the subnational units. In the case of Pskov we can examine 
how a subnational unit with its totalitarian background manages its foreign 
contacts on two levels of government, i.e. regional and municipal/rural. 
Was there a ￿foreign policy￿ of the Pskov region? Did the regional 
administration seek to coordinate its foreign activities with those on lower level of 
government? Was there a ￿regional foreign policy￿ that would have facilitated the 
interests of all Pskov￿ subnational units engaged in foreign activities? 
The main finding of this thesis is that in the Pskov oblast￿, three groups of 
subnational government, i.e. regional, local municipal and local rural, have 
chosen a different approach in terms of their foreign activities. Below those 
approaches will be analysed. Moreover, the reasons why a particular approach 
was chosen will be enlisted.  
There was no official strategy of the regional administration for the 
conduct of foreign activities. Moreover, the regional administration was not in a 
position to coordinate or direct the foreign activities of local government, i.e. 
local municipal or local rural local levels. The attempt to establish a euroregion 
failed spectacularly. Therefore, we cannot speak of a ￿foreign policy￿ of the Pskov 
oblast￿ as a whole. The foreign activities of all subnational units in Pskov oblast￿ 
were not only fragmented but had different aims and motivations. 
Let us first examine the regional level of government. In general, it could 
be argued that the foreign activities of Pskov oblast￿ were driven by political  
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rather than economic considerations during the period this thesis is dealing with, 
the 1990s. From the economic point of view it would have made more sense to 
associate with wealthier and modern Western economies in order to attract 
foreign know-how and investment to the ailing regional economy. The regional 
administration, however, chose Belarus, an economically backward and 
politically isolated country, as its prime target.  
If Pskov had chosen the other option of working closely with its Baltic 
neighbours and Scandinavia, for example, would this have improved the socio-
economic situation in the oblast￿ at all?  In my view, given the overall poor state 
of Baltic-Russian relations, such an approach would not have had a strong 
positive impact. 
Governor Mikhailov, who came to power in 1996, used the ￿weapon￿ of 
foreign policy in order to keep the population busy with ￿external enemies￿. 
Highlighting issues such as the discrimination against Russian-speaking 
minorities in the neighbouring Baltic States, Western aggression in Kosovo, and 
the expansion of Western organisations like NATO and EU has probably helped 
the governor to divert the attention of the people from the rapidly deteriorating 
socio-economic situation in Pskov itself. 
The subnational foreign activities of the Pskov regional administration in 
the 1990s were not aimed at weakening the central authorities￿ control in the 
region. The subnational foreign activities of the regional administration were 
clearly a case of paradiplomacy. Protodiplomacy, i.e. secessionist tendencies, was 
absent. Pskov region was not only a loyal federal subject but a strong supporter of 
the foreign policy line too.  
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I would call the foreign activities of the Pskov oblast￿ administration in the 
1990s a ￿policy of overreaction￿. Pskov has not only eagerly supported foreign 
policy decisions coming from the central government. In fact, the regional 
administration was opposing NATO enlargement and favouring cooperation with 
Belarus in a way that rivalled even the hardliners in Moscow.  
The main local municipal unit in the Pskov oblast￿, the City of Pskov, had 
a different agenda for its foreign activities than the regional administration. The 
city administration was more interested in financial gain than political profit when 
engaging in subnational foreign activities. The municipal authorities undertook a 
fundamental overhaul of their foreign activities in the early 1990s. They focussed 
on Western partners now, instead of their old Soviet-time partners. In the 
assessments of the success of subnational foreign activities, the object of 
measurement in the case of city administration was the aid received from foreign 
partners.  
There were several reasons why the local municipal unit under 
consideration was more active in developing foreign contacts than the regional 
administration or local rural units. First of all, the foreign contacts of municipal 
units in the oblast￿ had already begun to develop in Soviet times, when the oblast￿ 
was effectively barred from foreign activities. Although most of the partners from 
Soviet times lost their significance during the 1990s, the city administration was 
more experienced when dealing with foreign partners than other subnational units.  
The city of Pskov had already been allowed to establish foreign links in 
Soviet times. Although it happened in accordance with strict guidelines from 
Moscow, some of these links were sustainable and still exist. Consequently, the  
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city administration was in a much better position after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union when the issue of subnational foreign activities emerged.   
In contrast to the Belarusian orientation of the regional administration, the 
city chose a Western direction. The local municipal unit focussed on partners with 
ability and willingness first to finance the cooperation scheme with the City of 
Pskov, and, second, to provide humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of the city. As 
the cities and towns in the former Communist bloc were facing financial hardship, 
Western partners were the obvious alternative.  
Border-located local rural units, for their part, with their limited resources 
and specific border-related interests, focussed their foreign activities on their 
counterparts, i.e. local rural units, across the border. The main focus was on local 
authorities of Latvia and Estonia. The Council for Cooperation of Border Regions 
of the Republic of Latvia, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia was 
the main body for the conduct of local foreign activities. The Council that was 
formed between the local units of Pskov region, Estonia and Latvia failed to offer 
solutions to problems facing its founders, however.  
In my view, the eastern enlargement of the European Union will further 
strengthen the Baltic orientation of the local rural units, since more funds will 
become available for cross-border cooperation.  
The subnational dimension of foreign activities makes the international 
system more complex. As it would be misleading to think of states as having a 
single voice abroad, in the case of subnational units, the diversity of interests is 
ever-present too. As I have discovered in the case of subnational units in the 
oblast￿ Pskov of the Russian Federation, three dimensions of subnational foreign  
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activities co-exist. There is no single ￿foreign policy￿ of the Pskov oblast￿. In fact, 
there are three of them. 
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Pskov, Regions and Foreign Policy in Retrospect 
From the academic￿s perspective, the topic of subnational foreign 
activities remains an ambiguous one. The role of subnational foreign activities in 
the international system has not been clearly defined. This task has been delegated 
to federations, which will have to use the constitution for that purpose. On the 
other hand, hopefully, academic studies of the phenomenon of subnational foreign 
activities can contribute towards finding the appropriate place for those activities 
in international and centre-periphery relations. 
The case of subnational foreign activities in Russia should be especially 
intriguing for academic researchers, since this large and diverse state has 
experienced a turbulent period in terms of centre-periphery relations. Unlike the 
United States or Germany, Russia is in the middle of the process of finding right 
balance in centre-periphery relations. Subnational foreign activities are an 
important aspect of these relations, and, therefore, a potential source of conflict. 
In the conclusion, some predictions will be made on the future of subnational 
foreign activities in Russia in general and in Pskov in particular. 
The theoretical framework for explaining subnational foreign activities 
needs further development. Moreover, the amount of empirical evidence of these 
activities is clearly insufficient. Here, in the concluding part of the thesis, some 
suggestions will be made, how the existing theories and concepts could be  
 
 
 
 
 
271
modified and combined in order to improve the ￿tool-box￿ for the study of 
subnational foreign activities. 
 
 
Global Aspects of Subnational Foreign Activities 
As the examples of the United States and Germany in Chapter 1 have 
demonstrated, federations with long democratic traditions are relatively tolerant 
towards subnational foreign activities. It is because the rules for conduct of 
subnational foreign activities are defined in a way that is accepted by both the 
federal centre and the members of federation. The absence of clear definitions can 
lead to different and partly conflicting interpretations by federal centre and 
members of federation of the nature of subnational foreign activities, as the case 
of Russia in the 1990-s illustrates. 
Federations will continue their search for the optimal form of facilitating 
subnational foreign activities. Those activities are an important aspect of centre-
periphery relations and, therefore, must be seen in the wider context of the 
ongoing introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in many federations. Ignoring 
foreign policy and foreign economic interests of subnational units by federal 
centre can lead to the emergence of secessionist tendencies, i.e. protodiplomatic 
activities. Granting subnational units more rights in terms of foreign activities can 
be both dangerous and rewarding to a federal system, however.  
Let us first consider potential benefits of subnational foreign activities for 
the international system in general and for a federal system in particular. From the 
viewpoint of stability of the international system, subnational foreign activities 
could be a useful tool in many aspects. Most importantly, subnational actors add  
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diversity to the international system; tensions between states can be reduced using 
subnational actors such as regions or cities as mediators.  
For a federation, subnational foreign activities can bring both political and 
economic benefits. In a federal system, allowing for subnational foreign activities 
can boost the socio-economic development of its members. Furthermore, federal 
centre can use the distribution of rights for the conduct foreign activities as an 
individual bonus for preferred members of federation. Federal ministries, such as 
the ministry of foreign affairs, can use members of federation for communicating 
with their foreign counterparts indirectly. 
In an era of globalisation, for a subnational unit, engaging in foreign 
activities can be considered vital. First of all, increasing foreign investments and 
transfer of know-how are the main priorities of subnational actors when engaging 
in foreign activities. By engaging in foreign activities, subnational units can 
develop a clear profile for potential investors from abroad. Secondly, intense and 
profitable foreign partnerships can strengthen subnational unit￿s position vis-￿-vis 
federal centre.  
Let us now consider the dangers linked to the conduct of subnational 
foreign activities. There are several aspects that make subnational foreign 
activities a liability to international system and federal systems. Firstly, by 
undermining the monopoly of the federal centre in international affairs 
(￿multitude of voices￿), subnational foreign activities can damage the ability of the 
federal centre to act in the international arena. Allowing for subnational foreign 
activities can reduce tensions between states, on the one hand. But, as the number 
of actors in the international system grows, so does the potential for conflict 
between actors.   
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Secondly, subnational foreign activities can lead to disintegration of a 
federal system; suspicion of federal centre towards such activities can be 
understood As far as federal systems are concerned, those activities can endanger 
the territorial integrity by assisting secessionist tendencies. Last but not least, the 
existing ambiguity that surrounds legal aspects of subnational foreign activities 
makes foreign interference by outsiders in the internal affairs of a federation 
easier. In other words, if the rules for subnational foreign activities are not clearly 
defined, subnational actors can be manipulated by foreign actors in order to create 
an internal opposition to the positions of the federal centre in international affairs. 
Thirdly, risks for subnational actors lie in underestimating the resources, 
financial and human, needed for the conduct of foreign activities. Developing 
sustainable partnerships is time-consuming; the rewards from those partnerships 
are, however, not always tangible. The costs for foreign partnerships should be 
defendable in the eyes of taxpayers, i.e. voters.  
 
 
Russian Subnational Foreign Activities 
In the case of Russia the issue of subnational foreign activities should be 
examined within the context of ongoing power struggle between the federal centre 
and 88 federal subjects. The right to interact with outside world without specific 
permission from Moscow was an attractive option for regional leaders. Political 
leadership of the federation under Putin realised quickly that loosely controlled 
subnational foreign activities can be dangerous to the interests of Russia as a 
whole, however.  
 
 
 
 
 
274
The potential dangers of subnational foreign activities to the Russian 
federal system include its disintegration, when paradipolmatic activities transform 
into protodiplomatic activities. Moreover, allowing for ￿regional foreign policies￿ 
to emerge can weaken the position of Moscow in the international system.  
It is not just the federal centre in Moscow that should be concerned about 
the uncontrolled emergence of subnational foreign activities, however. In my 
view, allocating excessive financial and human resources to foreign activities can 
weaken the respective subnational administration financially, if the benefits from 
these activities are not adequate. 
President Putin has introduced large-scale reforms to curb powers of 
regional political leaders, among them an overhaul of the rules for the conduct of 
subnational foreign activities. Procedures to strengthen federal control of these 
activities were introduced by the government of Mr Kasyanov. The State Duma 
has by now adopted several laws to regulate subnational foreign activities. 
The right to engage in subnational foreign activities is one aspect of 
centre-periphery relations. In the light of changes imposed by the federal 
government, the regional leadership has in some cases altered its attitude towards 
foreign activities. As will be discussed below, Pskov regional administration has 
undertaken a radical reduction of its foreign activities￿ capabilities in the wake of 
respective federal reforms. 
Russian local municipal and rural units have by large eclipsed the recent 
strengthening of federal control over subnational foreign activities, however. In 
contrast to regional units, local municipal and rural units lack the political 
dimension in their foreign activities. As their main interests abroad lie in socio-
economic and cultural cooperation, these activities do not attract the attention of  
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the federal centre. Therefore, Russian rayons and towns can continue engaging in 
foreign activities as usual, i.e. as in the 1990s. 
 
 
Pskov￿ Experience 
The introduction of strict federal regulations for the conduct of subnational 
foreign activities has enabled the regional administration to become a pioneer of 
implementing the federal guidelines on the grass-root level.  
 
 
Picture No 9 Before Pskov was incorporated by the Russian centralist 
state, foreign affairs were decided here, in the Pskov Kremlin. 
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For Pskov regional administration, changes in federal legislation and a 
new regional leadership under Governor Kuznetsov have brought about an 
opportunity to reassess administrative structures dealing with foreign issues. Both 
the structure and personnel of the regional administration were subjected to a 
critical review. After the new governor was elected in 2005, an overhaul of the 
regional administration was launched. One of the outcomes of this overhaul, 
which was completed in 2006, was the abolishing of the structures dealing with 
subnational foreign activities, with the exception of structures engaged in 
subnational foreign economic activities.  
For academic researchers, assessing benefits from subnational foreign 
activities for regional, local municipal and rural units for the purpose of research 
is not an easy task, given the scarcity of information. In general, however, it could 
be argued that the City of Pskov, which has the most clear-cut aims in terms of 
foreign activities, has been the most successful subnational foreign actor in Pskov 
oblast￿. The city administration measures its own success in monetary terms and 
is, in that respect, the biggest beneficiary among the three types of actors in Pskov 
oblast￿. 
Pskov regional administration had not defined its goals in terms of foreign 
activities as clearly as the city administration; the only clearly formulated task has 
been attracting foreign investments to the regional economy. In that respect, the 
regional administration gained less from foreign activities, especially compared to 
neighbouring regions such as Leningrad and Novgorod. 
The results of subnational foreign activities of Pskov local rural units in 
border areas units are mixed. The aim of assisting foreign activities in the form of 
cross-border cooperation has been achieved partly. On the one hand, Pskov rural  
 
 
 
 
 
277
units have succeeded in establishing the most advanced structure for the conduct 
of cross-border activities, a euroregion. On the other, they have failed to fill this 
structure with life. A crucial test for the sustainability of Pskov local rural foreign 
activities will be transforming the euroregion that currently exists on paper only 
into an organisation capable of solving local problems in close cooperation with 
foreign partners. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Are the Existing Theories Sufficient? 
One of the conclusions of this thesis is that existing theories on 
subnational foreign activities need further development in order to produce usable 
output. Generally, the existing theories do not enable us to explain the 
phenomenon of subnational foreign activities but only to describe it. 
International theorists warn that in the current situation, where new actors 
other state enter the international system, old theories to explain international 
relations may no longer be valid. Because of the rapid increase in the number of 
actors and their growing diversity the existing international theories need an 
urgent update.
363 
Subnational foreign activities are a relatively new phenomenon in 
international affairs; therefore, the theoretical framework for explaining them is 
far from complete. The strengths and flaws of existing concepts and theories for 
explaining these activities will be discussed below. Furthermore, suggestions will 
be made on how the existing theoretical framework could be modified for more 
                                                 
363 Dougherty/ Platzgraff (2001): Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Platzgraff, Jr. Contending 
Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Study. New York: Longman, 2001, p. xiii. 
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accurate analysis of subnational foreign activities, with special emphasis on 
Russia. 
The most comprehensive attempt to explain subnational foreign activities 
has been made by Brian Hocking. He has proposed a set of entries for describing 
subnational foreign activities. In the case of Russia, the validity of his theory can 
be questioned in several aspects, however. This thesis will propose some 
extensions to the available body of theories on subnational foreign activities, 
based on research of subnational foreign activities in Pskov oblast￿.  
 
 
Hocking￿s Theory of International Actorness 
In general, in my opinion, Hocking￿s concept of measuring the 
international actorness of a particular subnational unit is only useable in a 
comparative analysis of similar actors, i.e. actors with similar status in a 
federation. The Russian federation consists of several types of members, which 
have different status. 
Moreover, Hocking￿s theory does not provide for keys for explaining and 
evaluating foreign activities of a subnational unit. It is a good basis for collecting 
and categorising data about subnational foreign activities, however. Further 
below, alterations to Hocking￿s theory will be proposed. 
 
 
Feldman & Feldman￿s Comparative Approach 
Comparison is the basic tool for any social scientist. Drawing the right 
conclusion from comparison is the key, however. Unfortunately, Feldman &  
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Feldman do not offer any keys on how to assess and evaluate the information 
gathered using the comparative approach. 
For example, does the fact that a regional unit has signed more agreements 
with foreign counterparts than a local municipal unit make the regional unit a 
more influential international actor automatically? Many questions remain 
unanswered using Feldman & Feldman￿s method of comparison. Nevertheless, it 
is an important tool for gathering information on subnational foreign activities. 
 
 
A Toolbox for Future Researchers 
As far as the tools for evaluating the data gathered using the modified 
inputs of Hocking￿s theory, I would propose a more extensive use of financial 
information on subnational foreign activities.  
The information obtained on subnational foreign activities in Pskov is not 
sufficient for proposing a complete model for the evaluation of subnational 
foreign activities. Three inputs are relevant for a future model, in my view, 
however. First, the percentage of the unit￿s budget allocated for foreign activities. 
Secondly, the relation of the expenditure on foreign activities to regional GDP 
should be taken into account. Thirdly, financial rewards from foreign activities for 
a subnational unit should be calculated. 
Measuring financial commitments only does not provide for sufficient 
information for assessing the degree of international actorness, however. 
Nevertheless, it is the key element for any model for assessing subnational foreign 
activities.  
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Future research on subnational foreign activities should focus on models 
for measuring and comparing international actorness of subnational units. Ideally, 
those models should be applicable universally, i.e. in all subnational 
governmental units in federations. 
Case studies are an invaluable source of information on the practice of 
subnational foreign activities. The two case studies presented in this thesis 
illuminate the difficulties facing subnational actors when dealing with foreign 
issues. 
 
 
Outlook for Subnational Foreign Activities 
The diverse world of subnational foreign activities is likely to continue 
thriving. As the world grows more and more interlinked; the state is no longer the 
sole player in the international system. Finding the right place for subnational 
foreign activities in international relations will not be an uncomplicated process, 
however. 
In the coming years, the overall political climate in Russia will determine 
the state of subnational foreign activities of regions, towns and rayons. Domestic 
factors, such as strengthening of the ￿vertical of power￿ favoured by Putin and his 
team. 
The shifting paradigm in the defence and security field from Cold War 
confrontation between two political blocks to fighting terrorism and securing 
energy supplies for the economies has redefined Russia￿s position in the 
international system.  
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Russia￿s relationship with the West has several dimensions. Most recently, 
fight against terrorism has become the common nominator for Russia and the 
West, especially the United States. Russia has partly succeeded in presenting the 
war in Chechnya as a war with al-Qaeda. The growing imbalances in the energy 
sector favour the oil and gas producers, such as Russia. As the oil and gas from 
the Middle East grows increasingly unpopular with the Western states, vast 
resources in Russia become increasingly attractive. Growing energy dependence 
of Europe on Russian oil and natural gas will limit the room for manoeuvre for 
European politicians when dealing with Russia, however. As we have witnessed 
during the Ukrainian-Russian ￿gas war￿ early 2006, Russia is prepared to use 
energy supplies as a political weapon. Western Europe, on the other hand, is too 
dependant on Russian energy supplies to react adequately to such political 
pressure on its allies. 
The arrival of Ms Angela Merkel in the chancellor￿s office in Berlin may 
bring about changes in European-Russian relations in general and in German-
Russian relations in particular. The decision to construct a new natural gas 
pipeline, which would link Russia and Germany directly, circumventing Ukraine 
and Poland, has triggered a strong reaction from the capitals of states, whose 
interests and historically explained sensitivities have been ignored to a large 
extent. 
The Baltic States have joined both NATO and the European Union in the 
year 2004. The hope that by joining those two organisations Russian-Baltic 
relations would automatically move to a higher next level seems to have been 
unfounded. Given the unresolved border question it is not surprising that in the  
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Pskov Public Library, the record on all entries about the relations with Estonia 
and Latvia can be found in the catalogue ￿border dispute￿.  
 
 
Outlook for Subnational Foreign Activities in Russia 
In Russia in general and in Pskov oblast￿ in particular, the trend towards 
centralisation shows no signs of reversing. In terms of subnational foreign 
activities, the reduction of freedom is highly likely to continue. However, there 
are signs that regions are reacting to the re-centralising tendencies and searching 
for ways to maintain some forms of subnational foreign activities. 
President Putin and the federal centre he represents are, in my opinion, 
highly likely to try and reduce the subnational units to a merely administrative 
status, as it was in Soviet times. New practices such as nomination of the 
governors by the president personally, are another step in this direction. 
In terms of subnational foreign activities, the effects of the re-
centralisation process can be noticed too. Beside ordering the registration in the 
federal Ministry of Justice of all agreements with foreign counterparts,  
 
 
Outlook for Subnational Foreign Activities in Pskov 
Pskov region, a new neighbour of both NATO and EU, will have to live in 
an increasingly paranoid situation. On the one hand, the temptation to seek 
foreign assistance for revitalising its economy will grow as more funds will 
become available for cross-border cooperation. On the other hand, however, the 
general political environment in Russia imposes other priorities.  
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Soon after its arrival in the office, the new administration of President 
Putin made it clear to the regional leaders that the period of uncontrolled 
relationship of regions with their foreign partners must end. However, the federal 
centre realised it was not possible to force the regions to behave like in Soviet 
times in terms of foreign activities, i.e. not having any foreign contacts at all. 
Therefore, a modus operandi acceptable to both the federal centre and regional 
governments had to be found. 
The most likely future scenario for subnational foreign activities in Russia 
in general, and in Pskov in particular, would be, in my view, what Duchacek has 
called co-operative/competitive segmentation, which is a mixture of cooperation 
between the central government authorities and subnational units in some areas of 
foreign activities, and competition or duplication in the others. Russia is no longer 
a totalitarian state that can fully control foreign activities of its subnational units. 
 
 
Regional Unit 
In the coming years both centrifugal and centripetal would forces would 
continue to influence subnational foreign activities in Russia. Nevertheless, the 
predictions of Russia falling apart because of secessionist movements in the 
regions, which were circulating in the 1990s, appear too far-fetched. 
On the regional level, the committee for foreign links and the institution of 
the vice-governor for foreign links were abolished in 2005. Already, back in 
2000, a federal official indicated that the regional administration had given up on 
the illusion of ￿independent foreign policy￿. After a few trips to foreign states, 
governors of different regions of Russia had discovered that they had no real  
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authority by the Constitution to sign treaties with foreign counterparts, be it a 
foreign state or its subnational unit.
364 
As far as the structures dealing with foreign issues are concerned, the 
changes that have taken place in the regional administration since the new 
Governor took power in November 2004 are of symbolic nature. I believe that, 
again, Pskov is a forerunner. In other regions similar changes, i.e. abolishing the 
structures for the conduct of foreign activities, might herald new times in terms of 
foreign activities. 
The new structure of the regional administration introduced in September 
2005, reveals important changes. The position of a vice-governor in charge of 
foreign activities has been abolished. The department for foreign links and 
tourism and foreign economic links have been abolished, too. The only part of the 
foreign activities structure in the regional administration that has survived this 
radical overhaul, is the tourism desk, which is now subordinated to the department 
for economy. 
The overhaul of the regional administration took the Governor nearly 9 
months. The changes in the field of foreign activities are massive. In fact, the 
capability of the regional administration in terms of foreign activities has been 
nearly annihilated.  
The question that remains to be answered is whether those radical changes 
that have taken place in the Pskov regional administration after the arrival of the 
new governor have broader meaning for other Russian regions. The new governor 
was elected as a candidate supported by the Communist Party. However, after the 
                                                 
364 Interview with an official from a federal ministry, conducted 10 May 2000, in Pskov. 
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elections, the governor distanced himself from the Communists (this step is 
similar to the former governor Mikhailov, who broke with the LDPR shortly after 
being elected). 
The fact that the structure for the conduct of foreign activities is no longer 
available is likely to reduce the degree of communication with foreign partners. 
The role that the two departments and the vice-governor responsible for foreign 
relations played was central. Nevertheless, it would be too early to predict the 
￿end of foreign activities￿ and a return to Soviet-style absence of foreign contacts 
on the oblast￿ level. 
As we have seen in the case study of the ship link between Tartu and 
Pskov, foreign economic links were subordinated to political considerations. Will 
the changes in the structure of the regional administration mean that the focus of 
foreign activities will shift from political cooperation to economic cooperation?  
 
 
Local Municipal Units 
Local municipal units in Pskov oblast￿ are in a different position than the 
regional unit. Most importantly, they do not share political motivations that drive 
some of the regional unit￿s foreign activities. Putting the emphasis on 
humanitarian aid, for example, gives local municipal units a different perspective 
in communication with foreign partners. 
Local municipal foreign activities are not regulated by federal legislation. 
Therefore, their agreements with foreign partners do not require the approval of 
federal ministries.   
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The financial benefits from foreign activities will most probably remain 
the main driving force of local municipal foreign activities. The City of Pskov is 
likely to continue its pursuit of humanitarian aid and cultural cooperation. The 
lack of political interests in the field of foreign activities helps to focus on clearly 
defined issues. By focussing on specific projects, such as assistance to the 
handicapped and orphans, the City of Pskov will continue to attract foreign 
partners seeking tangible results. 
Concerning the structures dealing with foreign issues in the city 
administration, no relevant changes can be foreseen. 
 
 
 
Local Rural Units 
The eastern enlargement of the European Union to the Russian border has 
confronted local rural units of the Pskov oblast￿ with new challenges. Having the 
EU as a neighbour brings both advantages and disadvantages. 
The creation of the euroregion Pskov-Livonia has so far not increased 
cross-border activities of Pskov local rural units. It is not clear, what benefits the 
euroregion will bring to the border areas. The potential of the euroregion should 
not be overestimated, since the necessary infrastructure for cross-border 
cooperation is not there. 
Local rural units in the border areas of Pskov oblast￿ are likely to continue 
their manoeuvres between the political pressures from the regional capital and the 
socio-economic necessities on the spot. In other words, as the case study on the 
euroregion has illustrated, the regional political leadership is more than eager to  
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exploit the opportunities offered by cross-border cooperation with EU member 
states and their subnational units. It seems, however, that Pskov local rural units 
do not accept direct interference from the regional unit in cross-border affairs.   
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